What makes the situation unusual is that the SAF is also receiving military assistance from Iran. Meanwhile, its opponent in Sudan’s civil war, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has received support from the United Arab Emirates, one of Saudi Arabia’s closest regional partners.

Looking at these relationships, many people ask the same question: if the SAF receives support from Iran, why is Saudi Arabia still willing to cooperate with it?

The answer lies in the reality on the ground.

The SAF is Sudan’s regular military and controls the country’s entire Red Sea coastline, including Port Sudan, the country’s most important seaport. By contrast, the RSF controls no part of Sudan’s Red Sea coast and therefore has no direct role in Red Sea maritime security.

For Saudi Arabia, protecting Red Sea shipping lanes is the priority. To achieve that objective, Riyadh has little choice but to work with the force that controls Sudan’s coastline. At present, that force is the SAF.

The fact that the SAF receives Iranian military assistance does not mean all of its interests are aligned with Tehran. Sudan remains in the middle of a civil war, and the SAF needs weapons to sustain the fight while also having strong incentives to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on Red Sea security.

If Riyadh refused to work with the SAF simply because Iran also supports it, Saudi Arabia would lose influence over the force controlling Sudan’s coastline. That would not reduce Iran’s influence. Instead, it could give Tehran even greater room to expand it.

This illustrates a broader principle of international politics. States rarely have the luxury of choosing a perfect partner. More often, every available option comes with significant drawbacks. The objective is not to find a flawless ally, but to choose the partner that best advances strategic interests while minimizing risk.

In other words, a partner does not have to be perfect to be worth working with. It only has to be the best available option.

#SaudiArabia #Iran #Sudan #SAF #RSF #RedSea #MiddleEast #Geopolitics

Control Threat | The Political Signals Others Miss

Sudan and Yemen’s internationally recognized government have agreed to strengthen maritime security cooperation in the Red Sea under a Saudi-led coalition protecting the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden from Houthi threats.

What makes this significant is that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which currently represent Sudan’s government, have spent months receiving Iranian weapons and military support during the civil war. Yet Sudan is now joining a Saudi-led security initiative to protect strategic shipping lanes from threats posed by the Houthis, Iran’s closest regional proxy.

This suggests Iran’s influence over its partners is gradually declining. They may still maintain ties with Tehran, but they are increasingly willing to cooperate with Iran’s rivals if they no longer see Tehran as capable of safeguarding their interests.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is no longer focused solely on defending its own territory. Riyadh is steadily building a regional maritime security network across the Red Sea, bringing coastal states together to protect one of the world’s most critical shipping routes. If this trend continues, Saudi Arabia could emerge as the region’s new security coordinator while Iran’s network of influence continues to shrink.

#SaudiArabia #Iran #Sudan #Yemen #RedSea #MiddleEast

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis

Uganda is considering sending troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The decision is far from random.

Uganda has one of Africa’s most experienced militaries in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping. Its forces have operated for years in Somalia, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, giving them valuable experience in complex security environments similar to those they could face in Gaza.

More importantly, Uganda has maintained close defense ties with Israel for decades. The two countries have cooperated extensively in military training and security, while Uganda’s military leadership has repeatedly expressed stronger support for Israel than most African governments.

Politically, Uganda is also a practical choice. Unlike many countries, it is largely free from Arab political influence and is not significantly dependent on Arab states for its security or economy. That gives Kampala greater freedom to cooperate with Israel without facing major political pressure. At the same time, Uganda’s participation helps present the mission as a multinational international force rather than an extension of the Israeli military.

#Israel #Gaza #Uganda #MiddleEast

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis