Burnham was once called the “King of the North,” a nickname he earned during his years as Mayor of Greater Manchester. His image as a northern politician willing to confront Westminster, particularly during disputes with the central government, helped Burnham build an appeal far beyond Manchester and ultimately carried him to 10 Downing Street.

But the skills that helped someone become the “King of the North” are not necessarily the skills required to lead the entire United Kingdom. What has happened around the issue of Scottish independence in September 2026 may be the first sign of that limitation.

If Burnham continues to let his opponents choose the battlefield, continues to react rather than lead, and fails to build a political narrative strong enough to bring England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland together, he may not need to wait for the United Kingdom to break apart. His premiership may end first.

Table of Contents

1. From “King of the North” to British Prime Minister

2. The Remark That Put Burnham on the Defensive

3. How Did the SNP Exploit That Mistake?

4. How Should Burnham Have Responded?

5. The Problem Is Not the Law, but His Ability to Unite

6. Burnham May Always Be Only the “King of the North”

1. From “King of the North” to British Prime Minister

Andy Burnham became British Prime Minister on July 20, 2026, just over a month after returning to the House of Commons. Before that, he spent nine years as Mayor of Greater Manchester and built a distinctive position in British politics.

It was during this period that the media began calling Burnham the “King of the North.” The nickname evokes the famous title from the television series Game of Thrones, but in British politics it reflected Burnham’s image as a powerful representative of northern England standing up to the concentration of power in Westminster.

Burnham strengthened that image in particular when he confronted the central government during the pandemic. He was willing to publicly challenge London, speak for communities that felt neglected by Westminster, and build the image of a leader who stood up for his region.

That was a major political asset while he was in Manchester. But once Burnham entered Downing Street, his position was completely reversed. He was no longer the outsider demanding that the center of power listen. He had become the center of power.

Burnham also simultaneously serves as Minister for the Union, a position directly connected to the responsibility of ensuring that the government serves England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as a whole.

A “King of the North” can build power by representing one region. A British Prime Minister must do something much harder: Convince regions with different identities and interests to accept him as their representative.

And this may be Burnham’s weakness.

2. The Remark That Put Burnham on the Defensive

On September 9, 2026, SNP MP Chris Law challenged Burnham in the House of Commons over Scotland’s right to hold another independence referendum.

Northern Ireland has a legal mechanism that allows a referendum on leaving the United Kingdom and uniting with the Republic of Ireland if it appears likely that a majority of voters would support it. Scotland has no equivalent mechanism.

The question was cleverly framed. Chris Law asked Burnham whether the Scottish people had a similar right to determine their own future and whether the conditions for holding a second independence referendum should be written into law.

Burnham replied that he would adhere to the Good Friday Agreement 100 percent. After discussing the conditions for holding a referendum in Northern Ireland, he made the remark that the SNP immediately seized upon:

“I would say that it is exactly the same situation in Scotland.”

Burnham went on to say that he was not aware of majority public support in Scotland for another referendum and that, until that changed, there would not be another vote.

This answer gave Scotland no additional legal rights. Current law still does not allow the Scottish Parliament to unilaterally hold an independence referendum. Westminster still holds the power to decide.

But Burnham turned a question he could have rejected into a debate over what conditions would allow Scotland to vote.

That was the political mistake.

3. How Did the SNP Exploit That Mistake?

Scotland’s First Minister, John Swinney, did not let the opportunity pass. On September 10, 2026, just one day after Burnham’s remarks, the Scottish First Minister wrote to him and proposed that the two meet to turn the principle Burnham had just articulated into a “legal mechanism” for a referendum.

The SNP’s logic is easy to understand: If the British Prime Minister says Scotland is in “exactly the same situation” as Northern Ireland when public opinion shifts strongly enough, why should Scotland not have a similar legal mechanism?

Burnham then had to emphasize that Scotland and Northern Ireland have different histories and constitutional circumstances, while continuing to reject another independence referendum. But the need to clarify his position exposed the problem with his original answer.

By September 14, 2026, the leaders of the SNP in Scotland, Plaid Cymru in Wales and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland had met in Cardiff and signed a joint memorandum of understanding. They asserted the right to self-determination, called on Westminster to prepare for constitutional change, and declared that each nation would determine its future in its own way and in its own time.

This does not mean that the United Kingdom is about to break apart. Scotland and Wales still cannot unilaterally hold an independence referendum recognized by Westminster. Northern Ireland has its own separate legal framework. Support for separation also differs significantly among the three.

Burnham allowed one of his own answers to become part of the argument his opponents are using to pressure his government. For a prime minister who has been in office for less than two months, that is a more worrying sign than the Scottish referendum issue itself.

4. How Should Burnham Have Responded?

SNP MP Chris Law placed Burnham inside a framework that strongly favored the SNP: When will Scotland be allowed to vote to leave the United Kingdom?

Burnham did not have to accept that framework.

First: Northern Ireland has its own legal framework, and the government will respect it.

Second: Scotland has a different constitutional framework, and the 2014 referendum was held legally.

Third: He should then have immediately shifted to a positive argument: My government will demonstrate that Scotland is stronger, more prosperous and has a greater voice inside the United Kingdom.

That would have allowed Burnham to respect democracy, while giving the SNP no wording it could turn into a new demand, and at the same time place himself in the proper role of a prime minister defending and uniting the Union.

Burnham could then have shifted the focus away from the question of “when Scotland will be allowed to leave” toward the question a prime minister should be able to answer: Why should Scotland continue to stay?

He could have talked about the economic benefits, the common market, security, defense, public finances, infrastructure and international influence that the four nations gain from remaining together within the United Kingdom.

More importantly, he could have said that his government’s job is not to calculate the threshold at which Scotland might want to leave, but to govern the country well enough that Scots do not want to leave. That is the role of a leader capable of uniting a country. Burnham did not do that.

He stepped directly into the SNP’s question, discussed thresholds of public opinion and unintentionally confirmed that a sufficiently large shift in public opinion could change the situation. From there, his opponents only need to continue asking: If such a threshold exists, why not define it in law?

5. The Problem Is Not the Law, but His Ability to Unite

Westminster still holds an overwhelming legal advantage. Scotland cannot unilaterally organize a lawful independence referendum unless Westminster transfers the necessary power. Wales has no unilateral mechanism either.

Burnham therefore did not create a constitutional crisis with a single remark. But a prime minister cannot rely solely on the law to keep a multinational state united.

If London’s final answer to Scotland becomes simply, “You do not have the right to hold a referendum,” separatists will have an argument that is easy to sell to voters: Westminster is using legal power to prevent the Scottish people from deciding their own future.

A better way to counter that argument is to persuade enough Scots that they do not need another referendum. To do that, Burnham must become a prime minister who is seen as capable of representing the entire United Kingdom.

He needs people in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast to feel that the central government is their government too, rather than a power in London that appears only to say “no.” This is a far more difficult test than winning power inside the Labour Party or winning an election.

6. Burnham May Always Be Only the “King of the North”

The nickname “King of the North” was once a compliment. It described an Andy Burnham with a clear political identity, an understanding of his voters, a willingness to confront Westminster and an ability to turn regional discontent into political power. That image helped make him one of the most prominent politicians in Britain and ultimately carried him into Downing Street.

But the office of Prime Minister requires a different kind of power. Burnham can no longer simply stand on one side and demand that Westminster change, because he is now Westminster. He no longer needs only to understand northern England. He must understand how to keep Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England together within the same political structure. Nor can he simply represent those who are dissatisfied with the center of power, because he must now make them trust that center.

The Scottish issue shows that this transition may be harder than Burnham expected. A politician who once succeeded by exploiting the distance between the regions and Westminster must now be the person who closes that very distance. If he cannot do that, the qualities that once carried him to Downing Street may become the limits of his leadership once he is there.

Whether the United Kingdom will break apart is still far too difficult to predict. Whether Scotland will eventually hold another referendum also depends on many political variables in the years ahead. But Burnham’s political career does not need to wait for those questions to be answered.

A prime minister who loses the ability to unite will increasingly have to rely on law, party discipline and the formal powers of office to hold together what should instead be sustained by political support. When opponents repeatedly force him onto the defensive, when different parts of the country increasingly view Westminster as an adversary rather than a common center, and when doubts about his leadership begin to emerge inside the Labour Party itself, the future of his premiership will become a problem before the future of the Union does.

That is the central prediction here: Andy Burnham’s political collapse has begun, not because Scotland is about to become independent, but because he is revealing a dangerous limitation for a British Prime Minister: His ability to win power may be greater than his ability to unite once he has won it.

Andy Burnham has proved that he can become the “King of the North.” What he has not proved is whether he can become the leader of the entire United Kingdom. Burnham is capable of becoming the “King of the North,” but he may not be capable of holding on to the office of Prime Minister of the entire United Kingdom.

These movements did not emerge in 2026. They have existed for decades, and in some cases for generations. What has changed is that their political strength is rising at the same time, while more people are questioning whether London still offers a model attractive enough to justify leaving the final say in the hands of the central government.

Contents

1. Why is the independence debate heating up again?

2. What do Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland want?

3. Why is the United Kingdom finding it harder to keep them?

4. Is this also about political ambition?

5. What do they gain by staying in the United Kingdom?

6. Who has the best chance of succeeding outside the United Kingdom?

7. What would the United Kingdom and England gain and lose?

8. If one succeeds, what happens to the other two?

9. Could this strengthen separatist movements around the world?

10. The hardest test begins after leaving

1. Why is the independence debate heating up again?

In Scotland, John Swinney is First Minister, the head of the Scottish Government, and leader of the SNP. The SNP is the Scottish National Party, a political force that seeks to make Scotland an independent country.

In Wales, Rhun ap Iorwerth is First Minister and leader of Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru is a Welsh nationalist party that seeks greater self determination and ultimately an independent Wales. The Senedd is the Welsh Parliament. After the May 2026 election, Plaid Cymru became the largest party and took control of the Welsh government for the first time.

In Northern Ireland, Michelle O’Neill is First Minister and a member of Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein is an Irish nationalist party active in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It does not seek an independent Northern Irish state. Its goal is for Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and reunify with the Republic of Ireland.

Developments in September 2026 rapidly pushed the issue back into the spotlight. On September 9, 2026, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham sparked controversy in the House of Commons when he suggested that Scotland could eventually be treated in a way similar to Northern Ireland if public support became clear enough. Northern Ireland has a mechanism for a referendum under the Good Friday Agreement, while Scotland has no equivalent arrangement. The Prime Minister’s office later had to reiterate that London had not agreed to another Scottish independence referendum.

The SNP immediately used those remarks to increase the pressure. On September 10, 2026, John Swinney called on the British government to clarify the mechanism through which Scotland could hold a referendum once public support reached a sufficient level.

On September 12, 2026, Donald Trump pushed the issue onto the international stage when he said in Dublin that he would like to see a united Ireland. His remarks immediately drew criticism from political forces that want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.

On September 14, 2026, the leaders of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are expected to meet in Cardiff to sign a joint declaration on self determination and cooperation in areas including the economy, energy, relations with Europe and constitutional issues. Three movements that developed separately are beginning to support one another politically.

2. What do Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland want?

Scotland wants to become an independent country. Scotland was once a separate kingdom before its political union with England in 1707. In 2014, Scotland held an independence referendum. 44.7 percent voted to leave the United Kingdom, while 55.3 percent voted to remain.

Brexit gave the independence movement new momentum. A majority of Scottish voters chose to remain in the European Union in 2016, but Scotland still had to leave because the United Kingdom as a whole voted for Brexit. For the SNP, this demonstrated that Scotland could choose one direction and still ultimately be taken in another by the decision of the United Kingdom as a whole.

Wales has moved more slowly. For decades, Plaid Cymru focused heavily on Welsh identity, the Welsh language and greater autonomy. As the Senedd and the Welsh Government gained more powers, independence gradually became a more serious political option.

Northern Ireland has a completely different history. The debate there is not primarily about creating a new country. It is about whether Northern Ireland should remain in the United Kingdom or reunify with the Republic of Ireland. This debate has lasted for generations and was once at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement moved the issue onto a democratic path.

3. Why is the United Kingdom finding it harder to keep them?

A union cannot survive indefinitely on history, law or the power of the central government alone. It must make its members feel that their lives are better inside it than outside it.

This is where London is struggling. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland still receive major benefits from the common market, public finances, the pound sterling and the United Kingdom’s defence system. But those advantages have not been enough to eliminate dissatisfaction over growth, public services, economic opportunities and political control.

When people do not believe the existing system is producing good enough results, the argument made by independence movements becomes easier to understand: If London cannot do better, let us do it ourselves.

Scotland wants greater control over its economy, immigration, energy and relationship with the European Union. Brexit strengthened the perception that Scotland’s political choices can still be overridden by decisions made across the United Kingdom as a whole.

In Wales, Plaid Cymru wants greater control over resources, public finances, justice and economic development. First Minister Rhun ap Iorwerth has also stressed that Wales should be treated as a nation with its own needs, not as a region of England.

Northern Ireland is different because national identity and the historical division of Ireland play a much larger role. But the same issue of political control also exists there: Sinn Fein does not want Northern Ireland’s future to remain dependent on decisions made in London.

England is by far the largest part of the United Kingdom in population, economic weight and political power. That gives London the foundation of a powerful state, but it also makes it easier for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to feel that they live within a system in which they are not the main decision makers.

If they see themselves as distinct nations, why should their most important decisions still be made by a political centre outside them? This question has always been present within their independence movements.

4. Is this also about political ambition?

Yes.

If Scotland became independent, Edinburgh would go from being the seat of a devolved government to the capital of a sovereign state. The Scottish Government would control taxation, borders, immigration, foreign policy and defence. Wales would undergo a similar transformation if it became independent.

Local political elites therefore have an incentive to seek greater power. Once a government controls health and education, it may also want authority over taxation, then immigration, foreign policy and eventually full sovereignty.

But it would be too simplistic to treat this only as the ambition of politicians. The SNP, Plaid Cymru and Sinn Fein could not become major political forces without enough voters sharing their dissatisfaction or political objectives.

In Scotland and Wales, dissatisfaction with current outcomes, national identity and the ambition for self government all coexist. In Northern Ireland, the historical division of Ireland and national identity play a larger role.

5. What do they gain by staying in the United Kingdom?

Scale provides major advantages. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are part of a single internal market, use the pound sterling, rely on the financial capacity of a large state, share a common defence system and benefit from London’s international influence.

Internal trade is especially important. Official figures show that sales to other parts of the United Kingdom are equivalent to at least 21.9 percent of Scotland’s GDP, 20.6 percent of Wales’s GDP and 24.1 percent of Northern Ireland’s GDP. For England, the figure is only around 3.1 percent.

The three also receive higher public spending per person than England. In the 2024 to 2025 financial year, public spending was GBP 13,134 per person in England, GBP 15,563 in Scotland, GBP 15,155 in Wales and GBP 16,116 in Northern Ireland.

Independence would give them greater control, but it would also require them to bear costs that are currently shared across the United Kingdom. More sovereignty also means paying for that sovereignty yourself.

6. Who has the best chance of succeeding outside the United Kingdom?

Scotland has the strongest foundation. It has North Sea oil and gas, renewable energy, financial services, the drinks industry, tourism and strong universities. In 2025, Scotland was a net exporter of 20.8 TWh of electricity to other areas, with an estimated value of around GBP 1.7 billion.

But public finances are a major weakness. In the 2025 to 2026 financial year, Scotland’s estimated fiscal deficit was GBP 25.3 billion, equivalent to 10.9 percent of GDP, compared with 4.2 percent for the United Kingdom as a whole. If Scotland became independent with its current spending and revenue structure, it would have to raise more revenue, cut spending or generate stronger economic growth.

Scotland has enough of a foundation to function as an independent country. Whether Scots would become richer after leaving is another matter.

Wales faces a harder calculation. Independence would give Cardiff greater control over taxation, energy, resources and economic development, but its economy is smaller and deeply integrated with England. Wales could gain political sovereignty before developing enough financial capacity to replace the benefits it currently receives from the wider system.

Northern Ireland has a completely different alternative. If Ireland reunified, Northern Ireland would not have to build a new state from scratch. It would join the Republic of Ireland and become fully part of the European Union. However, Northern Ireland’s economy remains heavily dependent on trade with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Scotland has the strongest foundation for standing on its own, Wales faces the greatest economic risk, while Northern Ireland has the clearest alternative because it can shift from London to Dublin.

7. What would the United Kingdom and England gain and lose?

If Scotland and Wales became independent while Northern Ireland reunified with the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom in its current form would effectively cease to exist. England would become the core of whatever state remained.

London could reduce some of the financial obligations associated with the other three nations. Public spending per person is currently higher in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland than in England. England is also less dependent on trade with the other three than they are on trade with England.

But the losses would be substantial. London would lose territory, population, natural resources, energy infrastructure, ports, maritime space and several strategically important military positions.

On the map, England would still have a long coastline and direct access to the North Sea, the English Channel, the Atlantic Ocean and the Irish Sea, but its maritime strategic depth would shrink considerably. Scotland opens onto the North Atlantic and the northern sea routes. Wales occupies a significant part of the western coastline of Great Britain. Northern Ireland provides an additional strategic position between the Irish Sea and the North Atlantic.

Scotland is also particularly important for energy and defence. The Faslane and Coulport bases currently play a central role in Britain’s nuclear submarine force. If an independent Scotland refused to allow London to continue using those facilities, the British government would need to reach a new agreement with Edinburgh or find an alternative location.

London would also lose part of its international weight. A state with less territory, a smaller population, fewer resources and reduced strategic capacity would find it harder to preserve the full level of influence currently enjoyed by the United Kingdom.

In return, England would have a simpler political structure, fewer disputes over devolution and a central government whose policies could more directly reflect the preferences of English voters.

London could reduce part of its financial burden, but the price would be a smaller territory, fewer resources, less strategic depth and diminished international weight.

8. If one succeeds, what happens to the other two?

If Scotland became independent and remained stable after several years, the argument that leaving the United Kingdom is simply too dangerous would become much weaker. Wales would have an immediate example next door showing that separation does not necessarily lead to collapse.

If Northern Ireland reunified with the Republic of Ireland and the transition went smoothly, the current structure of the United Kingdom would also lose its image of permanence.

The effect could also work in the opposite direction. If the first territory to leave suffered a fiscal crisis, lost investment or had to make severe cuts to public services, that outcome could weaken the remaining independence movements.

The first to leave would therefore influence more than its own future. Its success or failure would directly affect how attractive independence looks to the others.

9. Could this strengthen separatist movements around the world?

If Scotland left a union that has existed for more than three centuries through a democratic vote and then functioned successfully as an independent country, the impact would extend far beyond the United Kingdom.

Catalonia, Flanders, Corsica, Quebec and many other movements would not automatically gain new legal rights. Each has its own history and legal system. But they would gain a powerful example to point to: A community with a distinct identity can leave a developed democratic state through peaceful means.

Scotland would not even have to become independent for the effect to begin. If London increasingly accepted the principle that part of the United Kingdom could leave when a majority of its people wanted to, other separatist movements could cite that precedent.

If a case of separation ended in economic failure, the effect would reverse. Governments seeking to persuade voters to remain would use it as evidence that staying is safer.

The United Kingdom could become a major test case for separatist movements in the twenty first century.

10. The hardest test begins after leaving

Winning the right to leave only settles who has the power to decide. Currency, public finances, trade, borders, defence, welfare and relations with neighbouring countries still have to be dealt with afterward.

Scotland has the strongest foundation for taking the gamble. Wales may face the higher economic cost. Northern Ireland could join an existing state rather than build a new one. England would also have to accept that retaining more money and political control would come at the cost of territory, resources and strategic power.

In the end, the ability to preserve the United Kingdom still comes down to a simple calculation: London must convince people in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland that their lives are better inside the United Kingdom than they would be if they chose their own path.

MAIN CONTENT

1. What Is the Mecca Alliance Really?

2. What Is Saudi Arabia Trying to Escape From?

3. Why Is Israel at the Center of the Story?

4. Turkey and Pakistan: The Two Pieces Saudi Arabia Needs

5. Egypt, Syria, and an Expansion That Could Change the Balance

6. What Will Mecca Do to American Influence?

7. The Internal Weakness: Saudi Arabia and Turkey Both Want to Lead

8. Who Will Ultimately Shape the Middle East?

1. WHAT IS THE MECCA ALLIANCE REALLY?

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed in Mecca by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Its most striking provision states that an armed attack against any member will be considered an attack against all members. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the principle as technically similar to NATO’s Article 5, while emphasizing that the scale and form of assistance would be determined through consultation among the members. Mecca therefore creates a collective-defence obligation, but it does not mean that every attack will automatically send all three countries into war.

The differences between Mecca and NATO remain substantial. The full text of the agreement has not been published. Mecca does not yet possess an integrated military command comparable to NATO, it has no permanent joint force, and it has not demonstrated in a major crisis how far its members are actually willing to go in fulfilling their commitments.

However, the institutionalization that was only planned when the agreement was signed has now begun. On August 31, 2026, the foreign ministers, defence ministers, and senior military chiefs of the three countries met in Istanbul for the inaugural meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee. They agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for a three-year term. They also committed to strengthening collective defence capabilities and military cohesion through joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation, joint technology development, and production. Mecca has therefore begun moving from a political-military agreement on paper toward a permanent institutional structure.

The origins of Mecca also go deeper than the current crisis. On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, under which aggression against either country would be considered aggression against both. That agreement institutionalized a military relationship that had already existed for decades and immediately raised questions about the possible role of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in Gulf security. Mecca expanded that foundation by bringing Turkey into the structure, combining Saudi financial power, Turkish military and industrial capabilities, and Pakistan’s military strength and nuclear factor.

The wars across the region have made such a structure more urgent. On August 6, 2026, one day before the Mecca agreement was signed, Reuters cited a senior Saudi official saying Riyadh feared that Iran-linked forces could conduct coordinated attacks from Iraq and Yemen. At the same time, the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran had already continued for months, disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, placed pressure on energy markets, and exposed Gulf states to the consequences of military decisions they did not fully control.

By early September 2026, the danger from Yemen was no longer hypothetical. On September 8, 2026, the Houthis launched coordinated missile and drone attacks against cities, energy facilities, and an airbase in southern Saudi Arabia, wounding 73 people. On September 10, 2026, Houthi forces captured the Red Sea port city of Mocha, moving closer to Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.

The most important question about Mecca, therefore, is not the identity of a single enemy. The members themselves insist that the agreement is not directed against Iran or any other specific country. Its strategic value is broader: A collective-defence mechanism gives its members additional options when dealing with Iran, Israel, the Houthis, maritime instability, or even crises that do not yet exist. To understand how far Mecca could develop, it is necessary to examine what each member actually wants from the alliance.

2. WHAT IS SAUDI ARABIA TRYING TO ESCAPE FROM?

Saudi Arabia possesses money, energy, markets, and a special position in the Arab and Islamic worlds, but its independent military power has not yet matched those resources. For decades, Riyadh has relied heavily on the United States for weapons, technology, intelligence, logistics, and strategic deterrence. That relationship has provided Saudi Arabia with an extremely valuable security umbrella, but it has also created a vulnerability: When Washington controls capabilities that Riyadh cannot easily replace, the United States gains the ability to impose conditions.

Questions about the reliability of the American security umbrella did not begin in 2026. A series of events, from Iraq, the Arab Spring, Syria, and Yemen to the limited American military response after the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities, has caused regional governments to question Washington’s role. The Iran war in 2026 has deepened the problem because American partners in the Gulf can become targets of retaliation for military decisions made in Washington over which they have little control.

What Mohammed bin Salman appears to be seeking is therefore not a break with the United States. Riyadh still needs Washington and retains enormous interests in preserving the relationship. A more realistic objective is to change the balance between dependency and choice. In the past, if Washington rejected a Saudi strategic demand, Riyadh had very few alternatives capable of replacing American power. If Mecca, Saudi relations with China, and other networks continue to develop, Riyadh can remain an American partner without treating every demand from Washington as an unavoidable condition.

The debate over Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program demonstrates the value of that autonomy particularly clearly. The United States and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement related to civilian nuclear cooperation in July 2026. On July 24, 2026, Trump publicly said the United States would not proceed with the nuclear agreement unless Saudi Arabia joined the Abraham Accords and normalized relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia has maintained its demand for a credible and irreversible path toward a Palestinian state before recognizing Israel.

From Washington’s perspective, the transaction has a clear logic: The United States possesses technology Saudi Arabia wants and seeks to use that leverage to achieve another strategic objective, the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations. Riyadh can view the same transaction very differently. A Saudi strategic requirement in its relationship with the United States is being linked to a political decision that would produce a major geopolitical victory for Israel. If Saudi Arabia considers leadership of the Arab world and the ability to shape the region independently to be core interests, the condition gives Riyadh a concrete reason to build alternatives.

This is where the distinction between opposing the United States and opposing American pressure becomes essential. Saudi Arabia does not need to turn Washington into an enemy in order to reject a Washington policy. Riyadh can continue buying American technology, maintaining defence relations, and investing heavily in the United States while simultaneously building a structure that gives it the ability to act differently when the interests of the two countries diverge. Viewed this way, Mecca is more a tool for increasing Saudi freedom of action than a declaration of separation from the American order.

3. WHY IS ISRAEL AT THE CENTER OF THE STORY?

Israel is not a member of Mecca, but it is directly connected to many of the forces pushing Saudi Arabia toward a more independent path. A common argument holds that Saudi Arabia and Israel share concerns about Iran and therefore must eventually move closer together. That is only partly true. Both countries may want to prevent Iran from becoming the dominant power in the Middle East, but if Iran is weakened, a more important question immediately follows: Which country will fill the resulting power vacuum and set the rules for the region?

Israel has demonstrated both the capability and the willingness to use military power beyond its borders. In Syria, tensions between Israel and Turkey have become serious enough that the United States has had to establish a deconfliction mechanism to prevent the two countries from unintentionally sliding toward a military confrontation. In August 2026, Israel struck a Syrian airbase because of concerns that it could be connected to a Turkish military presence, while U.S. envoy Tom Barrack acknowledged that Ankara had not been informed in advance and could easily have prepared a military response after detecting Israeli aircraft moving toward the Turkish frontier.

Saudi Arabia is building power differently. Riyadh uses finance, energy, investment, diplomacy, and its ability to assemble Arab and Islamic partners. A post-Iran Middle East could therefore produce competition between two different models of regional power. Israel seeks to convert its military superiority and special relationship with the United States into an accepted central position in the regional order. Saudi Arabia wants to ensure that Riyadh itself remains one of the capitals that determines the future of the Arab and Islamic worlds.

This is why the Abraham Accords mean far more than a peace agreement. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have participated in normalization to varying degrees, but Saudi Arabia carries an entirely different weight. Riyadh is the custodian of Mecca and Medina, has deep influence across the Islamic world, and occupies a special position in the Arab system. If Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Israel, Israel will obtain a degree of regional legitimacy that the earlier agreements could not provide.

From Riyadh’s perspective, the price of such a decision depends heavily on Palestine. If Saudi Arabia recognizes Israel without securing a sufficiently significant political outcome for the Palestinians, Israel would receive a historic strategic victory while Riyadh could weaken its own claim to leadership of the Arab world. The Palestinian question therefore cannot be understood solely through religion or public opinion. It is directly connected to Saudi prestige and power.

Even the UAE, which normalized relations with Israel in 2020, has not accepted the idea that Israel should be free to destroy the prospects of a two-state solution. On August 21, 2026, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt in condemning Israel’s E1 settlement plan and warning that it threatened the viability of an independent, contiguous Palestinian state. Normalization with Israel therefore does not mean that Arab states are willing to allow Israel to determine the regional order alone.

The statement that “the United States is choosing Israel over Saudi Arabia” should consequently be understood as an analytical judgment about strategic priorities when interests collide, not as a claim that Washington has abandoned Riyadh. The strongest evidence today comes from the nuclear dispute: The United States is willing to use a strategic benefit that Saudi Arabia wants as leverage to pressure Riyadh into producing a major victory for Israel’s regional integration. If Mohammed bin Salman views that as a limit Saudi Arabia cannot accept, Riyadh has a strong incentive to build enough strategic power to make it harder for Washington to present the same choice in the future.

4. TURKEY AND PAKISTAN: THE TWO PIECES SAUDI ARABIA NEEDS

Saudi Arabia has enough money to purchase many of the world’s most advanced weapons, but buying weapons is not the same as possessing a complete military power system. Riyadh needs industry, manpower, operational experience, command capabilities, and partners that can actually deploy force. Turkey and Pakistan provide precisely the capabilities Saudi Arabia lacks, while both countries need resources that Riyadh can supply.

Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military, decades of experience operating inside an integrated military alliance, and a rapidly developing defence industry capable of producing UAVs, missiles, warships, electronics, and a growing range of other systems. For Ankara, Mecca opens a major market for Turkish defence technology, access to Gulf capital, and another platform through which Turkey can expand its political role in the Middle East. Fidan has also made clear that Erdogan wants the alliance to expand beyond its original three members, indicating that Ankara does not see Mecca merely as another defence contract with Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan brings a different form of power. The Pakistan-Saudi military relationship has existed for decades. More importantly, Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority country with nuclear weapons. This does not mean the Mecca Alliance automatically creates a Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia and Turkey, because no such public commitment under the trilateral agreement has been confirmed. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s presence changes the long-term deterrence calculations of any potential adversary.

In return, Islamabad needs capital, energy, defence contracts, and political support from Riyadh. Pakistan can also use Mecca to reshape its international position. Instead of being viewed primarily through its rivalry with India, Islamabad gains an opportunity to become a security provider for the Arab world and the broader Middle East. That is an extremely valuable political asset, particularly for a country whose military power is considerably greater than its economic power.

The exchange can therefore be understood in simple terms: Saudi Arabia brings money, energy, and political status. Turkey brings defence technology, military power, and NATO experience. Pakistan brings armed forces, strategic depth, and the nuclear factor. This complementarity explains why three countries with different priorities can nevertheless build a common alliance. Yet the same formula creates the most difficult internal question Mecca faces: Which country possesses the capability the others cannot replace?

NATO provides a useful comparison. The United States does not dominate the alliance simply because it contributes more money. Washington also provides intelligence, logistics, command capabilities, defence industry, global deployment capacity, and enough military power to protect its allies in practice. Saudi Arabia currently possesses the financial portion of that formula but not the entire military component. If Riyadh finances the system while Turkey supplies an increasing share of the technology and Pakistan supplies an important share of the military strength, Saudi Arabia could remain the administrative center of Mecca without necessarily becoming its unquestioned center of power.

5. EGYPT, SYRIA, AND AN EXPANSION THAT COULD CHANGE THE BALANCE

The Mecca Alliance becomes much more significant when its possible expansion is considered. Erdogan has publicly called for additional countries to join, while Fidan has specifically mentioned Egypt as a potential member. In August 2026, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty confirmed that Cairo was studying Mecca “very seriously” but had to examine constitutional issues, legal obligations, and existing strategic relationships before making a decision.

Egypt would bring much more than a large military. Cairo controls the Suez Canal, sits between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, has an enormous Arab population, and occupies a historic position in Arab politics. If Egypt joins, Mecca will become much harder to portray as simply a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani triangle. One of the traditional centers of the Arab world would be inside the structure, strengthening Riyadh’s claim that it is building a regional system led by indigenous powers.

The same value explains Cairo’s caution. Egypt wants to preserve relations with the United States, Israel, the UAE, Greece, Cyprus, and India while retaining its role as a mediator in multiple regional crises. Cairo may also worry that a security structure financed by Riyadh and institutionally centered in Saudi Arabia would strengthen Saudi leadership of the Arab world at the expense of Egyptian autonomy. The process of recruiting members therefore already raises the same question that could later divide the alliance itself: Who leads the Arab world?

As of September 11, 2026, there has been no official confirmation that Egypt will join Mecca. Significantly, on September 7, 2026, Abdelatty called for the development of broader Arab security arrangements built on the Arab Joint Defence Treaty and existing Arab League mechanisms. This does not mean Cairo has rejected Mecca, but it suggests that Egypt still wants a collective-security path in which its own autonomy and regional role are not subordinated entirely to a structure created by Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad.

Syria matters for a completely different reason: Geography. On August 21, 2026, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani confirmed that Damascus was considering Mecca but had not made a final decision. He also stated that Israel had no right to determine which relationships or alliances Syria could build and emphasized that one of Syria’s immediate priorities was ending Israeli attacks on Syrian territory. As of September 11, 2026, Syria has not announced accession to the alliance.

If Syria joins, Mecca would immediately face a real-world test of what collective defence actually means. Israel and Syria are still engaged in U.S.-mediated security discussions, but Israel has continued to use military force inside Syria at the same time. Washington is already attempting to coordinate between Israel, Syria, and Turkey to prevent an unintended confrontation. If Damascus were placed under a collective-defence mechanism with Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad, every Israeli strike on Syria would have to be evaluated in an entirely different strategic context.

If Egypt and Syria both joined, the implications for Israel would become considerably larger. Egypt lies southwest of Israel, Syria lies to the north and northeast, Turkey is farther north, and Saudi Arabia lies to the southeast. Pakistan does not border Israel but brings substantial military power and the nuclear factor. This should not be described as a military encirclement that has already taken shape. The more important point is that Israel would have to calculate several additional layers of potential response before using force.

Bangladesh is also keeping the door open, but the status of the invitation requires correction. Reuters reported on August 25, 2026, that Dhaka was viewing possible participation positively. However, Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman on August 27, 2026, and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaed Islam on September 1, 2026, subsequently said that Bangladesh had not received a formal invitation. Dhaka’s current public position is that it would consider membership positively if invited, but that national interests would determine the final decision.

If Bangladesh joins, Mecca would extend much deeper into South Asia. Pakistan lies west of India and Bangladesh lies to the east. If both belonged to the same defence structure, New Delhi would inevitably incorporate Mecca into its security calculations even if the alliance had not been created to oppose India.

Iran is the most sensitive scenario. There have been reports that Tehran received an invitation, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry denied that it had received a formal membership invitation. Iran therefore cannot be treated as a country that has formally been invited to join.

A new signal nevertheless emerged on September 2, 2026. Iran’s ambassador to Bangladesh, Jalil Rahimi Jahanabadi, said Tehran had neither expressed interest nor applied to join, but that Iran would accept if the Mecca members offered it membership. This is not the same as a formal Iranian application or a decision by Iran’s senior leadership to seek membership, but it shows that Tehran does not publicly regard Mecca as an inherently hostile structure and is leaving the possibility of future participation open.

The U.S.-Iran conflict remained unresolved as of September 11, 2026. If Iran joined Mecca under such circumstances, a new American or Israeli attack on Iran could create consultation and assistance obligations for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Ankara would then simultaneously belong to NATO alongside the United States and to Mecca alongside Iran. Nothing in the existing arrangements allows us to conclude automatically that Turkey would fight the United States, but the political contradiction for NATO would be profound.

Expectations about the speed of enlargement also need to be updated. On September 2, 2026, Pakistan said it was not aware of any country having formally applied. By September 10, 2026, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson said there were currently no plans to expand the alliance. That does not necessarily close Mecca to new members in the long term. It suggests that the three founders are prioritizing consolidation and testing of the existing structure before adding additional states.

6. WHAT WILL MECCA DO TO AMERICAN INFLUENCE?

Trump’s reaction creates one of the greatest paradoxes surrounding the agreement. On August 16, 2026, the U.S. president publicly welcomed the Mecca Agreement, said he was pleased that the three countries had finally signed it, and described it as a major, bold, and important step because Middle Eastern countries would be better able to defend themselves. That reaction is entirely consistent with Trump’s longstanding position that allies and partners should spend more on their own defence rather than relying so heavily on American resources.

In the short term, Mecca could genuinely serve American interests. If Saudi Arabia becomes better able to defend itself, Turkey supplies more regional military capability, and Pakistan assumes a larger security role, the United States does not need to manage every crisis directly. Washington can reduce costs while maintaining relationships with all three founding members, each of which already has important links with the United States.

But the Houthi crisis in September 2026 demonstrates the current limits of that process. According to Axios, Mohammed bin Salman called Trump twice on September 10, 2026, and urged the United States to strike the Houthis as they advanced along the Red Sea coast. Trump declined, and U.S. officials said Washington currently had no plans to open a new direct military front against the Houthis. Reuters carried the report while noting that it had not independently verified the Axios account. CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper also travelled to Saudi Arabia for coordination. If the reported calls are confirmed, the episode is particularly significant: Less than two months after Mecca was signed and little more than a week after its permanent institutional structure was agreed, Riyadh still turned to Washington when confronted with a serious military crisis.

The problem arises if Mecca actually succeeds. A Saudi Arabia with its own air defence, defence industry, military partners, and security network would be less dependent on Washington’s protection. As dependency falls, American leverage also falls. The nuclear dispute illustrates the point particularly clearly. Trump can currently link American nuclear technology to normalization with Israel because U.S. technology remains extremely valuable to Riyadh. If Saudi Arabia eventually develops sufficiently credible alternatives, Washington’s ability to impose such conditions will weaken.

This is why strategists can view Mecca very differently from Trump. Mecca’s importance does not necessarily depend on Turkey and Pakistan being able to replace American military power completely. Its political importance lies in Riyadh’s search for alternatives because Saudi Arabia no longer assumes that the old system will always serve its interests.

The same development can therefore support two different interpretations. Trump sees burden-sharing, while strategists see the gradual erosion of America’s indispensability. Both processes can occur simultaneously. The United States saves resources when its partners become stronger, but those same stronger partners also become more capable of saying no to Washington.

The relationship between Mecca and the Abraham Accords should be viewed within this context. The Abraham Accords are a U.S.-supported process designed to integrate Israel more deeply into the regional system. Mecca creates a different kind of structure in which major Muslim powers can coordinate without the United States being a member and without Israel occupying the center. It is still too early to describe them as opposing blocs, but their strategic directions are clearly different.

Saudi Arabia stands between those two paths. If Riyadh normalizes relations with Israel, Washington and Jerusalem would achieve a major victory in strengthening the Abraham framework. If Saudi Arabia instead continues developing Mecca and later brings Egypt, Syria, or other countries into the structure, Riyadh will be building a center of power that neither the United States nor Israel directly controls. This is one reason Mohammed bin Salman’s decision will have consequences far beyond bilateral Saudi-Israeli relations.

For Israel, the long-term risk from Mecca does not necessarily come from direct war. Israel currently possesses the ability to use military force rapidly before other regional states can coordinate an effective response. If Mecca develops shared early warning, air defence, intelligence, logistics, and consultation mechanisms, an Israeli military action against one member would have to account for several countries instead of a single opponent. Simply increasing the cost of military action would already narrow Israel’s strategic freedom.

The United States and Israel therefore have multiple ways to respond. Washington can use security, economic, and technological incentives to keep Saudi Arabia close, accelerate the Abraham process, encourage Egypt to remain outside Mecca, or exploit disagreements among the members. Israel can deepen relationships with partners such as Greece, Cyprus, and India while continuing to limit Turkey’s military expansion in Syria.

Pressure, however, can produce the opposite effect. The more Israel uses force inside Syria, the more reason Damascus has to seek a security umbrella. The more Washington uses Saudi dependency to impose conditions connected to Israel, the more reason Riyadh has to build alternatives. An attempt to weaken Mecca could therefore unintentionally provide additional justification for making it stronger.

The Houthi crisis in September 2026 could even accelerate this process. If Riyadh concludes that Washington does not want to deal directly with the Houthis while Mecca is not yet capable of responding independently, Saudi Arabia will have even greater reason to develop the capabilities the alliance still lacks: Shared intelligence, air and missile defence, logistics, command structures, early warning, and deployable forces. In other words, failure in the first stress test would not necessarily weaken Mecca. It could show the three members exactly what they need to build next.

7. THE INTERNAL WEAKNESS: SAUDI ARABIA AND TURKEY BOTH WANT TO LEAD

An alliance can be built around common interests without its members sharing the same ultimate objectives. This is precisely the problem Mecca will have to manage. Pakistan prioritizes its rivalry with India. Turkey focuses heavily on Syria, Israel, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and NATO. Saudi Arabia concentrates on the Gulf, Yemen, the Red Sea, Iran, energy, and its leadership position in the Arab world. All three can agree that they need greater strategic autonomy without being equally willing to pay the cost of every conflict affecting another member.

The alliance’s first serious stress test is now much clearer. After the September 8, 2026, Houthi attacks, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned that unprovoked aggression or the spillover of the Yemen conflict into Saudi territory could activate the Mecca Agreement and that Pakistan was bound by its commitments. Yet on September 10, 2026, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said that no military response under the agreement was currently being discussed and that Islamabad would act when the time came.

The gap between those two statements matters. It does not mean Pakistan is abandoning its commitment. It shows that the principle that “an attack on one is an attack on all” still requires a political decision before it becomes military action. Mecca therefore resembles NATO in the principle of collective defence, but the precise response still depends on circumstances and political decisions by the member governments.

More difficult tests could emerge outside the Middle East. If Pakistan and India enter a major war, would Saudi Arabia be prepared to sacrifice valuable economic relations with New Delhi in order to stand fully behind Islamabad? If Turkey clashes with Israel in Syria, how far would Pakistan go in supporting Ankara? If Saudi Arabia continues to face Houthi attacks, would Turkey deploy forces to Yemen or limit itself to intelligence, equipment, and diplomatic assistance? The agreement can create obligations, but national interests will still determine how far those obligations are carried out.

Developments in Yemen have raised the level of that test. The Houthis have not only struck Saudi territory. On September 10, 2026, they also seized Mocha, strengthening their ability to pressure Bab el-Mandeb. Reuters cited Yemeni government, Iranian, and regional sources saying that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards provided military guidance and weapons to the Houthi offensive. Pakistan has meanwhile conveyed a warning to Iran to rein in the Houthis. Mecca is therefore simultaneously confronting an attack on a member, a proxy conflict, and a threat to a strategic maritime chokepoint, yet it has still not produced a collective military response.

The more important long-term contradiction lies between Riyadh and Ankara. The two countries currently complement each other extremely well. Saudi Arabia possesses capital needed by the Turkish economy and defence industry, while Ankara possesses military and technological capabilities Riyadh wants. But neither Mohammed bin Salman nor Erdogan appears interested in becoming a secondary player in the regional order.

Saudi Arabia wants to use economic power, religious status, and capital to become the center of the Arab world. Turkey wants to assert itself as a major power stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria to the Caucasus and the broader Islamic world. The two countries competed intensely in the years following the Arab Spring. Their presence together in Mecca reflects a period in which common interests are larger than their disagreements. It does not prove that the competition for leadership has disappeared.

The paradox is that the weaker Mecca remains, the less important this problem is. The more successful Mecca becomes, the more serious the leadership question becomes. If the alliance genuinely reduces American pressure, forces Israel to act more cautiously, and attracts additional members, Riyadh and Ankara will both possess more power worth competing over. At that point, the most important rival to Saudi Arabia’s leadership ambitions may not be outside Mecca at all.

Riyadh therefore has to do more than provide financing. Saudi Arabia needs its own defence industry, intelligence capabilities, logistics, command structures, and the ability to protect its partners. Otherwise, Turkey could become the military backbone of the alliance while Pakistan retains a form of strategic deterrence Saudi Arabia cannot independently provide.

The decision on August 31, 2026, to place the secretariat in Saudi Arabia while appointing a Pakistani as its first secretary-general for three years is also revealing. Riyadh is the institutional center of Mecca, but operational authority is already being distributed among the members. That may reduce competition during the alliance’s early phase, but it also underlines that Saudi Arabia has not created a simple structure in which Riyadh commands and the other members follow.

This is the difference between a financier and a leader. A financier can pay the costs required to keep a system functioning. A leader must possess capabilities that make the system unable to function in the same way without it. The United States achieved that position inside NATO. Saudi Arabia still has to prove it can convert financial power into a similar form of strategic authority within Mecca.

8. WHO WILL ULTIMATELY SHAPE THE MIDDLE EAST?

The Mecca Alliance is not yet an Islamic NATO, and it cannot yet accurately be described as an official anti-American or anti-Israeli alliance. Its military commitments remain only partially tested, its members have different interests, and its command structures are still being developed. But judging Mecca only by its current strength would miss the more important question: The direction in which it develops could reshape regional power relationships long before the alliance reaches NATO’s level of integration.

By early September 2026, however, Mecca had already progressed beyond the stage it occupied immediately after signing. The Strategic Political and Defence Committee had met. The establishment of a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia had been agreed. The initial leadership arrangement had been allocated, and the three states had committed themselves to joint defence, industrial, and technological development. What had not yet emerged was an integrated military command or a collective military response during a real crisis.

If the three members build regular exercises, interoperability, intelligence sharing, air defence, logistics, and joint defence production, Mecca will gradually become a more difficult structure to reverse. If Egypt joins, the alliance gains additional Arab political weight and strategic access around Suez. If Syria joins, Mecca reaches Israel’s immediate frontier. If Bangladesh joins, its influence extends deeper into South Asia. If Iran ever becomes a member, the relationship between Mecca, the United States, Israel, and NATO would move into an entirely different category.

At least in the short term, however, expansion is no longer the obvious next step. Pakistan said on September 10, 2026, that there were currently no plans to expand the alliance. The immediate test is therefore not how many states Mecca can recruit, but whether its three founding members can turn their collective-defence clause into practical capability.

International reactions also demonstrate that Mecca has not been isolated. Trump publicly welcomed the agreement on August 16, 2026. Several Muslim-majority states have responded positively to the idea that regional countries should assume greater responsibility for their own security. India is cautious because of Pakistan. Israel has to consider the implications of the alliance’s future development. Strategists are debating whether Mecca represents burden-sharing or the beginning of a more post-American regional order. These competing interpretations reflect the alliance’s unfinished character: The structure remains flexible enough that different actors still hope it can serve their own interests.

Saudi Arabia has the most to gain. If Riyadh succeeds, it could move from being an extremely wealthy country that still depends on an external great power for its ultimate security toward becoming a state capable of organizing capital, military power, and regional influence around its own interests. Mohammed bin Salman would then be doing more than reducing dependence on the United States. He would gain greater ability to force Washington to negotiate with Saudi Arabia as a center of power that possesses genuine alternatives.

But the Houthi crisis in September 2026 also demonstrates that Saudi Arabia has not yet reached that position. A founding member has been attacked. Pakistan has said the agreement could be activated, yet as of September 10, 2026, there had been no collective military response. At the same time, Axios reported that Mohammed bin Salman turned to Trump and asked the United States to strike the Houthis directly. If that report is confirmed, it is perhaps the clearest evidence yet of the gap between Mecca’s strategic ambition and its current capabilities.

Israel would also have to adapt to a different Middle East. For years, its military superiority has allowed it to manage different theatres largely as separate problems. A Syria operating inside a defence network with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, or an Egypt participating in the same structure, would make those calculations more complicated. Israel could still retain overwhelming military advantages, but military superiority would no longer necessarily translate into the same freedom to act without considering the response of a broader network.

For the United States, a successful Mecca contains both advantages and risks. Washington could reduce its burden if regional partners become better able to defend themselves, exactly as Trump wants. But a region more capable of organizing itself will also be harder to control. As Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, and other states increasingly try to construct an order around their own interests, Washington can no longer automatically assume that it will remain the final decision-maker in every regional security arrangement.

This is also why Mecca’s true purpose does not need to be hidden in some secret clause. The members may be completely sincere when they describe the agreement as defensive. A sufficiently strong defensive alliance can still have major political consequences: It helps members resist pressure, increases the cost of military action by adversaries, and creates strategic options that previously did not exist. If Mecca makes it easier for Saudi Arabia to refuse Washington and forces Israel to account for several countries before using military force, the regional balance of power has changed even without the alliance ever declaring itself “anti-American” or “anti-Israeli.”

The larger contest will therefore revolve around who gets to shape the future Middle East. The United States wants to preserve its position as the most influential external power. Israel wants to convert military superiority and normalization into an accepted central role in the region. Saudi Arabia wants to demonstrate that no Arab order can be designed without Riyadh. Turkey wants Ankara to possess similar influence. Pakistan wants to turn military power into influence beyond South Asia.

For now, those ambitions have found a common meeting point in Mecca because each country needs something the others possess. But if the alliance truly succeeds, that very success could open the next competition. Saudi Arabia can use money to assemble an alliance, but whether money is enough to ensure that Riyadh always sets the rules remains unanswered.

The developments of September 2026 do not change the central question of this analysis. They make it sharper. Mecca has demonstrated that its three members are serious about building institutions, but the Houthi stress test has simultaneously shown that a defence institution does not automatically produce a defence capability. Saudi Arabia now has an alliance, but Riyadh has not yet demonstrated that the alliance can act when Saudi Arabia itself is genuinely under attack.

That may ultimately be the defining test of the Mecca Alliance. If Mohammed bin Salman can transform financial power into military capability, institutional authority, and the ability to protect allies, Saudi Arabia will move closer to becoming a power that directly shapes the Middle East. Mecca will show whether Saudi Arabia can turn money into power, or whether it will ultimately end up financing the ambitions of Turkey and Pakistan.

From its name and signing location to its administrative structure, Saudi Arabia appears to occupy the central position. Riyadh wants not only to reduce its security dependence on the United States but also to become a power capable of shaping the Middle Eastern order.

Turkey needs capital, access to defense markets, and a greater regional role. Pakistan needs investment, energy support, defense contracts, and Saudi backing to expand its influence in the Arab world.

The Mecca Alliance will reveal whether Saudi Arabia can shape the alliance around its own interests or merely become the financier that enables Turkey and Pakistan to pursue their own ambitions.

However, being at the center on paper does not necessarily translate into having the greatest influence in practice. NATO operates by consensus, yet the United States remains its most influential member because Washington provides not only funding but also military power, command capabilities, and the ability to protect its allies.

Saudi Arabia has only half of that formula. Riyadh can provide financing, purchase weapons, and bring partners together. But if the alliance’s military capabilities remain largely in the hands of Turkey and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia may become the financier without necessarily setting the goals and rules.

Control Threat | The Political Signals Others Miss

What makes the situation unusual is that the SAF is also receiving military assistance from Iran. Meanwhile, its opponent in Sudan’s civil war, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has received support from the United Arab Emirates, one of Saudi Arabia’s closest regional partners.

Looking at these relationships, many people ask the same question: if the SAF receives support from Iran, why is Saudi Arabia still willing to cooperate with it?

The answer lies in the reality on the ground.

The SAF is Sudan’s regular military and controls the country’s entire Red Sea coastline, including Port Sudan, the country’s most important seaport. By contrast, the RSF controls no part of Sudan’s Red Sea coast and therefore has no direct role in Red Sea maritime security.

For Saudi Arabia, protecting Red Sea shipping lanes is the priority. To achieve that objective, Riyadh has little choice but to work with the force that controls Sudan’s coastline. At present, that force is the SAF.

The fact that the SAF receives Iranian military assistance does not mean all of its interests are aligned with Tehran. Sudan remains in the middle of a civil war, and the SAF needs weapons to sustain the fight while also having strong incentives to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on Red Sea security.

If Riyadh refused to work with the SAF simply because Iran also supports it, Saudi Arabia would lose influence over the force controlling Sudan’s coastline. That would not reduce Iran’s influence. Instead, it could give Tehran even greater room to expand it.

This illustrates a broader principle of international politics. States rarely have the luxury of choosing a perfect partner. More often, every available option comes with significant drawbacks. The objective is not to find a flawless ally, but to choose the partner that best advances strategic interests while minimizing risk.

In other words, a partner does not have to be perfect to be worth working with. It only has to be the best available option.

#SaudiArabia #Iran #Sudan #SAF #RSF #RedSea #MiddleEast #Geopolitics

Control Threat | The Political Signals Others Miss

More than 1,000 German lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and legal experts have signed an open letter urging the federal government and parliament to initiate proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court to ban the Alternative for Germany (AfD).

The signatories argue that AfD has violated the core principles of Germany’s Basic Law, particularly human dignity and the free democratic order.

AfD is no longer a fringe party. In the most recent federal election, it became the largest opposition party in the Bundestag and continues to enjoy strong support in national opinion polls.

Political movements do not emerge out of nowhere. They are often the result of problems that voters believe the governing parties or the political establishment have failed to address, from immigration, the cost of living, and public security to the feeling that their voices are no longer being heard.

If AfD’s rise is rooted in voters’ disappointment with the traditional parties, then banning AfD may remove an organization, but it cannot remove that disappointment. If the goal is to weaken a political movement, the underlying conditions that drove millions of people toward it must ultimately be addressed.

#Germany #AfD #Europe #Geopolitics

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis

India’s decision not to purchase Russia’s Su-57 or the U.S. F-35 is more than a defense procurement choice. It is a strategic decision.

- For Russia, selling the Su-57 to India would help preserve its influence in one of the world’s largest defense markets while keeping New Delhi within Russia’s defense technology ecosystem.

- For the United States, selling the F-35 is about more than economic gains. It would deepen strategic influence by integrating India more closely into the American defense and technology ecosystem for decades to come.

- India, however, is pursuing a different objective. Instead of choosing between Washington and Moscow, New Delhi is investing in its own defense industrial base through the indigenous fifth-generation fighter program, AMCA.

If successful, India will gain far more than a new fighter aircraft. It will acquire the capability to design, develop, and manufacture critical technologies at home, reduce dependence on foreign powers, and strengthen its strategic autonomy.

Weapons are a direct instrument of power. If a nation can produce them itself, that is always the best option. Otherwise, the ability to shape power ultimately rests with the supplier.

#India #Russia #USA #Defense #Geopolitics

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis

“Israel is the second cyber superpower in the world. And now we’re going to do the same with artificial intelligence.”

“Within the next decade, I want Israel to build its own aircraft. We never know whether the critical platforms we currently receive from abroad could one day be denied to us.”

These were two of the most notable messages delivered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he outlined his vision for the next decade. At first glance, they seem to be about AI and fighter aircraft. Strategically, however, Netanyahu is pursuing a much larger objective.

Israel still relies heavily on U.S. support, particularly in defense. But allies can change with elections, shifting national interests, or geopolitical circumstances. That is why Israel is seeking to reduce its dependence by investing in long-term sources of national power: artificial intelligence and a stronger domestic defense industry.

If this vision becomes reality, Israel would emerge as a nation that is technologically, economically, and militarily self-reliant. Such a transformation would give it far greater freedom to pursue its strategic objectives without being constrained by the decisions of other major powers, especially the United States.

Over the long term, that could elevate Israel from being a major military power to becoming a center of influence capable of shaping the balance of power across the Middle East.

History suggests that regional powers with enduring economic, technological, and military strength tend to expand their influence beyond their own regions. Perhaps this is not merely a ten-year development plan. It may be the foundation for Israel to move toward a higher position in the international order.

#Israel #USA #AI #DefenseIndustry #Geopolitics

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis

Trump is attacking a model of economic development.

In his view, the UK still possesses one of its greatest strategic assets: North Sea oil and gas. Yet it has deliberately restricted new production in pursuit of its net-zero emissions agenda.

Trump argues that abandoning domestic resources leads to higher energy prices, rising production costs, weaker industrial competitiveness, and greater dependence on external suppliers.

That is why he believes expanding North Sea oil and gas production could create jobs, increase government revenue, strengthen energy security, and boost economic growth.

Behind this debate lie two competing political philosophies.

One prioritizes economic growth, industrial strength, and energy security, even if that means relying on fossil fuels for longer.

The other accepts slower short-term growth in exchange for accelerating the transition to a low-carbon economy.

If the UK develops its own resources more aggressively, Trump believes it will not only strengthen Britain’s economy but also create more opportunities for U.S. investment, technology, and energy cooperation.

From an America First perspective, a wealthier, stronger, and more self-reliant ally is also a better customer, a stronger NATO contributor, and a more valuable strategic partner for the United States.

That is why, by calling Britain “bankrupt,” Trump is not simply criticizing the UK. He is promoting a model in which allies maximize their own strengths, creating greater economic and strategic benefits for themselves and for the United States.

#UK #NorthSea #Energy #Geopolitics #Trump

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis

Greece has established an interministerial committee to comprehensively assess the development of nuclear power. This is not a decision to build nuclear plants yet, but the first step toward integrating nuclear energy into its long-term national strategy.

What is noteworthy is that nuclear power is no longer just an energy policy.

- It provides stable baseload electricity, reduces dependence on imported natural gas, and strengthens energy security.

- At the same time, developing a civilian nuclear industry allows a country to accumulate strategic expertise, skilled personnel, and industrial capabilities.

- As a result, many countries with advanced civilian nuclear programs are considered to possess “latent nuclear capability”: they are not developing nuclear weapons, but if a political decision were ever made, they would have the technological and industrial foundation to develop them much faster than countries without a civilian nuclear sector.

Japan is a prime example. Although it remains committed to its non-nuclear weapons policy, it is widely regarded as one of the world’s leading latent nuclear powers because of its advanced nuclear technology and industrial base.

In an increasingly unstable world, nuclear power is becoming more than just a source of clean energy. It is also a strategic national asset.

#Greece #NuclearEnergy #EnergySecurity #Geopolitics #NuclearPower

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis

Former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi argues that Kyiv should stop waiting for NATO membership and instead build new security alliances.

Strategically, that may sound reasonable. But there is one major obstacle.

Ukraine is still at war. If any country signs a binding defense treaty with Ukraine today, it also risks being drawn into a direct conflict with Russia, something no country wants. That is also why Ukraine has not joined NATO.

If even NATO is not yet willing to share that risk, building a new military alliance with an equivalent level of commitment would be even harder.

Ukraine’s problem is not a lack of partners. The real problem is that no country is currently willing to accept a legal obligation to fight in defense of Ukraine.

In other words, Ukraine can build a network of partners today. But forming a genuine defense alliance will likely have to wait until the battlefield or the broader geopolitical environment changes.

#Ukraine #NATO #Russia

Control Threat | Strategic Risk Analysis

“We need to cultivate additional alliances.”

That is why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel is investing heavily in its relationship with India.

His remarks reflect a strategy Israel has pursued for years: not relying on a single ally, but building a network of partners, each serving a different strategic purpose.

- The United States remains Israel’s most important ally, providing the foundation for military cooperation, diplomacy, and security assistance. No other country can replace America’s role.

- But India is the partner Israel is investing in most for the future.

There are several reasons.

- India is one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies and is expected to become even more influential in the decades ahead. Partnering with India means building ties with one of the world’s emerging power centers.

- India is one of Israel’s largest defense customers. The two countries cooperate extensively on UAVs, missiles, radar systems, air defense, cybersecurity, intelligence, and counterterrorism. Defense cooperation has become a strategic pillar of the relationship.

- With more than 1.4 billion people and growing influence in international institutions, India helps Israel expand its diplomatic reach beyond its traditional Western partners.

- The two countries also have almost no direct geopolitical conflicts. This creates significant room to deepen cooperation in technology, AI, innovation, agriculture, and investment.

Beyond India, Israel has built strategic partnerships with other countries, each serving a distinct purpose.

- Azerbaijan is a key partner for energy security and strategic cooperation related to Iran.

- The UAE has opened new opportunities for trade, investment, and engagement with the Arab world following the Abraham Accords.

- Germany remains Israel’s leading defense partner in Europe.

- Greece and Cyprus strengthen Israel’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean through cooperation on energy and security.

Looking at this network, it becomes clear that Israel is not searching for “another America.” Instead, it is building strong partnerships across different regions to reduce dependence on any single country and adapt to a rapidly changing international order.

That is the message behind Netanyahu’s emphasis on India: in an increasingly multipolar world, strength comes from the ability to build multiple strategic alliances.

#Israel #India #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #InternationalRelations

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued that people in Gaza are not free to leave and asked: If countries truly care about Gazans, why are they unwilling to accept those who want to leave?

That statement raises another question.

Some countries involved in the Gaza issue:

- Do not accept Palestinian refugees

- Do not support the freedom to leave

- Do not accept Israel’s approach to resolving the Gaza issue

- Yet continue to advocate for a two-state solution

So what is the ultimate objective?

If every option is rejected, the question becomes: Are some countries truly protecting the people of Gaza, or are they preserving Gaza as a strategic burden on Israel?

An unstable Gaza is also a geopolitical tool. As long as Gaza remains unstable, Israel will continue to consume military, financial and political resources while being forced to focus on the Middle East instead of larger strategic priorities.

Do they want to end the conflict, or do they want Gaza to remain a permanent flashpoint that continues to constrain Israel’s strategic power?

#Israel #Gaza #MiddleEast #Geopolitics #TwoStateSolution #Strategy #Security

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Because Syria is still far from fully unified.

After Bashar al-Assad’s fall, President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government regained control over most of the country. However, several areas remain outside Damascus’ authority, including the northeast, which is controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). After more than a decade of civil war, Syria is also too weak to endure another major conflict.

That is why Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani made his first visit to Damascus since Assad’s fall.

The talks focused on the future of the Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Syria and the possibility of integrating the SDF into the new Syrian state. Barzani is regarded as one of the few Kurdish leaders able to engage with Damascus, Baghdad, Ankara, and Washington, making him a potential bridge between Syria’s government and the Kurdish leadership.

If this process succeeds, Turkey could become one of its biggest beneficiaries.

For years, Ankara has argued that the YPG, the core force within the SDF, is closely linked to the PKK, an armed group that has fought against the Turkish state and operates mainly in Turkey and northern Iraq.

The SDF still maintains its own military structure and controls much of northeastern Syria. Turkey fears that as long as this arrangement continues, the region could remain a source of influence and logistical support for the PKK.

If the SDF is integrated into Syria’s military under President Ahmed al-Sharaa instead of remaining an independent armed force, the PKK would lose one of its most important sources of support and operational space along Turkey’s southern border.

For Damascus, resolving this issue through negotiation rather than another military campaign would represent a major step toward reunifying Syria and rebuilding a country exhausted by years of war.

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#Syria #Turkey #Kurds #MiddleEast #Geopolitics

People will always seek a better life and better opportunities.

But if developed countries continue absorbing migrants, failing states will never have to pay the price for their own failures. Corrupt governments, weak institutions, and failing education systems can survive because dissatisfied citizens always have an escape route.

A well-enforced border reverses that dynamic. When people can no longer leave so easily, pressure returns to where it belongs: their own governments. To keep their citizens, governments must create jobs, fight corruption, improve education, strengthen security, and grow their economies, or face increasing public resistance.

This is also a form of institutional natural selection. Over time, better-governed countries retain their people, while poorly governed ones are forced to reform. As governance improves, migration declines and national borders regain their meaning.

Illegal immigration will never end as long as failing states can continue exporting the consequences of their own failures to other countries.

#IllegalImmigration #BorderSecurity #Geopolitics #Politics #Governance #Migration #Europe

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Before Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed, few believed the Syrian opposition could achieve a military victory.

Turkey was pursuing reconciliation with Damascus to address the refugee crisis. Several Arab states were also restoring ties with Assad in the hope of gradually pulling Syria away from Iran’s influence. Most analysts believed the conflict had reached a stalemate and that a large-scale offensive was unlikely to change the balance.

Against that backdrop, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa revealed that HTS decided on its own to launch the offensive, despite widespread skepticism and concerns that failure would trigger massive Russian airstrikes and another wave of refugees. Turkey, HTS’s most important external backer, also did not support the operation.

What followed reshaped the region. Assad’s regime collapsed far faster than most governments and analysts had anticipated.

The episode raises an important question about strategic assessment. Great powers may possess satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and extensive intelligence networks. Yet critical factors such as troop morale, leadership quality, logistics, and institutional decay are often difficult to measure from afar.

By contrast, forces fighting on the front line may detect those signs much earlier through direct contact with the enemy.

Syria’s war offers a lasting lesson for intelligence and strategy: those with the most data do not necessarily understand the battlefield best. Sometimes, those closest to the fighting recognize history’s turning point before anyone else.

#Syria #Intelligence #Strategy #MiddleEast

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“I came to one conclusion from Iraq: we must not transplant Iraq’s reality onto Syria. Every country has its own circumstances and its own challenges.

What I learned from Iraq is that the conflicts, divisions, and sectarian strife that devastated Iraq must never be repeated in Syria.”

That is how Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa described the most important lesson he drew from Iraq.

What stands out is that Al-Sharaa is not focused on Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, but on what happened afterward. As Iraq’s state institutions collapsed, a power vacuum emerged. Sectarian conflict escalated, militias and extremist groups gained strength, while regional powers expanded their influence through proxy forces.

That is the scenario Al-Sharaa is determined to prevent in Syria.

It also helps explain why Syria has recently signaled that its priorities are domestic stability, economic reconstruction, and avoiding being drawn into regional power struggles.

From Al-Sharaa’s perspective, a weak Syria would easily become an arena for other countries’ competition. Only after the state is stable and strong will Damascus have greater room to pursue its own strategic interests.

#Syria #Iraq #Geopolitics #MiddleEast

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Sudan and Yemen’s internationally recognized government have agreed to strengthen maritime security cooperation in the Red Sea under a Saudi-led coalition protecting the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden from Houthi threats.

What makes this significant is that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which currently represent Sudan’s government, have spent months receiving Iranian weapons and military support during the civil war. Yet Sudan is now joining a Saudi-led security initiative to protect strategic shipping lanes from threats posed by the Houthis, Iran’s closest regional proxy.

This suggests Iran’s influence over its partners is gradually declining. They may still maintain ties with Tehran, but they are increasingly willing to cooperate with Iran’s rivals if they no longer see Tehran as capable of safeguarding their interests.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is no longer focused solely on defending its own territory. Riyadh is steadily building a regional maritime security network across the Red Sea, bringing coastal states together to protect one of the world’s most critical shipping routes. If this trend continues, Saudi Arabia could emerge as the region’s new security coordinator while Iran’s network of influence continues to shrink.

#SaudiArabia #Iran #Sudan #Yemen #RedSea #MiddleEast

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Created in 2002 on the foundation of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was designed as a Russian-led collective defense alliance and is often described as “Russia’s version of NATO.”

In recent years, however, the alliance has faced growing challenges.

The most controversial case is Armenia. During the 2021–2023 conflicts with Azerbaijan, Yerevan repeatedly called on the CSTO for assistance, but the alliance did not deploy military forces. Armenia later froze its CSTO membership in early 2024.

Another contradiction involves Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Despite both being CSTO members, the two countries have repeatedly clashed along their shared border, with the alliance unable to resolve the conflict.

Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan all left the alliance at different times. Today, the CSTO has only six members. Russia and Belarus remain its closest allies. Armenia has frozen its membership. Kazakhstan is pursuing a more balanced foreign policy and reducing its dependence on Moscow, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan continue to experience recurring border clashes.

The CSTO still exists as an organization, but when one member is left without the protection it expected, two others are fighting each other, and several countries have either left or distanced themselves from Moscow, the credibility of Russia’s military alliance inevitably comes into question.

#CSTO #Russia #Geopolitics #Putin

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With Nikol Pashinyan expected to remain prime minister, Armenia is likely to continue reducing its dependence on Russia while expanding cooperation with the West.

The turning point came in early 2024, when Armenia froze its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led military alliance long regarded as a cornerstone of Moscow’s security influence across the former Soviet space. The decision reflected Yerevan’s loss of confidence after Russia and the CSTO failed to intervene on Armenia’s behalf during its conflict with Azerbaijan, dealing a significant blow to Russia’s credibility as a security guarantor for its allies.

At the same time, Armenia accelerated its integration with the European Union. The two sides held their first-ever EU-Armenia Summit, expanding cooperation in the fields of economy, energy, border management, and institutional reform.

In the security sphere, Yerevan has strengthened cooperation with the United States and other Western partners while diversifying its arms procurement by purchasing more military equipment from India instead of relying almost exclusively on Russia.

Another major shift is Pashinyan’s effort to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The goal is to open new trade routes, reduce Armenia’s regional isolation, and gradually lessen its strategic dependence on Russia.

In response, Moscow has repeatedly warned Armenia about the consequences of moving closer to the EU and has applied economic pressure, including restrictions on imports of certain Armenian products.

Despite this strategic shift, Armenia cannot break away from Russia overnight. Its economy still depends heavily on trade, energy supplies, and remittances from Russia. Pashinyan’s objective is therefore not to sever ties with Moscow, but to gradually build alternatives and reduce Armenia’s dependence over the long term.

#Armenia #Russia #EU #Geopolitics

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