President Paul Biya, 93, has ruled Cameroon for 44 years and frequently stays in Switzerland. Meanwhile, the country continues to face separatist conflict, terrorism, and political divisions.

The U.S. has begun preparing for the post-Biya era. But can Washington protect its interests in Central Africa if the transfer of power descends into chaos?

Table of Contents

1. Cameroon Still Has No Clear Successor

2. The Risk of Chaos After Paul Biya

3. What Interests Do the U.S. and Other Powers Have in Cameroon?

4. What Can Washington Do Before Power Changes Hands?

5. Conclusion

1. Cameroon Still Has No Clear Successor

Paul Biya came to power in 1982 and is now serving his eighth presidential term, which is scheduled to end in 2032, when he will be 99. On August 20, 2026, he returned to Cameroon after spending 73 days in Switzerland. The government maintains that he continued governing the country during his absence.

In April 2026, Cameroon amended its constitution to restore the position of vice president, allowing the appointed official to assume power if the president dies, resigns, or becomes permanently unable to perform his duties. However, as of October 17, Biya had still not appointed anyone to the position.

The deeper problem is the prolonged concentration of power in one individual. Over more than four decades, Biya has built a network of loyal officials and security forces. When he leaves power, disagreements among competing leadership groups could complicate the succession process.

2. The Risk of Chaos After Paul Biya

Cameroon was already facing serious instability before the succession issue became increasingly urgent. In the two English-speaking regions in the west, Ambazonia separatists have been fighting government forces since 2017. Meanwhile, northern Cameroon continues to face attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP, an affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS) in West Africa.

The October 2025 presidential election deepened political divisions when the opposition rejected Biya’s declared victory. Subsequent protests led to clashes and casualties. According to the Carnegie Endowment, the security system Biya has built could face internal divisions if competing power centers struggle over succession. Separatist and terrorist groups could then exploit a weakened central government to expand their operations. Cameroon will not necessarily descend into chaos after Biya. But if political disputes spread into the military, a succession crisis could escalate into a broader security crisis.

3. What Interests Do the U.S. and Other Powers Have in Cameroon?

Cameroon lies along the Gulf of Guinea, has important ports such as Douala and Kribi, and serves as a trade gateway for Chad and the Central African Republic. Several major powers therefore have economic and security interests in the country.

China is a major trading partner, accounting for approximately 20.7% of Cameroon’s imports in 2025. Beijing has also helped finance and construct the Kribi deep-water port. By March 2026, China held approximately 64.9% of Cameroon’s bilateral external debt.

France maintains longstanding economic influence, with approximately 1.62 billion euros in foreign direct investment stock in 2024. Russia and Israel also maintain military cooperation ties with Biya’s government.

For the U.S., Cameroon offers three main strategic benefits: Supporting counterterrorism efforts around Lake Chad, ensuring maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, and maintaining strategic influence in Central Africa.

However, Washington’s direct interests are relatively limited in scale. Total U.S.-Cameroon trade in goods and services reached only approximately 704.6 million U.S. dollars in 2025. The U.S. deployed around 300 military personnel for intelligence and counterterrorism surveillance missions beginning in 2015 but ended that deployment in early 2020. Military cooperation is now maintained primarily through training and exercises, including Obangame Express in April 2026.

This distinction matters. China and France have substantial economic interests to protect, while the U.S. maintains security cooperation with a relatively small military presence. If Cameroon enters a crisis, Washington must weigh the value of its interests at risk against the costs of deeper involvement.

4. What Can Washington Do Before Power Changes Hands?

On October 6, 2026, Africa Intelligence reported that U.S. diplomats were developing multiple post-Biya scenarios and consulting international partners. The Trump administration wants to protect American economic and security interests as Cameroon approaches a political transition.

But preparing to respond to a crisis is only part of the equation. Washington could also proactively build relationships with individuals who may join the next government, rather than waiting until a successor emerges before establishing contact.

According to the Carnegie Endowment, notable figures in the succession debate include Franck Biya, the president’s son, and Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, Secretary-General of the Presidency. However, no one has been officially designated as Biya’s successor.

The U.S. could maintain dialogue with multiple leadership groups, opposition figures, and regional partners to better understand the balance of power while establishing channels of cooperation that could remain active after Biya leaves office.

This approach could also give Washington a voice in the transition through diplomacy and established relationships. However, building ties early is different from directly selecting or backing a successor. Intervening too deeply in domestic political disputes could provoke opposition to the U.S. and make the situation more complicated.

There is currently no public evidence confirming that Washington is backing a specific candidate. Available reporting indicates that the U.S. has been studying succession scenarios and preparing to protect its interests.

5. Conclusion

After Paul Biya’s 44 years in power, Cameroon faces the risk of a contested succession while several internal conflicts remain unresolved. A prolonged crisis could threaten the interests of the U.S., China, France, and other partners.

For Washington, its interests in Cameroon are valuable but do not appear substantial enough to justify large-scale military involvement. Preparing early, building relationships with multiple political groups, and preserving the ability to cooperate with a future government could help the U.S. protect its interests without taking on significant additional security costs.

The U.S. does not necessarily need Paul Biya to remain in power. What Washington needs is a Cameroon stable enough to maintain strategic cooperation. The question is whether the U.S. can prepare for that transition in advance or will instead have to deal with the consequences of a political crisis after it has already erupted.

Over the past two decades, the United States has spent trillions of dollars on wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and military operations across the Middle East. During the same period, China expanded trade, built infrastructure, invested in mining, and became a major economic partner for many African countries. By 2025, China’s merchandise trade with Africa was more than four times that of the United States. Did Washington choose the wrong place to invest its power?

Table of Contents

1. Why Has the United States Prioritized the Middle East, Europe, and Asia Over Africa?

2. What Has the United States Gained From Its Wars and Strategic Commitments in the Middle East?

3. China Arrived Later: Was Africa a Strategic Opportunity or a Necessity?

4. How Far Has China Actually Surpassed the United States in Africa?

5. Africa: A Strategic Treasure Trove or a Challenge Too Difficult for Great Powers?

6. The United States and China: Two Different Models of Power, the Same Limitations?

7. What If the United States Had Invested Resources From Its Middle Eastern Wars in Africa?

8. Did the United States Miss Africa’s Opportunities, or Is China Now Facing a Difficult Challenge?

1. Why Has the United States Prioritized the Middle East, Europe, and Asia Over Africa?

After World War II, the United States focused on Europe to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence, establishing NATO in 1949 and maintaining a substantial military presence across the continent. In East Asia, Washington built alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, initially to contain communist adversaries and today primarily to counter China’s rise. These are regions where a loss of American strategic superiority could allow rival powers to directly challenge Washington’s position as a global superpower.

The Middle East holds strategic importance because of its vast oil and gas reserves and critical shipping routes, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal. The United States must also protect Israel and its Gulf allies while preventing Iran from expanding its influence. Even as American dependence on imported oil has declined, a crisis in the Middle East can still drive up global energy prices, affecting the economies of the United States and its allies.

Africa, meanwhile, possesses enormous natural resources but has no military power that poses a direct threat to the United States comparable to the former Soviet Union or present-day China. Washington has therefore relied primarily on security cooperation, counterterrorism operations, investment, and a limited number of strategic military bases rather than establishing an extensive military network across the continent.

The United States has legitimate reasons to prioritize other regions over Africa. However, as China expands its access to minerals, infrastructure, and political influence across the continent, Washington faces strategic risks that previously received insufficient attention.

2. What Has the United States Gained From Its Wars and Strategic Commitments in the Middle East?

The United States has spent trillions of dollars on wars since September 11, 2001. According to Brown University, the wars in Iraq and Syria alone cost approximately $1.79 trillion between 2003 and 2023, excluding an estimated $1.1 trillion in veterans’ care obligations projected through 2050. But what has Washington gained from this enormous expenditure?

In 2003, the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein, removing a regime that had invaded Kuwait and confronted Washington. However, Saddam had also been a longtime adversary of Iran. His removal gave Tehran an opportunity to expand its influence in Iraq, while the United States had to confront insurgencies and return to combat operations against ISIS in 2014. Washington eliminated one adversary but simultaneously removed a force that had helped contain Iran.

In Afghanistan, the United States overthrew the Taliban in 2001 and spent two decades supporting the establishment of a new government. Yet the Taliban returned to power immediately after the American withdrawal in 2021. In Libya in 2011, the United States joined NATO in an intervention that contributed to Gaddafi’s overthrow, at a direct U.S. military cost of approximately $1.1 billion. The country subsequently descended into political fragmentation and prolonged conflict. These cases demonstrate that defeating a government is far easier than building a stable state to replace it.

Nevertheless, the United States has secured important strategic benefits in the Middle East: Maintaining a network of military bases, protecting Israel and its Gulf allies, preserving access to critical energy shipping routes, and preventing rival powers from dominating the region. The issue is whether Washington needed prolonged wars and costly nation-building efforts to preserve those interests. Had it avoided some of these expenditures, the United States could have devoted substantially more resources to expanding its economic influence in Africa.

3. China Arrived Later: Was Africa a Strategic Opportunity or a Necessity?

By the time China emerged as a major economic power, the United States had already established extensive networks of alliances and military bases across Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Beijing faced significant obstacles to competing directly with Washington militarily in these regions. Africa, meanwhile, offered vast natural resources, substantial unmet investment needs, and a level of American strategic attention that did not match its economic potential.

In 2000, Beijing established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, promoting trade, financing, and infrastructure investment. While the United States concentrated on wars following September 11, China expanded its presence in markets that many Western companies considered unattractive because of political risks and high investment costs. Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises enabled Beijing to undertake projects that private investors were often unwilling to finance.

China also gradually expanded its influence over African governments. In Djibouti, Beijing became the country’s largest creditor, financed port and railway projects, and established a military base. In Zambia, China’s position as a major creditor gave it an important role in debt restructuring after the country defaulted in 2020. Beijing also financed a leadership training school in Tanzania for six ruling parties from southern Africa, establishing direct relationships with political leaders. These financial, infrastructure, and political connections strengthened China’s negotiating position with African governments, although they did not mean those countries had to comply with every demand from Beijing.

4. How Far Has China Actually Surpassed the United States in Africa?

In 2025, merchandise trade between China and Africa reached approximately $348 billion, more than four times the U.S. figure of $83.3 billion. But China’s more concerning advantage lies in critical minerals. In 2024, the Democratic Republic of the Congo supplied approximately 75% of the world’s cobalt, while Chinese companies held interests in many of the country’s largest cobalt mines. Beijing also dominates the refining of numerous minerals, creating the risk that the United States will remain dependent on China even when purchasing raw materials from other countries.

China has also expanded its political influence through loans, infrastructure investment, mining rights, and relationships with African leaders. These economic interests give Beijing greater influence in negotiations over debt, trade, and strategic projects.

The United States still retains significant advantages. According to figures released in 2025, the accumulated stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Africa exceeded that of China. Washington also maintains security partnerships and a military base in Djibouti, where China has established its own base. Many African countries continue cooperating with both powers to protect their national interests.

China has therefore surpassed the United States in trade and gained advantages in certain mineral supply chains, but it would be premature to conclude that Beijing dominates Africa. Washington’s greatest concern should be China’s ability to use its economic position to influence political decisions and restrict American access to strategic resources.

5. Africa: A Strategic Treasure Trove or a Challenge Too Difficult for Great Powers?

Africa is rich in natural resources, but many regions suffer from inadequate infrastructure, difficult terrain, and high transportation costs. Developing a mineral deposit may require investors to construct additional railways, ports, and power plants. Risks are even greater in countries experiencing prolonged conflicts, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Somalia, where central governments do not control their entire territories and numerous armed groups compete for power.

The history of colonialism also demonstrates the limits of controlling Africa. After World War II, European empires weakened as independence movements gained strength and the costs of maintaining colonial rule continued to rise. France fought an eight-year war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 but ultimately had to accept Algerian independence. Today, major powers can access natural resources through trade and investment contracts without directly governing territories or assuming the costs of maintaining order.

Political fragmentation presents another challenge. Many African countries contain ethnic communities, tribes, and political factions with competing interests. When state institutions are weak, disputes over power and resources can easily escalate into conflict. In Libya, after Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011, opposition factions failed to establish a unified political authority, leaving the country deeply divided. This is a risk that major powers must consider when contemplating regime change or efforts to rebuild a state.

The United States and China can therefore invest in mining and infrastructure and cooperate with local governments, but both remain cautious about commitments that would require them to guarantee long-term security and stability. Africa offers substantial economic opportunities, but not every opportunity produces returns that justify its costs and risks.

6. The United States and China: Two Different Models of Power, the Same Limitations?

The United States builds influence in Africa through foreign aid, security cooperation, trade, and private investment. China, by contrast, uses state-owned banks and enterprises to finance infrastructure and mining projects while strengthening relationships with host governments. This model enables Beijing to pursue projects that many American companies avoid because of high risks and uncertain financial returns.

However, China has also become more cautious. According to Boston University, new Chinese loan commitments to Africa declined from approximately $28.8 billion in 2016 to less than $2.1 billion in 2024. Beijing continues to pursue trade and investment but has restricted large-scale lending as many projects encounter difficulties involving revenue, debt, and political instability.

The more assets and citizens China has in Africa, the more concerned Beijing must become about local security and political developments. Conflicts can bring projects to a halt, destroy assets, and make loans difficult to recover. China therefore faces many of the same risks that Washington has generally sought to limit.

The United States and China follow different investment models, but neither wants to bear the costs of building and maintaining order in unstable countries. Both depend on host governments to provide security, enforce contracts, and resolve internal conflicts. Without these conditions, increased investment does not necessarily translate into lasting political influence or sustainable economic returns.

7. What If the United States Had Invested Resources From Its Middle Eastern Wars in Africa?

In 2003, the United States chose to overthrow Saddam Hussein. But Washington had another option: Continue containing Saddam rather than pursuing regime change in Iraq. Under that scenario, Saddam might have remained a counterweight to Iran, while the United States could have avoided some of the costs of war and the years spent trying to stabilize Iraq afterward.

Had Washington redirected a portion of those savings toward Africa in the early 2000s, it might have secured more mineral rights, developed infrastructure, and established supply chains before China consolidated its position. Instead, Beijing expanded its economic relationships and gained advantages in sectors that Washington now considers critical to national security.

In December 2025, the United States signed a $553 million loan agreement to support railway and port infrastructure along the Lobito Corridor, connecting mining regions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to the Atlantic Ocean through Angola. The project demonstrates Washington’s efforts to expand access to critical minerals and reduce dependence on supply routes dominated by China. Had similar investments begun two decades earlier, the United States might now occupy a stronger position.

Nevertheless, the United States still needs to protect Israel, its Gulf allies, and critical shipping routes in the Middle East. The more reasonable alternative would not necessarily have been to withdraw from the Middle East and shift toward Africa, but rather to avoid excessively costly wars aimed at regime change and nation-building. Washington might have preserved most of its security interests in the Middle East while allocating more resources to economic competition with China in Africa.

8. Did the United States Miss Africa’s Opportunities, or Is China Now Facing a Difficult Challenge?

The United States missed important economic opportunities in Africa, particularly in mining, infrastructure, and supply chains. Devoting excessive resources to prolonged wars in the Middle East reduced Washington’s ability to focus on these sectors, while China seized the opportunity to expand its economic and political influence.

However, China is now facing difficulties of its own. Beijing has sharply reduced new lending to Africa as many projects encounter risks involving debt, profitability, and political instability. China possesses substantial economic advantages but cannot control the entire continent, while the United States continues to exercise significant influence through investment, diplomacy, and security cooperation.

The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy indicates that Washington is shifting its focus toward trade, investment, and critical minerals while avoiding prolonged military commitments. This may be a more effective approach than competing with China at any cost.

Under current circumstances, the United States does not need to outspend China across all of Africa. Washington should concentrate on the most important resources, transportation routes, and strategic relationships while avoiding the mistake of committing excessive resources to resolving conflicts that African countries themselves must ultimately address.

Nazi Germany once stunned Europe with the speed of its victories. Poland was defeated. France collapsed. Country after country fell before they could fully mobilize their strength. Those victories gave Hitler reason to believe that speed could compensate for Germany’s weaknesses. But Britain did not surrender. The Soviet Union did not collapse. Once a war expected to last weeks stretched into years, an entirely different set of factors began to determine the outcome.

Nearly a century later, Donald Trump has repeatedly bet on military campaigns designed to produce results very quickly. Venezuela made that approach look almost perfect. The opening days of the war with Iran pushed Trump’s deterrent credibility even higher. But Iran is still standing. And that is where the lesson that eventually cost Hitler so much begins to matter for Trump.

Table of Contents

1. What Did Hitler’s Rapid Victories Hide?

2. From Syria to Iran: Trump Grew Accustomed to Short, Sharp Strikes

3. Venezuela Took Trump’s Deterrent Credibility to Its Peak. Iran Began to Pull It Down

4. Why the United States Can No Longer Concentrate Its Full Power as It Did in the Gulf War

5. Is America Getting Weaker, or Has the World Washington Is Trying to Protect Become Too Large?

6. How Much U.S. Power Is Iran Actually Facing?

7. Hormuz Brings the War to the Gas Pump and the Ballot Box

8. A Short War Could Leave Trump’s Final Two Years in Chaos

1. What Did Hitler’s Rapid Victories Hide?

Nazi Germany entered World War II with a major vulnerability: Its military was powerful, but the economy behind it lacked many of the raw materials essential to modern warfare. Germany depended heavily on oil from Romania and iron ore from Sweden, while developing synthetic fuel and artificial rubber to reduce its dependence on imports. If the war dragged on and Britain cut off trade routes, Berlin would become increasingly disadvantaged against enemies with larger resource bases and greater industrial capacity.

Blitzkrieg allowed Hitler to postpone that problem. If an opponent collapsed within weeks, Germany did not yet have to compete over who had more oil, who could build more aircraft or who could replace losses faster.

The early victories came with extraordinary speed:

Poland: September 1, 1939 → early October 1939, about five weeks.
Denmark: April 9, 1940, surrendered the same day.
Norway: April 9, 1940 → June 10, 1940, about two months.
Luxembourg: May 10, 1940, occupied the same day.
The Netherlands: May 10, 1940 → May 14, 1940, about four days.
Belgium: May 10, 1940 → May 28, 1940, 18 days.
France: May 10, 1940 → armistice signed June 22, 1940, about six weeks.
Yugoslavia: April 6, 1941 → April 17, 1941, 11 days.
Greece: April 6, 1941 → most of the mainland occupied by late April, with resistance ending in early June 1941.

In less than a year, much of Europe had been defeated in campaigns lasting anywhere from a few hours to a few weeks. Blitzkrieg appeared to offer the perfect solution to Germany’s resource weakness: You did not need more resources than your enemy if you could defeat him before those resources could be fully mobilized.

But Britain did not surrender. In 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union expecting another rapid collapse. It never came. The deeper German forces advanced eastward, the longer their supply lines became, the greater their fuel requirements grew and the harder it became to replace losses. By 1942, oil had become such a serious problem that the Caucasus oil fields became one of Germany’s major strategic objectives.

Hitler was now trapped in precisely the kind of war Germany was least suited to win: A long conflict against enemies with far more oil, raw materials, manpower and industrial capacity. The early victories had hidden that weakness. Once the war stopped ending quickly, Germany’s resource limits became impossible to conceal.

2. From Syria to Iran: Trump Grew Accustomed to Short, Sharp Strikes

Donald Trump does not use Blitzkrieg in the literal way Hitler did in Europe, but his foreign policy has repeatedly followed a similar rhythm: Hit hard, hit fast, produce a clear result and avoid allowing the United States to become trapped in a long war.

Syria, 2017: Trump ordered 59 Tomahawk missiles fired at the Syrian government’s Shayrat air base after the chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun.

Syria, 2018: The United States, Britain and France struck facilities the coalition identified as part of Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons program. The operation ended after a single wave of strikes.

Iraq, 2020: Trump ordered the killing of Major General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. Iran retaliated against U.S. bases, but neither side entered a full-scale war.

Iran, 2025: Trump brought the United States directly into the Israel-Iran war through Operation Midnight Hammer, striking the nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. The war ended after 12 days.

Caribbean, 2025: The Trump administration began using military force against vessels Washington accused of transporting drugs from the Venezuelan region.

These operations differed greatly in scale and purpose, but they repeatedly gave Trump the same experience: The United States could unleash overwhelming force for a short period, produce immediate results and stop before the conflict became a prolonged war of attrition.

By early 2026, Venezuela made that approach look more convincing than ever.

3. Venezuela Took Trump’s Deterrent Credibility to Its Peak. Iran Began to Pull It Down

On January 3, 2026, Delta Force raided Caracas, captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and withdrew from Venezuela. From the moment U.S. special forces approached the compound until they left, the operation took just over two hours. No U.S. service members were killed, although several were wounded and one helicopter was hit. A sitting president had been seized in his own capital and taken aboard a U.S. warship. As a demonstration of deterrence, the message could hardly have been stronger: Washington had turned something that looked extraordinarily difficult into a one-night operation.

Less than two months later, the opening hours of the campaign against Iran made that image even more intimidating. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale air campaign. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed, along with IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour, Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh and numerous other senior officials. Trump said much of Iran’s senior leadership had been eliminated. The Associated Press reported that roughly 40 senior officials were killed during the opening phase.

After Venezuela and the opening strike on Iran, Trump’s image as a president willing to unleash enormous force and produce immediate results reached extraordinary heights. From the perspective of America’s adversaries, Maduro had just been taken from his own capital, while Iran’s supreme leader and numerous senior commanders had been killed in the first hours of a new war.

But Iran did not collapse. The state continued functioning, Iranian forces continued fighting and months later the war was still not over. The Strait of Hormuz remained unstable, energy prices remained under pressure and Washington had yet to convert its initial military superiority into a decisive political outcome. Venezuela made Trump’s version of rapid warfare appear almost limitless. The opening hours in Iran strengthened that impression. Iran’s survival is what began to expose its limits.

4. Why the United States Can No Longer Concentrate Its Full Power as It Did in the Gulf War

To understand why a superpower such as the United States now has to calculate the use of individual missile types in a war with Iran, it is worth returning to 1991. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States and its allies assembled a massive force in the Gulf. Roughly 540,000 U.S. troops deployed to Saudi Arabia, supported by thousands of aircraft, warships and forces from dozens of other countries. After weeks of air strikes, the ground campaign lasted only about 100 hours before Iraqi forces were driven out of Kuwait.

That was Operation Desert Storm. Its objective was also relatively limited: Liberate Kuwait and defeat the Iraqi forces occupying it, rather than march on Baghdad and overthrow Saddam. The military and political return was enormous compared with the duration of direct combat. Kuwait was liberated, the international coalition remained intact, the Iraqi military suffered severe losses and the United States emerged from the Cold War with the image of a power capable of concentrating overwhelming force on a single battlefield.

But after 1991, the way the United States prepared for war changed. The Soviet Union disappeared, and the prospect of total war against another superpower appeared more remote. Ammunition stockpiles declined, the defense industry consolidated and some reserve production capacity was eliminated because maintaining it during peacetime was expensive. At the same time, America’s global responsibilities did not shrink.

NATO expanded. The United States continued maintaining forces in Europe, Japan, South Korea and the Middle East. After September 11, 2001, Afghanistan and Iraq drew America into two long wars. Then came the campaign against ISIS, protecting shipping in the Red Sea, supporting Ukraine, defending Israel and preparing for a potential war with China. The United States remained extremely powerful. But its power increasingly had more places to go.

5. Is America Getting Weaker, or Has the World Washington Is Trying to Protect Become Too Large?

Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be judged simply by how much money they cost. The real question is what the United States gained politically, militarily and strategically in return.

In Afghanistan, the United States overthrew the Taliban within weeks after September 11, disrupted Al Qaeda’s network and eliminated many of its leaders. But a counterterrorism campaign gradually became a two-decade state-building project. When the United States withdrew in 2021, the Kabul government collapsed and the Taliban returned to power.

In Iraq, the United States quickly overthrew Saddam Hussein, removed a long-standing hostile regime and ended Iraq’s ability to threaten its neighbors as it had before. But the war then dragged on, the weapons of mass destruction used as a central justification for the invasion were never found, and the resulting power vacuum helped Iran expand its influence inside Iraq.

Afghanistan and Iraq did not directly cause today’s shortages of Patriot or THAAD interceptors. The deeper cost was trillions of U.S. dollars, manpower and nearly two decades of strategic attention focused on the Middle East and South Asia while Russia rearmed and China emerged as America’s principal military competitor in Asia.

Ukraine is different. Supporting Kyiv has cost money and consumed certain types of ammunition, but the United States has also received clear strategic benefits: Russia has suffered major military losses without U.S. combat troops directly entering the war, NATO has been strengthened and European defense spending has increased.

The most immediate pressure on America’s stocks of high-end missiles now comes more directly from the Middle East: Operations against the Houthis, defending Israel against Iran, the Iran war of 2025 and especially the war with Iran in 2026. After 25 years of war and increasingly far-flung commitments, a major problem is beginning to emerge: Is America getting weaker, or has the world Washington is trying to protect become too large?

6. How Much U.S. Power Is Iran Actually Facing?

The United States remains the world’s most powerful military power, but that power is distributed across multiple regions. U.S. Central Command is responsible for the Middle East. Europe must prepare for Russia. Forces in Japan and South Korea must remain ready for crises in East Asia. Indo-Pacific Command must preserve enough power for the most serious scenario of all: A conflict with China.

The key point is that these dangers are not hypothetical problems from some distant future. Russia is already fighting in Ukraine. China continues applying military pressure around Taiwan. The Middle East is already at war. Washington therefore cannot freely pull warships, aircraft or missiles from one region and send them elsewhere without considering the possibility that another crisis could erupt precisely when those forces have been moved.

Washington can still shift resources between theaters, but every transfer creates a new calculation. A Patriot interceptor sent to the Middle East is one no longer available in the stockpile previously reserved for Europe or Asia. A destroyer pulled into the Gulf is no longer where it had been before. Delays in the delivery of PAC-3 MSE missiles to Poland because the Iran war reduced U.S. inventories show how attrition in one theater can quickly affect another. Money cannot solve the problem immediately either. Tomahawk, THAAD, Patriot and many other missiles require months or years to replace. Stockpiles can decline rapidly, while industrial capacity cannot expand at the same speed.

This is the limitation Iran is exposing. Tehran is not facing the entire U.S. military at once. It is facing the portion Washington can commit to the Middle East without allowing risks in Europe and Asia to rise too far. If the United States wanted to move from air strikes and defense to a campaign aimed at overthrowing the Iranian regime, Washington would have to draw far more troops, ships, aircraft and ammunition away from other priorities.

That also changes how America’s adversaries calculate U.S. deterrence. Iraq in 2003 showed that Washington could overthrow a hostile government in a very short period of time. Today, Russia, China, Iran and North Korea can add another question to their calculations: How much power can the United States actually dedicate to their theater, how long can it sustain that commitment and how much must it keep in reserve for a crisis somewhere else?

Iran in 2026 is testing exactly that limit. The United States can still inflict enormous military damage. But when an opponent does not collapse quickly, the war begins to shift from raw firepower to stockpiles, production, economics, time and the other theaters Washington cannot afford to leave exposed.

7. Hormuz Brings the War to the Gas Pump and the Ballot Box

The Iran war has moved from the Middle East directly into the daily lives of Americans. The Strait of Hormuz remains unstable, oil and gasoline prices remain under pressure and the cost of living is becoming an increasingly important political issue. A Reuters/Ipsos poll in early October found that most Americans surveyed believed Trump’s policies were contributing to higher prices.

That becomes particularly dangerous with the November 3 midterm elections approaching. Republicans hold only a very narrow majority in the House of Representatives, while Democrats need only a small net gain to take control. If the war and higher fuel prices continue to frustrate voters, Iran could help alter the balance of power in Washington.

Even losing only the House would force Trump into the final two years of his presidency with an opposition party able to control committees, open investigations, subpoena officials, pressure administration spending and obstruct parts of his legislative agenda. If Democrats also capture the Senate, the pressure would become considerably greater.

8. A Short War Could Leave Trump’s Final Two Years in Chaos

Trump still has more than two years left in office. If Iran collapses or a favorable agreement emerges soon, he could still turn the war into a political victory. But if it drags on, pressure from fuel prices, depleted stockpiles and the need to preserve forces for Russia, China and other theaters will continue to grow.

The midterm elections could make the situation much harder. If Republicans lose the House, Democrats could block major legislation, control congressional committees, open investigations, subpoena officials and pressure the administration through the budget. If Republicans also lose the Senate, Trump would face even greater difficulty advancing legislation and confirming senior officials.

Trump would still control the White House and remain commander in chief. But if the Iran war remains unresolved, the final two years of his presidency could be consumed by confrontation between the White House and Congress, budget battles, high energy prices, depleted weapons stockpiles and pressure from multiple theaters at once.

If the war continues, Trump could go from the peak of his deterrent credibility after Venezuela and the opening days of the Iran campaign to ending his presidency in chaos, leaving behind an America whose credibility has been seriously weakened.

Qatar is rich because of natural gas, but the ships carrying that wealth must pass through waters Doha does not control. LNG, or liquefied natural gas leaving Qatar must first cross the Strait of Hormuz. Cargoes heading to Europe must then pass through the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and finally the Suez Canal. This makes relations with the powers positioned along these maritime routes part of Qatar’s economic security.

This is why the Horn of Africa matters to Doha. If geography alone were the deciding factor, Somaliland would offer several advantages over Somalia. Somaliland’s Port of Berbera sits directly on the Gulf of Aden, closer to the Bab el Mandeb Strait, with direct access to the maritime route leading into the Red Sea. It has also been developed into an important deep water port.

So why has Qatar chosen to side with Somalia and oppose Somaliland’s attempt to gain independence?

Table of Contents

1. How Qatar’s Weaknesses Shaped Its Foreign Policy

2. Why Somaliland Looks Attractive on the Map

3. Why Qatar Still Chose Somalia

4. The UAE and Israel Were Already Ahead in Somaliland

5. Somalia Opened the Door Just as Qatar Sought Greater Influence

6. Qatar Somalia Relations Did Not Begin in 2026

7. What Qatar and Somalia Need From Each Other

8. What Somalia Reveals About How Qatar Builds Power

1. How Qatar’s Weaknesses Shaped Its Foreign Policy

Qatar possesses some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves and generates enough revenue to invest across multiple continents. But that wealth also creates a major vulnerability. Qatar’s economy and government revenues remain heavily dependent on oil and gas. In 2025, hydrocarbons accounted for roughly 87 percent of merchandise exports and around 85 percent of government revenue. LNG, or liquefied natural gas, alone generated more than half of the total value of Qatar’s merchandise exports. In other words, the money that funds the state budget, overseas investments, and much of Qatar’s economic power depends directly on Doha’s ability to move energy from the Persian Gulf to global markets.

This is where geography becomes a weakness. Qatar is a small peninsula inside the Persian Gulf. LNG leaving Qatar must first cross the Strait of Hormuz. Cargoes heading to Europe through the Suez route must then pass through the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and finally the Suez Canal.

Qatar controls none of these chokepoints. Hormuz lies between Iran and Oman. Bab el Mandeb lies between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea. The Suez Canal belongs to Egypt. A significant part of Qatar’s economy therefore depends on maritime routes outside Doha’s control. Qatar also lacks the military power to protect the entire route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Doha needs Hormuz to remain open, the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandeb to remain stable, the Red Sea to remain secure, and the Suez Canal to continue operating.

This is one of the keys to understanding Qatar’s foreign policy. Saudi Arabia has vast territory. Turkey has a large military. Israel has military and technological power. Iran has strategic depth, missiles, and armed networks. Qatar has enormous financial resources but lacks comparable instruments of power. Doha therefore uses what it has to compensate for what it lacks by building relationships with the countries and powers positioned along the routes that are vital to Qatar’s economy.

2. Why Somaliland Looks Attractive on the Map

From a purely geographic perspective, Somaliland possesses an extremely valuable asset: the Port of Berbera. Berbera sits on the Gulf of Aden, along the maritime route linking the Indian Ocean with the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. From there, the distance to Bab el Mandeb is far shorter than from southern Somalia. Somaliland is therefore well positioned to access one of the most important maritime corridors connecting Asia and Europe.

That is also why the United Arab Emirates has invested heavily in Berbera. For Qatar, a deep relationship with Somaliland could theoretically provide several advantages. It could give Doha access to a strategic port, a position closer to Bab el Mandeb, greater influence from the Persian Gulf into the Gulf of Aden, and additional depth for its maritime security network. Viewed individually, these advantages make Somaliland appear more attractive than Somalia. But this is where geography begins to collide with politics.

3. Why Qatar Still Chose Somalia

Qatar cannot determine its relationship with Somaliland as if Somaliland existed alone on the map. Doha has to consider its entire network of partners. After Israel recognized Somaliland on December 26, 2025, describing Somaliland as a breakaway region of Somalia, Qatar immediately rejected the decision and reaffirmed its support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. Qatar was not alone. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan, Djibouti, Iran, and numerous other Arab, Muslim, and African countries also opposed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.

Three of those countries are particularly important to Doha. Turkey is Qatar’s closest military ally and one of the Somali government’s most important military partners. Saudi Arabia is a country with which Qatar spent years rebuilding relations after the 2017 to 2021 blockade, and Riyadh now shares many interests with Doha in Red Sea affairs. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, a vital link on the maritime route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, and it has also taken a clear position in support of the Somali government.

Qatar therefore faces a relatively straightforward calculation. Choosing Somaliland could provide the advantage of Berbera, but it would also place Doha on the opposite side of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Somali government at the same time. Qatar is under no legal obligation to choose Somalia, but the structure of Doha’s relationships makes Somalia the far more logical choice.

4. The UAE and Israel Were Already Ahead in Somaliland

Somaliland is also not an empty space waiting for Qatar to enter. The UAE has been there for years. Dubai based DP World has invested hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in Berbera. Abu Dhabi has also developed deep relationships with Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubbaland, ranging from ports and security cooperation to ties with local authorities. When Mogadishu severed relations with the UAE in early 2026, Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubbaland all said they would continue their relationships with Abu Dhabi. Israel then formally recognized Somaliland and began expanding its political and security ties there.

Qatar therefore has another factor to consider. If Doha moved into Somaliland, it would be entering an area where the UAE has already invested heavily and where Israel has recently established a new political position. Qatar and the UAE have already competed for influence in places ranging from Libya to the Horn of Africa. Mogadishu, by contrast, was opening up new space. Somalia is therefore attractive to Qatar not only because Somalia itself has strategic value, but also because it gives Doha room to expand its influence without entering a space where the UAE and Israel already hold stronger positions.

5. Somalia Opened the Door Just as Qatar Sought Greater Influence

January 2026 was a particularly important moment. On January 12, 2026, Somalia’s federal government cancelled its agreements with the UAE, including security and defense cooperation. Mogadishu accused Abu Dhabi of undermining Somalia’s sovereignty. The Somali government also investigated allegations that the UAE had used Somali territory to move a Yemeni separatist leader out of the country, while Abu Dhabi was also linked to the process that led to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The UAE did not acknowledge these allegations.

After UAE support was cut off, Somali officials mentioned Qatar or Saudi Arabia as possible alternatives that could replace part of the resources previously provided by Abu Dhabi. Just seven days later, on January 19, 2026, Qatar and Somalia signed a defense cooperation agreement in Doha. According to Somalia, the agreement covers military training, exchanges of expertise, development of defense capabilities, and stronger security cooperation.

This is not a mutual defense treaty. There is no public commitment requiring Qatar to send troops if Somalia is attacked, no announced Qatari base in Somalia, and no specific new weapons package has been disclosed. The timing, however, is significant. Somalia had just lost the UAE from its security network, while Qatar immediately gained more room to expand its role. This fits Doha’s broader approach to influence, which is to become a partner that another government does not want to lose.

6. Qatar Somalia Relations Did Not Begin in 2026

The new defense agreement did not emerge from nowhere. Qatar’s relationship with Somalia’s federal government has been developing since at least the 2017 GCC crisis. When Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed their blockade on Qatar, Somalia’s federal government chose to remain neutral, even though some regional administrations inside Somalia sided with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Mogadishu also stressed that the federal government held the authority to determine Somalia’s foreign policy.

In late 2017, Qatar signed a development package worth around 200 million U.S. dollars with the Somali government, focusing on infrastructure, education, job creation, and strengthening state capacity. Doha later financed road projects linking Mogadishu with Jowhar and Afgoye.

In 2019, Qatar provided Somalia with 68 modern military vehicles, officially intended to strengthen state institutions, the central government, and counterterrorism capabilities. Qatar also provided budget support to Somalia that year. By 2026, Somali officers continued to receive training at Qatari military academies.

Over time, Doha has followed a fairly consistent approach: investing in Somalia’s central government. This also distinguishes Qatar from the UAE. Abu Dhabi has developed relationships with the federal government as well as Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubbaland, while Qatar has focused more heavily on the internationally recognized federal government.

7. What Qatar and Somalia Need From Each Other

Somalia needs three things that Qatar can provide.

The first is money. Mogadishu still requires outside resources to strengthen the state, build infrastructure, and develop its security forces. The second is military training and defense support. Qatar does not possess an enormous military, but it has enough financial capacity to fund training facilities, purchase equipment, and help smaller partners develop their capabilities.

The third is diplomatic balance. As relations with the UAE deteriorated, Mogadishu needed other Gulf states to prevent excessive dependence on a single external sponsor. Qatar can help provide that alternative.

In return, Somalia gives Doha a partner in the Horn of Africa, an internationally recognized government, and access to a country with a long coastline along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Somalia is also a member of the United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, or OIC.

More importantly, Somalia gives Qatar a position in a region connecting the Middle East with Africa and the maritime routes around the southern Red Sea. Qatar does not need to build a massive military base in Somalia to benefit from the relationship. If Doha becomes one of the governments Mogadishu turns to for money, training, diplomacy, or security assistance, Qatar already has influence.

8. What Somalia Reveals About How Qatar Builds Power

This is how Qatar compensates for its own weaknesses. Qatar is too small to protect all of its interests abroad on its own. Its military cannot control Hormuz, secure the Bab el Mandeb Strait, or determine what happens at Suez. Doha also lacks the population and territory required to build a large military system abroad.

But Qatar has money. Doha can convert that money into relationships, aid, training, investment, political influence, and access to foreign governments. Somalia is a clear example.

If geography alone determined the decision, Berbera in Somaliland might look more attractive to Qatar than Mogadishu. Foreign policy, however, is shaped by more than distance from a strategic strait. Turkey stands with Somalia. Saudi Arabia stands with Somalia. Egypt stands with Somalia. The UAE already holds a strong position in Somaliland, while Israel has recognized Somaliland.

Qatar therefore has two choices. One is to move into Somaliland, compete for space with the UAE and Israel, and create friction with some of Doha’s most important partners. The other is to stand with Somalia, reinforce Qatar’s existing network, gain a position in the Horn of Africa, and fill part of the space the UAE has left behind in Mogadishu.

Doha chose the second option. That choice makes sense for a country with enormous financial resources but limited military power to compel others to follow its preferences. Somaliland has Berbera. Somalia has an entire network standing behind it. For Qatar, that network is more valuable than a port.

This also points to the broader logic of Qatar’s strategy. Its vulnerable geography, limited military scale, and heavy dependence on energy export routes push Doha to build a wide network of relationships to protect its interests. Qatar’s wealth gives it the financial resources to build and sustain those relationships. The more countries that have interests tied to Doha, the harder Qatar becomes to isolate or pressure.

Ethiopia has vast territory but no coastline. Somaliland has a coastline but lacks recognition and the strength to defend itself. Israel has military power, technology, and international influence, but it is too far away to build a durable foothold in the Horn of Africa on its own.

These three weaknesses are creating a rare opportunity. Israel could help bring Ethiopia and Somaliland back together: Ethiopia could recognize Somaliland in exchange for a corridor to the sea, Somaliland would gain a major ally directly across its border, and Israel would gain a network of partners capable of protecting its interests at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

If the three countries can align these interests, Ethiopia could restore its regional power, Somaliland could begin to emerge from Somalia’s shadow, and Israel could turn its current foothold in Somaliland into lasting influence across the Horn of Africa. A new power axis may be waiting to take shape.

Contents

1. Ethiopia Needs the Sea to Escape the Cycle of Poverty and Conflict

2. Egypt Is Building a Structure to Contain Ethiopia

3. Somaliland Has the Location but Lacks Legitimacy and Power

4. Israel Has Moved Into the Strategic Opening in Somaliland

5. Why Ethiopia Is the Missing Piece Israel and Somaliland Both Need

6. Israel Should Bring Ethiopia and Somaliland Back Together

7. How Could a New Axis Change the Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa?

1. Ethiopia Needs the Sea to Escape the Cycle of Poverty and Conflict

Ethiopia is the most populous country in the core Horn of Africa, has a long history of statehood, once played a major role in regional security, and hosts the headquarters of the African Union. But since Eritrea gained independence in 1993, a country of more than 130 million people has had no coastline and has depended heavily on Djibouti for access to global trade.

This is more than a geographic problem. Ethiopian goods must pass through another country’s infrastructure and territory before reaching international markets. Transport costs, procedures, delays, and dependence on a single main corridor all make goods more expensive, weaken business competitiveness, and limit industrialization.

The effects then spill into domestic politics. Ethiopia has long-standing ethnic, regional, and political divisions, and a struggling economy makes those tensions even harder to manage. When resources are limited, regions and political elites compete more intensely over budgets, land, investment, and power. Faster economic growth would not erase those divisions, but it would give the government more money to create jobs, build infrastructure, distribute economic gains across regions, and ease grievances.

Access to the sea could therefore affect Ethiopia on two levels. Economically, Addis Ababa would reduce its dependence on Djibouti and gain more logistics options. Politically, a larger economy would give the government more tools to manage domestic instability.

If Ethiopia gained an additional corridor through Somaliland, Djibouti would also lose its near monopoly. Transport routes would have to compete on price and service quality, Ethiopian businesses would gain alternatives, and foreign investors would have more reason to believe that a factory deep inside Ethiopia could still reach global markets at a reasonable cost.

A richer and more stable Ethiopia would also have a chance to restore influence lost during years of internal conflict. That is why Addis Ababa increasingly sees access to the sea as a strategic interest directly tied to the country’s future.

2. Egypt Is Building a Structure to Contain Ethiopia

That ambition is bringing Ethiopia into increasingly sharp competition with Egypt. The first source of tension is the Nile. Ethiopia sits upstream on the Blue Nile and has built the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), while Egypt lies downstream and depends heavily on the Nile for its water supply. Cairo therefore has strong reasons to prevent Ethiopia from gaining too much unilateral control over the water before it reaches Egypt.

The Red Sea adds another layer of competition. If Ethiopia can strengthen its autonomy over the Nile while also securing long-term access to the sea, Addis Ababa would remove two of its biggest geopolitical constraints at the same time. Ethiopia could then convert its population and economic scale into far greater regional power than it possesses today.

Egypt has found partners with overlapping interests. Eritrea is wary of Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions and particularly sensitive to any discussion involving Assab. Somalia opposes Addis Ababa making direct agreements with Somaliland. Sudan also has its own disputes and interests involving Ethiopia.

On October 4, 2026, the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia met in New Alamein. The issues on the agenda included Somali sovereignty, transboundary water, and Red Sea governance. All of them directly constrain Ethiopia’s strategic room for maneuver.

Cairo is becoming the central node connecting countries that each have their own reasons to contain Addis Ababa. Ethiopia, meanwhile, is still dealing with internal conflict while relations with Eritrea are deteriorating to dangerous levels. A large but landlocked country is facing pressure from several directions at the same time that its domestic strength is being eroded. That is why a deeper relationship with Israel could become increasingly attractive to Addis Ababa.

3. Somaliland Has the Location but Lacks Legitimacy and Power

Somaliland stands on the opposite side of Ethiopia’s problem. Ethiopia has vast territory but no coastline, while Somaliland has an extremely valuable coastal position but lacks scale and international recognition.

Hargeisa declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and has since operated in practice as a separate state, with its own government, security forces, currency, and institutions. At various points Somaliland has been more stable than much of Somalia, but that stability has still not been enough to secure broad international acceptance as an independent country.

The lack of recognition limits access to capital, international institutions, state-to-state agreements, and long-term security guarantees. Somaliland can govern itself, but it continues to live under Somalia’s shadow and must always consider the possibility that Mogadishu could try to reassert control if the balance of power changes.

Ethiopia has long been the most natural partner capable of helping Somaliland change that position. The two sides came close to a major breakthrough on January 1, 2024, when they signed a memorandum of understanding concerning Ethiopian access to Somaliland’s coastline.

Somaliland said at the time that the agreement would eventually lead Ethiopia toward recognizing Somaliland. Addis Ababa publicly placed greater emphasis on sea access and cooperation with Hargeisa, while the full text of the agreement was never released. The political logic behind the deal, however, was clear: Somaliland wanted to use its geographic assets to gain recognition, while Ethiopia wanted to use its relationship with Somaliland to break out of its landlocked position.

Somalia reacted furiously, and Egypt quickly used the crisis to move closer to Mogadishu. Turkey later mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia through the Ankara Declaration in late 2024, putting the Addis Ababa-Hargeisa plan on hold.

But the reasons that brought the two sides together have not disappeared. Ethiopia still needs the sea, and Somaliland still needs recognition from an African country with enough political weight to matter.

4. Israel Has Moved Into the Strategic Opening in Somaliland

On December 26, 2025, Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Jerusalem had clear geopolitical reasons to move first. Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, across from Yemen and near the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The Houthis have demonstrated that a force located thousands of kilometers from Israel can still place direct pressure on Israeli trade and security by threatening shipping through Bab el-Mandeb.

Israel has Eilat at the northern end of the Red Sea, but Yemen remains far away. A partner in Somaliland brings Israel much closer to the Gulf of Aden and the Houthis, creating better conditions for intelligence gathering, surveillance, UAV operations, and rapid response in the event of conflict.

The Israel-Somaliland relationship has also begun to move into the security sphere. In June 2026, Somaliland confirmed that Israel was training its military and police, although Hargeisa denied that it was negotiating an Israeli military base.

Israel therefore already has a new partner in a highly valuable location. But Somaliland on its own remains a small country, faces opposition from Somalia, and lacks the strategic depth needed to defend itself if it comes under a major attack from Somalia. That is where Ethiopia becomes crucial.

5. Why Ethiopia Is the Missing Piece Israel and Somaliland Both Need

Israel can provide Somaliland with intelligence, military technology, training, air defense, and diplomatic support. But Israel is far away. If Somaliland came under military pressure from Somalia or another force, Jerusalem could not respond on the ground with the speed and scale available to a neighboring state.

Ethiopia could fill that role. It sits directly behind Somaliland, has vast territory, a larger military, and land-based logistics networks connected directly to the region. A sufficiently deep security relationship with Addis Ababa would give Somaliland a nearby strategic rear if conflict broke out.

In that scenario, Israel and Ethiopia could play different roles. Israel could provide intelligence, technology, air defense, training, and strategic support. Ethiopia could provide logistics, ground forces, rear territory, and the ability to respond immediately within the region. Somaliland would no longer have to depend primarily on a powerful partner located far away.

This would also serve Israel’s interests directly. A Somaliland backed by Ethiopia would be much harder to isolate or defeat. Jerusalem could maintain its strategic position at the southern entrance to the Red Sea without having to carry the entire burden of Somaliland’s defense itself.

Ethiopia would also increase Somaliland’s economic value. Berbera currently serves a relatively small market, but if a significant share of Ethiopian trade shifted through the port, it could become a gateway for an economy of more than 130 million people. Somaliland would gain revenue, jobs, and economic interests directly tied to Ethiopia, while Israel would gain a more stable partner around which to build long-term influence.

This is the most important part of the triangle. Somaliland provides the location both Ethiopia and Israel need. Ethiopia provides the market and land-based security Somaliland lacks. Israel provides technology, security capabilities, and international networks that neither can easily build to the same level on its own.

6. Israel Should Bring Ethiopia and Somaliland Back Together

Israel is now in a rare diplomatic position. Jerusalem has long-standing relations with Addis Ababa while also being the first country to recognize Somaliland. Ethiopia and Somaliland already understand the benefits of cooperation, but the 2024 agreement showed how vulnerable a purely bilateral relationship can be to Somali opposition and Egyptian pressure.

Israel could help change that calculation by bringing both sides back to the negotiating table with a broader package. A new agreement should not revolve around a strip of coastline alone. Sea access, diplomatic recognition, trade, investment, and security cooperation should be placed within the same framework so that the interests of all three parties become tied together.

Ethiopia could recognize Somaliland and redirect part of its trade through Somaliland territory. In return, Somaliland could guarantee Ethiopia a stable, long-term corridor to the sea. Israel could support the arrangement through technology, intelligence, training, investment, and a security framework protecting both the trade corridor and Somaliland’s position.

Recognition from Ethiopia would be particularly important for Hargeisa. Israel has already broken the first barrier, but Ethiopia is Somaliland’s direct neighbor, the largest country in the core Horn of Africa, and Addis Ababa hosts the headquarters of the African Union. If Ethiopia recognized Somaliland, Israel’s decision would no longer stand as an isolated move by a Middle Eastern country. Somaliland would gain an African partner with enough political weight to force other governments to reassess their own positions.

Israel does not need to carry the entire burden in Somaliland by itself. A more effective strategy would be to bring Ethiopia back in, giving Somaliland a major ally directly across the border while Israel provides technology, intelligence, and strategic support from a distance.

7. How Could a New Axis Change the Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa?

Somalia would be the strongest opponent. Mogadishu considers Somaliland part of its territory and would view Ethiopian recognition of Hargeisa as an attempt to alter Somali sovereignty.

Egypt would also have strong reasons to prevent such a structure from emerging. An Ethiopia with additional access to the sea would weaken the effectiveness of Cairo’s containment strategy. If Addis Ababa also received technology and support from Israel while Somaliland became an eastern commercial rear, Ethiopia would gain more room to resist pressure from the network being built around Egypt.

Eritrea faces a more complicated calculation. A route through Somaliland could reduce Ethiopia’s need for Assab and therefore remove one potential source of direct confrontation. But a less dependent, wealthier Ethiopia with an additional strategic relationship with Israel would also become a stronger rival over the long term.

Israel should therefore avoid turning the new structure into an openly anti-Egyptian alliance. Security relations between Jerusalem and Cairo remain highly valuable to both sides. Cooperation with Ethiopia and Somaliland can instead be built around trade, maritime security, counterterrorism, and stability in the Horn of Africa, while the practical result would still be to reduce Ethiopia’s isolation.

If this structure takes shape and proves durable, its greatest value will lie in what it makes possible next. Israel could use the Horn of Africa as a platform for expanding its influence deeper into the continent and taking a more direct role in Africa’s security, trade, and political affairs. Over the longer term, this could become one of the steps that allows Israel to move beyond its role as a regional Middle Eastern power and closer to becoming a major power with influence on the international stage.

On September 30, 2026, the United States completed the withdrawal of forces associated with Operation Inherent Resolve from Iraq. Twenty-three years have passed since the 2003 invasion. Saddam Hussein is long gone, and ISIS no longer controls vast territories, but power inside Iraq remains divided among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Region, and various political and armed forces. Washington has also failed to create an Iraq fully aligned with the United States. Iran retains deep influence in Iraqi politics and over some Shia armed groups, while Baghdad still does not hold a complete monopoly over the use of force.

The United States was powerful enough to destroy Saddam Hussein’s regime within weeks, but building a new order strong enough to replace Saddam became a problem that lasted more than two decades.

To assess Washington’s 2003 decision, it is not enough to look only at what happened after the invasion. The opposite questions must also be asked: What would the United States have had to pay if Saddam had remained in power? What strategic benefits could Washington gain if it turned Iraq into a stable country that cooperated with the United States? And just as importantly, did Washington fully understand the political and social structure it was preparing to dismantle?

Table of Contents

1. How 9/11 Changed the Way the United States Viewed Threats

2. Leaving Saddam in Power Also Had a Cost

3. Iraq Has Enormous Strategic Value for the United States

4. Why Did Washington Decide to Overthrow Saddam?

5. America’s Biggest Miscalculation Came After Victory

6. Before Overthrowing a Regime, Understand What Lies Beneath It

7. Iraq Was Difficult to Shape Because Saddam Ruled a Deeply Fragmented Society

8. Iran Lost an Adversary but Also Faced Greater U.S. Military Pressure

9. Washington Eventually Found a Way to Reduce the Violence

10. From the 2011 Withdrawal to the Return of ISIS

11. Why Did the United States Withdraw in 2026 if Iraq Still Mattered?

12. Conclusion: Overthrowing Saddam Was Only the First Step

1. How 9/11 Changed the Way the United States Viewed Threats

The Iraq War cannot be fully understood without considering September 11, 2001. Before the terrorist attacks, Washington had already viewed Saddam Hussein as a long-term problem, but primarily dealt with him through containment. After 9/11, the way the United States calculated risk changed.

The Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy stated that the United States could not rely solely on retaliation after being attacked. When dealing with terrorist organizations and governments Washington considered hostile that were seeking weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of waiting could be too great. Washington therefore argued that in some circumstances, the United States needed the ability to act before a threat fully developed.

Afghanistan was the first place where this new thinking was applied. The Taliban sheltered al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and Washington launched its military campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001.

Iraq was different. Saddam Hussein was not behind 9/11. The 9/11 Commission later found that contacts had existed between Iraq and al-Qaeda, but it found no credible evidence that Saddam had participated in attacks against the United States.

After 9/11, however, the question in Washington was no longer simply whether Saddam was preparing an immediate attack on the United States. The question became whether the United States should continue accepting the existence of a government that had waged war against its neighbors, used chemical weapons, and previously developed weapons of mass destruction programs. Iraq shifted from being a problem to contain into a risk the Bush administration wanted to address before it had the chance to become more dangerous.

2. Leaving Saddam in Power Also Had a Cost

Judging the Iraq War only by the losses that followed 2003 can create a false comparison: War had costs, while avoiding war did not.

In reality, keeping Saddam in power meant the United States would have had to maintain a containment system with no clear end date. After the 1991 Gulf War, Washington and London maintained no-fly zones, regular military operations, economic sanctions, weapons inspections, and military forces in the region to prevent Baghdad from rebuilding its ability to threaten neighboring states.

The reasons for this system were not hypothetical. Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990 with roughly 100,000 troops and later launched missiles at Israel and coalition bases in Saudi Arabia. The containment policy after 1991 significantly weakened Iraq, but its success depended on the United States continuing to maintain pressure.

By the early 2000s, Saddam no longer possessed the military power Iraq had in 1990. Iraq in 2003 was not a regional power preparing to sweep into the Gulf. But Washington still had to protect Kuwait, maintain forces in the region, and ensure that Saddam did not regain the opportunity to rebuild his strength if sanctions and inspections weakened.

The real choice, therefore, was not between “attacking Saddam” and “leaving everything peaceful.” It was between indefinitely managing a hostile government or removing that government and accepting responsibility for the order that would emerge after Saddam.

3. Iraq Has Enormous Strategic Value for the United States

Iraq mattered for reasons that extended far beyond Saddam. Geography gives the country exceptional strategic value to any major power seeking to influence the Middle East.

Iran lies to Iraq’s east. Syria and Jordan lie to the west. Turkey is to the north. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are to the south. Iraq sits between the Persian Gulf and the Levant while also possessing about 145 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, placing it among the largest oil reserve holders in the world.

A Baghdad that cooperated with Washington could therefore generate influence far beyond Iraq’s borders. Iran is the clearest example. After the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, U.S. forces were present in Afghanistan to Iran’s east. After 2003, U.S. forces were also present in Iraq to Iran’s west, while to the south stood the broader network of American forces and bases in the Gulf. During the first years after the invasion, Tehran had to account for a U.S. military presence on multiple fronts at the same time.

A non-hostile Iraq also significantly reduced the threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Washington no longer had to contend with the possibility that a government in Baghdad resembling Saddam’s would once again use military force to alter the balance of power in the Gulf.

Iraq also lies along the geographic route connecting Iran to Syria. A strong Baghdad independent of Tehran could make it more difficult for Iran to build a continuous corridor of influence from Iranian territory through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.

Oil also needs to be placed in its proper context. There is no basis for reducing the war to the claim that “the United States invaded Iraq to take its oil.” The United States did not turn Iraqi oil fields into American property. But a country possessing one of the world’s largest oil reserves clearly has strategic importance for global energy markets and the balance of power in the Gulf.

Iraq in 2003 was therefore both a security problem and a geopolitical opportunity. Removing Saddam opened the possibility of transforming a long-standing adversary into a component of a regional order more favorable to the United States.

4. Why Did Washington Decide to Overthrow Saddam?

Saddam’s record gave arguments for military action considerable weight in the American political environment after 9/11. Iraq had fought a war against Iran, invaded Kuwait, used chemical weapons, and repeatedly confronted international monitoring mechanisms. The Bush administration also believed that Iraq still maintained or could rapidly rebuild weapons of mass destruction programs.

Weapons of Mass Destruction, or WMD, refers primarily to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

WMD later became the weakest part of the prewar case. The United States did not find active stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction on the scale Washington had anticipated. The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that several important assessments in the 2002 intelligence estimate had been overstated or were not adequately supported by the underlying intelligence. The committee also identified a tendency toward consensus within the intelligence community, with analysts assuming that Iraq still maintained active WMD programs and interpreting ambiguous information through that assumption.

This meant that the immediate threat posed by Iraq had been overstated. But the 2003 decision did not rest solely on the question of WMD stockpiles. It was part of a broader calculation: Washington wanted to end the indefinite containment of Saddam, remove a source of instability that had already launched wars in the Gulf, and create an opportunity to build a new Iraq that would fit more favorably into the U.S.-led regional security structure.

The invasion then demonstrated the enormous imbalance of military power. Saddam’s government collapsed within weeks. An adversary that had remained a problem for more than a decade after the Gulf War disappeared. The United States gained a direct military position in the center of the Middle East and significantly increased its ability to pressure regional adversaries. But overthrowing Saddam turned out to be the easy part.

5. America’s Biggest Miscalculation Came After Victory

Washington prepared extremely well to defeat Saddam’s military. The United States was far less prepared to manage Iraq once the old central government disappeared.

RAND Corporation, a U.S. strategic research institution, later assessed that postwar planning had relied on assumptions that the security environment would remain relatively permissive and that Iraqi police could maintain order. Reality moved in the opposite direction. Security deteriorated rapidly, while the remaining police and security forces were unable to contain rising crime and political violence.

The Iraqi military disintegrated during the war and was later formally dissolved by the Coalition Provisional Authority, or CPA, under CPA Order Number 2. Many senior Baath Party members were removed from government institutions. The police were not dissolved in the same way but were severely weakened during the chaotic first weeks.

The central mistake was not simply the decision to dissolve the Iraqi army. Washington had reasons to fear that restoring Saddam’s military intact would lead Shia and Kurdish communities, which had suffered under that apparatus, to believe that the old order was returning. The larger problem was that the United States removed a major part of the old coercive structure without having a sufficiently strong replacement ready to take over immediately.

A force designed to advance, destroy the enemy’s military, and seize strategic objectives suddenly had to perform a completely different mission: protect neighborhoods, weapons depots, infrastructure, roads, borders, ministries, and maintain public order across an entire country.

As security deteriorated, insurgent groups had time to build networks. The United States repeatedly demonstrated that it could enter an area and drive the enemy out, but often lacked the forces necessary to hold that territory for long enough. The Iraq Study Group described the problem directly in 2006: U.S. forces could clear an area, but there were not enough American troops or sufficient Iraqi support to hold every area that had been cleared.

If one miscalculation must be identified above all others, it was Washington’s underestimation of the scale of the postwar mission. The United States brought enough power to destroy Saddam’s government but was not adequately prepared for the vacuum that emerged after it disappeared.

6. Before Overthrowing a Regime, Understand What Lies Beneath It

Washington’s miscalculation therefore went beyond troop numbers or deployment methods. A more fundamental question must be asked before deciding to use military force to overthrow any government: What kind of society is that government holding together?

How many centers of power exist within the country? How many political, ethnic, religious, or tribal factions are there? Do these factions merely disagree over policy, or do they see one another as existential threats? Do they possess their own armed forces? Does central authority rest on consent and institutions, or primarily on coercion?

These questions strongly shape what happens on the day the central government collapses. Overthrowing a government through military force and building a stable political order afterward are two completely different missions. A regime can be defeated within weeks, but if it has been using concentrated power to hold rival factions inside the same state, its collapse can simultaneously release every power struggle that had previously been suppressed.

A country with a weak military is therefore not necessarily easy to occupy or reconstruct. In some cases, the most fragmented countries can become the most difficult postwar environments to control.

Before launching a regime-change operation, the question should not only be, “How long will it take to defeat the enemy’s military?” The more important question is: “Who will control the country the next day?” Which factions will accept the new order? Which will consider it a threat? Who will control armed forces? Who will protect minority groups? Who will control revenue, oil, budgets, and ministries? And what force will be strong enough to keep the state functioning during the transition?

Iraq is a particularly clear example. The United States prepared to defeat Saddam Hussein, but it did not fully appreciate how difficult it would be to replace the political system that had held Shia, Sunni, Kurds, tribes, and multiple political networks within the same state structure.

This is one of the main reasons the post-Saddam problem lasted more than two decades rather than ending within months of the regime’s collapse. U.S. forces were not continuously present throughout that entire period. Washington withdrew most of its forces in 2011 and returned in 2014 after ISIS seized large areas of territory. The fact that the United States had to return demonstrated that the post-Saddam problem had not ended when Saddam fell.

7. Iraq Was Difficult to Shape Because Saddam Ruled a Deeply Fragmented Society

Iraq was especially difficult to reconstruct because Saddam did not rule a homogeneous society. Most Iraqis are Shia. Arab Sunnis had occupied a major position in the old power structure. The Kurds have a distinct national identity, autonomous territory, and their own Peshmerga armed forces. Beneath these major communities are tribes, political parties, clerics, political families, and local patronage networks.

Saddam did not resolve these divisions. He placed an extremely powerful center of authority above them. The Baath Party, military, Republican Guard, intelligence agencies, security forces, and family networks created a system in which opponents found it extremely difficult to accumulate enough power to challenge Baghdad. Order existed, but it depended heavily on coercion and repression.

Once Saddam disappeared, forces that had previously been suppressed began competing directly over who would control the new Iraq. Elections did not erase these identities. In many cases, they transformed them into political structures. Shia political forces organized around Shia parties. Kurdish parties dominated politics in Kurdistan. Sunni forces had to rediscover their place after losing the privileged position they had enjoyed under Saddam.

This created a deeper problem. If losing an election only means losing some seats in parliament, factions can accept the result. But if a faction believes that losing political power also means losing the ability to protect itself from its rivals, the incentive to retain independent armed forces becomes much stronger.

That is why Iraq does not contain only political parties. Some centers of power also maintain armed forces, economic networks, and relationships with foreign states. The Kurds have the Peshmerga, the armed forces of the Kurdistan Region. The Popular Mobilization Forces are an umbrella structure containing multiple forces that expanded dramatically after the rise of ISIS in 2014. The PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s formal security structure, but many units retain varying degrees of autonomy, while some Shia factions within the organization maintain deep relationships with Iran.

Iraq’s problem is therefore not simply democracy versus dictatorship. The challenge is to build a state strong and credible enough that rival factions believe they can place their weapons under Baghdad’s authority without fearing that Baghdad could later fall into the hands of an adversary and turn those institutions against them. Saddam solved that problem through absolute power. The post-Saddam system had to find another way.

8. Iran Lost an Adversary but Also Faced Greater U.S. Military Pressure

One common interpretation of the Iraq War is that the United States overthrew Saddam and inadvertently handed Iraq to Iran. That view captures only part of the longer-term development.

Saddam was clearly a major counterweight to Tehran. Iraq and Iran fought an eight-year war. When Saddam disappeared, Tehran lost a major military adversary on its western border.

But at the same time, the U.S. military appeared inside Iraq. After the Taliban was removed in 2001 and Saddam was removed in 2003, Iran faced American forces in Afghanistan to the east and Iraq to the west, while to the south remained the U.S. fleet and network of military bases across the Gulf. In the short term, this represented a major increase in Washington’s ability to apply military pressure to Tehran. Overthrowing Saddam therefore did not simply hand Iran an immediate strategic gift.

Tehran’s advantage became clearer later, as Washington proved unable to completely shape Iraq’s new political system. Many Shia parties that Saddam had repressed had lived in exile or maintained long-standing relationships with Iran. As elections brought Shia political forces to the center of Iraqi politics, Tehran gained channels of influence that Saddam’s regime had previously prevented from operating.

The rise of ISIS after 2014 accelerated this process. When Mosul fell and multiple Iraqi military units collapsed, Baghdad had to mobilize forces under the Popular Mobilization Forces to fight ISIS. Many of these groups fought for Iraqi security, but some hard-line Shia factions maintained deep relationships with Tehran. By 2026, the influence of Iran-aligned forces remained a major issue within Iraq’s political and security structure, while the U.S. withdrawal increased concerns that these groups would gain additional room to operate.

The effect of Saddam’s removal on Iran therefore unfolded in two stages. In the first stage, the United States moved military power directly to Iran’s border and created enormous pressure. In the second, Tehran exploited Iraq’s internal fragmentation to build influence from within the new political and security system.

9. Washington Eventually Found a Way to Reduce the Violence

By 2006, Iraq had entered an extremely dangerous period. A Sunni insurgency, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Shia militias, and sectarian violence were all expanding. Washington was forced to acknowledge that its existing deployment strategy was insufficient.

The 2007 Surge is often understood simply as the deployment of roughly 30,000 additional U.S. troops. But the more important change was how those troops were used. American forces moved deeper into residential areas, established joint security stations with Iraqi forces, and remained in areas they had secured rather than repeatedly withdrawing to large bases. The emphasis shifted from primarily hunting enemy forces to protecting civilians, holding territory, and preventing insurgents from returning.

Washington also exploited an important shift within the Sunni community. Many tribes in Anbar had become increasingly hostile to al-Qaeda in Iraq because the organization killed local leaders and attempted to impose its authority over Sunni communities themselves. The United States began cooperating with these forces through the Anbar Awakening and later the Sons of Iraq.

This represented a major change. Washington no longer treated every Sunni force opposed to the government as part of a single bloc. The United States sought to separate groups that could be reconciled from jihadist organizations that could not. Violence then fell sharply in 2007 and 2008. Al-Qaeda in Iraq lost many sanctuaries and support networks. The Iraqi state gained additional time to rebuild its security forces.

This demonstrated that the United States was not powerless in the face of Iraq’s chaos. When Washington increased troop levels, changed its deployment model, and combined military operations with efforts to split insurgent forces, security improved substantially. But it also revealed the limits of military power. The military could reduce violence and create political space. It could not force Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish factions to reach a durable political settlement on its own.

10. From the 2011 Withdrawal to the Return of ISIS

When the United States withdrew most of its forces at the end of 2011, Iraq was significantly more stable than it had been in 2006 and 2007. But the political foundations remained fragile.

The government of Nouri al-Maliki was increasingly accused by Sunni forces of concentrating power and excluding them from the system. At the same time, Syria descended into civil war. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was able to exploit both Sunni resentment inside Iraq and the security vacuum in Syria to rebuild and ultimately evolve into ISIS.

In 2014, Mosul fell. Many Iraqi military units that Washington had spent years building collapsed. ISIS seized large areas of Iraq and Syria. The United States had to return to Iraq at Baghdad’s invitation, but this time the mission was much narrower. Washington did not return to directly rebuild Iraq’s entire political system. The United States provided air power, intelligence, training, and support so Iraqi forces could defeat ISIS as a territorial organization.

By the end of 2017, ISIS had lost most of the territory it had controlled in Iraq. In the following years, Iraqi security forces gradually assumed most counterterrorism responsibilities. In 2024, the United States and Iraq agreed on a roadmap to transition from the coalition’s military mission toward a long-term bilateral security relationship. The two-phase plan continued support for operations against ISIS in Syria from Iraqi territory through at least September 2026, depending on conditions.

11. Why Did the United States Withdraw in 2026 if Iraq Still Mattered?

The 2026 withdrawal did not mean Washington had concluded that Iraq no longer possessed strategic value. The calculation had changed. ISIS no longer controlled vast territories. Iraqi security forces had become more capable. At the same time, American troops stationed in Iraq were increasingly becoming targets for Iran-aligned militias.

Every attack risked creating an escalation cycle. Militias attacked U.S. forces. Washington retaliated. Baghdad objected to the United States using military force on Iraqi territory. Iran-aligned groups then used Baghdad’s reaction to increase political pressure for American forces to leave.

Washington therefore had to ask a new question: Did the United States still need troops physically stationed inside Iraq to preserve influence, or could it achieve many of the same objectives through other instruments? By the end of September 2026, the United States completed the withdrawal of its remaining military forces under the timetable agreed by both governments. Iran-aligned factions portrayed the departure as a victory, while some Iraqi and Kurdish officials feared that the vacuum could create additional opportunities for both Iran-backed militias and remaining ISIS networks.

The United States clearly lost some advantages. Its ability to collect intelligence directly on the ground declined. Its ability to respond militarily from within Iraq declined. Iran-aligned forces gained additional operational space. But Washington also reduced the costs and risks associated with maintaining a network of bases that had repeatedly become targets.

More importantly, withdrawal did not mean the disappearance of American influence. The United States still maintains defense, diplomatic, intelligence, and economic relationships with Baghdad. Washington also retains a broader network of military bases and allies across the Middle East, allowing it to influence developments inside Iraq without necessarily maintaining a large force within the country itself.

Financial influence remains particularly important. Iraqi oil revenues continue to pass through an account held by the Central Bank of Iraq at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Oil provides roughly 90 percent of Iraq’s state budget, which means the dollar-based financial system continues to give Washington significant leverage even after the military withdrawal.

This may represent a new phase in U.S.-Iraq relations: less dependence on direct military presence, while preserving influence through security cooperation, finance, diplomacy, and the wider regional power of the United States.

12. Conclusion: Overthrowing Saddam Was Only the First Step

The decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein had a clear strategic logic within the post-9/11 security environment of the United States. Washington did not simply want to remove a hostile government. The United States wanted to end the indefinite containment of Saddam, eliminate a source of instability that had already launched wars in the Gulf, and open the possibility of transforming Iraq into part of a regional security structure more favorable to Washington.

The war produced real strategic changes. Saddam and the Baath regime could no longer threaten Kuwait. The United States gained a direct military position in the center of the Middle East during the years following the invasion. After Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, Washington possessed a greater ability to pressure Iran from multiple directions.

But those strategic gains must be weighed against the enormous costs of the postwar period and the assumptions that proved wrong. The central miscalculation was not Washington’s ability to defeat Saddam. It did that very quickly. The miscalculation was its incomplete understanding of what would emerge after Saddam disappeared.

Before using military force to overthrow a government, it is necessary to understand not only how strong that government’s military is, but also the forces that government is holding beneath it. A regime can itself be a source of instability. But in a fragmented state, it can simultaneously function as a lid holding down multiple power struggles. Removing the lid does not mean the forces beneath it will automatically cooperate to build a new order.

Iraq demonstrates this problem clearly. Saddam used a centralized system of power, the military, security forces, intelligence services, and repression to keep competing communities and factions under Baghdad’s control. The United States destroyed that center of power very quickly, but it did not have another center strong enough to immediately hold Shia, Sunni, Kurdish, tribal, and political networks together within a stable system.

That is why overthrowing Saddam took only weeks, while the post-Saddam problem lasted more than two decades. The United States had to change strategy, increase troop levels, rebuild Iraqi military and police forces, cooperate with Sunni tribes, fight al-Qaeda, withdraw most of its forces in 2011, return in 2014 to fight ISIS, and continue supporting Baghdad until the 2026 withdrawal.

The result in 2026 is also not an Iraq fully aligned with Washington. Iraq has not fragmented into multiple independent states, but power inside the country remains divided. Kurdistan retains extensive autonomy and its own Peshmerga forces. The Popular Mobilization Forces became part of the security structure, but some factions within them continue to maintain deep ties with Iran. Baghdad has a central government, military, and state institutions, but it still does not possess a complete monopoly over the use of force throughout the system.

Iran has major influence but does not completely control Iraq. The United States has withdrawn its troops but has not disappeared from Iraq. Washington still maintains security and diplomatic ties with Baghdad, retains substantial financial leverage, and continues to possess significant military power across the Middle East. The 2026 withdrawal can therefore be understood as a shift toward a model of influence that depends less on maintaining troops directly on Iraqi territory.

If the war is assessed against the strategic objectives Washington pursued, several outcomes are clear: Saddam was removed, a government that had directly waged war against U.S. partners in the Gulf disappeared, Iraq did not return to the pre-2003 power structure, and the United States still retains considerable ability to influence Baghdad. At the same time, the enormous postwar costs, the expansion of Iranian influence, and the continued fragmentation of power demonstrate that Washington did not achieve the full political order it once envisioned.

Iraq therefore reveals an important limit of military power. A superpower can destroy a regime in a matter of weeks. That does not mean it can build a replacement political order in a matter of months.

The central lesson from Iraq is not only whether Saddam should have been overthrown. It is the question that must be asked before any regime-change operation: After the existing government disappears, who controls the country the next day? If that question does not have a sufficiently strong answer, military victory may be only the beginning of a much longer war.

1. Washington Is Deliberately Extending the Transition

2. The United States Needs to Turn Its Current Advantage Into Durable Mechanisms

3. An Election Alone Is Not Enough to Create Democracy

4. Why Would a Multiparty Venezuela Benefit the United States?

5. Rodriguez Has Something Washington Needs Right Now

6. The Economy Needs to Stabilize Before Power Is Handed to a New Government

7. Machado Could Speed Up the Political Clock

8. Washington Is Also Taking a Gamble

9. The United States Is Preparing for Venezuela After Free Elections

1. Washington Is Deliberately Extending the Transition

Venezuela has come a long way since Nicolas Maduro lost power, yet Washington is still not pushing Caracas to hold an immediate presidential election. President Donald Trump has told interim President Delcy Rodriguez directly that Venezuela will eventually need elections. However, he did not demand a specific date. According to U.S. officials cited by Axios, the current plan has three steps: Change the composition of the Supreme Court, reform the electoral authority, and only then set an election date. Some officials in the Trump administration reportedly believe even 2027 may be too soon.

The White House has also publicly described the transition in a specific sequence: Stabilization, economic recovery, reconciliation, and finally democratic transition. The Trump administration has said a stable economy is a necessary condition for Venezuela to move toward elections. That sequence reflects how Washington currently views Venezuela. The United States has become too deeply involved to simply bring the country to election day and leave everything that follows to chance. A new government can emerge after one night of voting. A durable democratic political system takes much longer to build. Washington is using that time.

2. The United States Needs to Turn Its Current Advantage Into Durable Mechanisms

U.S. foreign policy has always been tied to national interests. Venezuela is no exception. Washington has already spent significant resources changing the balance of power in the country that holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves. Since Maduro lost power, the United States has rapidly expanded cooperation with the Rodriguez government in oil, mining, finance, debt restructuring and investment.

In September, the White House announced a major oil agreement granting U.S. interests management rights, economic benefits and long term purchasing rights across 17 oil fields. The White House publicly described the deal as part of a strategy to strengthen U.S. energy power, build U.S. led supply chains and replace previous Russian and Chinese influence. At the same time, the Rodriguez government has been negotiating with international financial institutions and the United States over Venezuela’s estimated $150 billion to $200 billion debt burden, as well as oil, gold, electricity projects and access to international capital. These things take time.

From Washington’s perspective, the period before elections gives the United States an opportunity to turn its current political influence into a structure of cooperation that is much harder to reverse: Long term contracts, investment, financial mechanisms, auditing systems, supply chains, corporate relationships and overlapping economic interests between the two countries. A new president can change policy, but a network of interests deeply embedded in the economy is far more difficult to unwind.

The United States also has to consider the possibility that a future elected Venezuelan government could take a different view of Washington. That government could review existing oil agreements, seek closer relations with China, rebuild deeper ties with Russia or simply reduce its dependence on the United States. Washington has every reason to prepare for that possibility now. The United States has already paid significant military, diplomatic and economic costs in Venezuela. Washington will want the post-Maduro order to produce lasting benefits for the United States rather than leave everything dependent on the outcome of another election a few years from now.

3. An Election Alone Is Not Enough to Create Democracy

Venezuela raises another question: What guarantees that the winner of the next election will continue to respect democracy? A weak democracy can legally elect a leader who later moves step by step to control the courts, electoral authorities, media, legislature and security forces. Authoritarian systems emerging from countries that once held elections are hardly unusual in modern history.

Venezuela also has several conditions that make the concentration of power easier: The state controls enormous natural resources, the administrative apparatus is powerful, the security forces have an important political role, and many institutions were weakened during the years of Chavez and Maduro. That is why Washington wants to change the institutions first.

Under the plan described by U.S. officials, the Supreme Court would be restructured to become more representative, opposition forces would participate in nominating judges, and the National Electoral Council would be reformed before an election date is announced. The logic is straightforward: The first election will only have lasting value if the winner cannot easily dismantle the system after entering the presidential palace. If Venezuela escapes Maduro only to hand almost all political power to another leader, it will simply have changed the name at the top. Washington needs more centers of power.

4. Why Would a Multiparty Venezuela Benefit the United States?

Democracy also has direct strategic value for the United States. Relations with an authoritarian government have one major weakness: An entire foreign policy relationship can depend on one person or one party. If that leader cooperates with Washington, the United States can reach agreements very quickly. When that leader turns against Washington, nearly the entire state can turn with him.

Venezuela under Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro is a clear example. When the center of power in Caracas chose confrontation with Washington, the United States had virtually no influence inside Venezuela’s political apparatus, while Russia, China, Cuba and Iran expanded their room to operate.

A multiparty democracy creates a different structure. The president becomes only one part of the system. Congress, opposition parties, courts, local governments, businesses, the media and civil society become separate centers of power. If a future Venezuelan government wanted to reduce cooperation with the United States, Washington would still have other channels through which to maintain ties and protect its interests. A party that loses one election can also return in the next one with U.S. support.

That makes the relationship between the two countries less dependent on the attitude of a single individual. For the United States, this is a major practical advantage of a democratic Venezuela. Washington needs a system sufficiently decentralized that no future leader can easily pull the entire country back into an anti-U.S. orbit as Chavez once did. To achieve that, the institutions need to be in place before the competition for power reaches its decisive stage.

5. Rodriguez Has Something Washington Needs Right Now

There is another paradox in the transition. Delcy Rodriguez’s government still carries many characteristics of the old power structure. Rodriguez served as vice president under Maduro. Venezuela still does not have a new government created through a free presidential election after Maduro’s fall. Yet the very concentration of power inside the current system allows Rodriguez to implement major changes more quickly.

A normal democracy has countless points at which policy can be slowed or blocked: Congress, opposition parties, courts, interest groups, labor unions, companies, local governments and ultimately voters. A highly centralized government has fewer such obstacles.

Washington currently needs Venezuela to restructure its debt, change the oil sector, attract investment, reform state institutions, restore relations with international financial institutions and prepare a new political system. Rodriguez can use the existing state apparatus to push those measures through more quickly. Trump has also established a direct working relationship with Rodriguez. Their September meeting in New York came as the two sides were significantly expanding economic and diplomatic cooperation. Reuters reported that Trump’s support for the interim government had increased in recent months.

At this stage, concentrated power can function as an instrument of transition. A newly elected democratic government would have to negotiate every major change with multiple political forces. It would also have to think about the next election. Painful but necessary economic measures could quickly become major political liabilities. Rodriguez has more concentrated authority to carry out measures that may be unpopular. Washington can use this period to complete the hardest parts of the restructuring before returning the political system fully to electoral competition.

The risks are also substantial. A transitional government with too much power can easily try to remain in power longer than originally intended. Time is therefore both an asset and a danger in the U.S. strategy if Washington does not use it carefully.

6. The Economy Needs to Stabilize Before Power Is Handed to a New Government

Washington is also concerned about the condition the first democratic government would inherit. Venezuela still faces a massive debt burden, a weak electrical system, an oil industry that requires huge investment, deteriorating infrastructure and an economy that has only recently emerged from years of crisis.

U.S. officials told Axios very directly that they do not want to hold elections only to leave a democratic government inheriting an “economic disaster” and facing major protests six months later over inflation and living conditions. They fear such a scenario could threaten the entire transition. That concern has a clear political basis.

People usually place enormous expectations on the government that emerges after a failed regime. They expect prices to fall, jobs to return, electricity to stabilize, public services to improve and everyday life to get better quickly. If those changes do not arrive, disappointment can spread just as fast. Former political forces can then return with a familiar message: Democracy has not improved your lives.

A new government weakened by economic failure can lose legitimacy before democratic institutions have had time to take root. Washington has invested too much in this process to accept the risk of a new democratic government collapsing simply because it took power too soon. The United States wants the next government to inherit a Venezuela where capital has begun to return, oil production is increasing, debt restructuring is underway and living conditions are stable enough for people to give the new democratic system time to prove itself.

7. Machado Could Speed Up the Political Clock

Maria Corina Machado has therefore become a particularly difficult figure in Washington’s calculations. She remains one of the most influential opposition figures in Venezuela. Reuters reported that Machado had the highest support among Venezuelan political figures in the surveys cited by the news agency in September.

Machado wants to return to Venezuela and push for free elections. She has also publicly questioned the durability of economic agreements signed during the transition, arguing that only a legitimate democratic government can provide long term stability for investors. Washington, however, has previously shown caution over the timing of her return. Reuters reported that U.S. officials asked Machado to delay her return because they feared her presence could disrupt the transition process backed by the United States. Machado’s movement is also not currently part of the main negotiating framework.

The reason is easy to understand when looking at the balance of power. Machado’s return would not simply mean an opposition leader stepping off a plane. She has the ability to mobilize crowds, increase pressure on the Rodriguez government and turn demands for early elections into a street movement. Once tens or hundreds of thousands of people begin demanding a specific election date, Washington will find it far more difficult to manage the process according to its own technical timetable.

A large movement could also push Venezuela toward a change of power through mass protests before the Supreme Court is reformed, the electoral authority is rebuilt, the economy is stabilized and the new mechanisms of cooperation with the United States have taken root. Machado has a political interest in acting early. Her strength comes from the support she has now, and political support can always change over time. Washington has an interest in extending the preparation period. Both sides want Venezuela to reach a competitive election, but their preferred timelines are not necessarily the same.

8. Washington Is Also Taking a Gamble

Extending the transition can bring significant benefits for the United States, but the risks increase the longer it continues. Rodriguez could build her own political base. Former members of the Maduro system could adapt to the new order and protect their own positions. Economic agreements with the United States could also be viewed by Venezuelans as deals signed before they had a chance to choose a new government. Machado has already used this argument by saying that only a genuinely democratic government can provide the long term legal stability investors need.

Washington also faces a problem of legitimacy. The United States played a decisive role in removing Maduro from power and has declared democracy to be the ultimate objective. If years pass without elections, more people will begin asking when the transition is supposed to end.

Even within the Trump administration, there is still no agreed timeline. Axios reported that some officials want elections in 2027 if conditions allow, while others believe the summer or fall of 2028 would be more realistic. One official acknowledged that the current situation cannot continue indefinitely.

Time helps Washington rebuild Venezuela. Time also helps those already in power strengthen their positions. The line between a transitional government and a government that wants to remain in office can become very blurred if there is no clear end date.

9. The United States Is Preparing for Venezuela After Free Elections

Washington now has an opportunity it has not had in decades: The chance to reshape its relationship with Venezuela almost from the ground up. The United States is using that opportunity across several areas at once.

The oil sector is being restructured with greater U.S. participation. Russian and Chinese companies are being pushed out of some strategic assets. The financial system is reconnecting with Western institutions. Venezuela’s enormous debt burden is beginning to be addressed. The courts and electoral authorities are being prepared for reform. Washington is also maintaining relations with several political groups rather than placing Venezuela’s entire future in the hands of one individual.

The publicly stated U.S. objective remains elections. But the timing of those elections will determine a great deal. If voting takes place immediately, the new government could inherit an old judicial system, an unfinished electoral structure, a weak economy and international economic relationships that are still being rebuilt. That government would face enormous pressure from its first day in office.

If Washington has another one or two years, the picture could look very different. Oil contracts could already be operating. U.S. companies could have committed capital. Debt restructuring could have a clear path. International financial institutions could have returned. The electoral authority could be reformed. The courts could include representatives of different political forces. Political parties would have time to reorganize. Living conditions could have improved.

Venezuelans would still choose their own president, but the next president would enter a system far more deeply structured than the Venezuela that existed immediately after Maduro lost power. That is the value of time for Washington.

Before Hugo Chavez, Venezuela spent roughly four decades under a multiparty democratic system centered largely around Accion Democratica and COPEI. During that period, Venezuela was also one of the United States’ most important political, economic and energy partners in Latin America, with close government ties, major U.S. corporate investment and an important role in supplying oil to the American market.

Chavez gradually dismantled that structure of relations. Venezuela moved closer to Cuba, Russia, China and Iran, while Washington’s political influence in Caracas steadily declined. The process continued under Nicolas Maduro.

For the United States, the opportunity now extends far beyond regaining access to an oil market. Washington has a chance to rebuild the position it once held in Venezuela before Chavez, but this time within a structure capable of surviving multiple governments. With an opportunity to reconstruct the entire relationship, Washington has little reason to rush into an election before the most important changes are firmly in place.

Machado therefore becomes a major variable. She has the ability to turn the demand for democracy into immediate political pressure, while Washington still needs more time to complete a much longer transition.

Venezuela’s future may revolve around three questions: How soon do Venezuelans want the right to choose a new government, how much time does Washington need to complete its preparations for the post-transition period, and will Machado accept that timetable or increase the pressure to the point of direct confrontation with the United States?

Taken individually, a port in Somaliland, an investment in Angola, or an allied force in Yemen may not appear to form a coherent strategy. But when these pieces are placed on the same map, a pattern begins to emerge: The UAE is building a network of power stretching from the Middle East into the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Contents

1. The UAE Does Not Need to Control Entire Countries

2. Ports Are the First Layer of the Network

3. The Horn of Africa Is Where the Pattern Becomes Clearest

4. Berbera: Where Commerce and Security Converge

5. Yemen: Withdrawing Troops Does Not Mean Withdrawing Influence

6. Sudan: The Network Enters More Contested Territory

7. Libya: A Pattern That Appeared Earlier

8. Why Do Ports and Local Forces Go Together?

9. What Does the UAE Actually Want?

10. A Different Kind of Power Is Emerging

1. The UAE Does Not Need to Control Entire Countries

Traditional great powers often build influence through military bases, security treaties, state aid, or direct deployments. The UAE is usually more flexible. A port can generate commercial benefits, an economic zone can attract capital, a logistics company can build long-term relationships with governments, while a training program can establish ties with local security forces.

A friendly local force can also protect UAE interests without requiring thousands of Emirati troops to remain permanently deployed. This does not mean every UAE investment is a geopolitical project. Most ports, logistics facilities, and transport operations still have to generate commercial returns, but for a country as deeply dependent on international trade as the UAE, commercial and strategic interests can often converge in the same location.

This is essential to understanding how the UAE expands its influence: It does not necessarily seek to own territory, but rather to become difficult to separate from the infrastructure, commerce, and balance of power in strategically important regions.

2. Ports Are the First Layer of the Network

The UAE possesses two particularly large logistics networks. DP World is ultimately owned by the Government of Dubai and operates a network of ports, container terminals, and logistics hubs across multiple continents. In Abu Dhabi, AD Ports Group forms a second network, with operations stretching from the Middle East into Africa and other regions.

In recent years, UAE companies have continued expanding their presence at ports including Luanda in Angola, Pointe-Noire in the Republic of the Congo, Douala in Cameroon, Aqaba in Jordan, and Latakia in Syria. These are primarily commercial projects, but a 20- or 30-year port operating agreement has very different implications from simply selling goods to a country or making a short-term financial investment.

When a UAE company manages a major commercial gateway for decades, the UAE becomes part of the infrastructure that the local economy uses every day. This creates long-term relationships with governments, businesses, economic elites, and national logistics systems. Ports therefore do more than move goods. They create relationships that can endure across multiple political administrations.

3. The Horn of Africa Is Where the Pattern Becomes Clearest

Nowhere is the intersection of UAE commercial, political, and security interests clearer than in the Horn of Africa. The region lies immediately south of Bab al-Mandab, the strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and then the Indian Ocean. It is one of the most important maritime corridors linking Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

The UAE has built deep relationships with Somaliland and Puntland, two entities with complicated relations with Somalia’s federal government. In Somaliland, DP World manages and develops the Port of Berbera while also developing the surrounding economic zone and logistics infrastructure. Farther east, a company within the DP World system has also participated in developing the Port of Bosaso in Puntland.

These projects create a chain of presence along the Gulf of Aden, directly across from Yemen. Viewed individually, each port could simply be considered part of a normal logistics expansion strategy. But when placed alongside Bab al-Mandab, Yemen, and the Red Sea, the strategic value of this network becomes much clearer.

4. Berbera: Where Commerce and Security Converge

Berbera is perhaps the clearest example of how a commercial location can simultaneously carry strategic value. Somaliland previously allowed the UAE to develop a military facility in Berbera and use airport infrastructure there. The relationship between the UAE and Somaliland has therefore extended beyond port operations and economic zone development.

At the same location, the UAE has ties with the Somaliland authorities, a Dubai-owned company operates the port, Emirati entities invest in logistics infrastructure, and security relations have existed for years. When commerce, diplomacy, and security overlap at the same point, UAE influence becomes considerably more durable. If one area of the relationship encounters problems, other ties can still help sustain the presence of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the region.

5. Yemen: Withdrawing Troops Does Not Mean Withdrawing Influence

Yemen illustrates a different approach. The UAE joined the Saudi-led coalition in 2015 and at one point deployed substantial forces on the ground. Abu Dhabi later withdrew most of its direct military presence, but Emirati influence did not disappear with the troops.

The UAE built deep ties with the Southern Transitional Council, or STC, a force seeking to restore an independent state in southern Yemen. Abu Dhabi has also maintained relationships with other forces along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This has allowed the UAE to retain influence in strategically important areas even after reducing its direct military presence.

Southern Yemen is particularly important because it surrounds the Gulf of Aden and provides access to Bab al-Mandab. From this perspective, the logic is straightforward: A country does not necessarily need to deploy its own military to control territory directly if local forces already share some of its political and security interests.

But this model also carries risks. Local forces are not tools that can be completely controlled from abroad. They have their own objectives and ambitions and may act in ways that create friction with other UAE partners. Yemen shows that power exercised through local partners can generate substantial influence, but it does not amount to absolute control.

6. Sudan: The Network Enters More Contested Territory

Sudan is a far more sensitive case. The Sudanese government has repeatedly accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, in its war against the Sudanese Armed Forces, which began in 2023. The UAE denies supplying weapons to the RSF and says its role has focused on humanitarian assistance and promoting a diplomatic solution.

International investigations and United Nations reports have examined numerous allegations involving logistics routes through Chad and neighboring countries. Because Abu Dhabi denies providing direct military support to the RSF, these claims must be clearly distinguished between allegations, investigative findings, and facts acknowledged by the parties themselves.

Sudan nevertheless illustrates a broader issue. When a country has built logistics, financial, aviation, and political networks stretching from the Gulf into the Horn of Africa and North Africa, those networks are not valuable only in peacetime. Once war begins, the same commercial corridors and cross-border relationships can become important factors in the balance of power.

7. Libya: A Pattern That Appeared Earlier

Sudan is not the first conflict in which the UAE has appeared alongside outside powers backing competing local forces. During Libya’s civil war, the UAE, Egypt, and several other partners supported Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the east, while Turkey backed the authorities in Tripoli.

Libya, Sudan, and Yemen are not identical conflicts. The UAE’s partners are different, local objectives differ, and the level of intervention has varied. Yet one recurring feature remains: Abu Dhabi often builds direct relationships with forces capable of controlling territory, transport routes, or strategically important areas rather than placing all of its influence in the hands of central governments.

This is particularly useful in divided countries or states where the central government does not fully control the national territory. An agreement with the government in the capital may not provide actual access to a port, airport, or road controlled by another force. Relationships with local actors allow the UAE to operate in fragmented political environments.

8. Why Do Ports and Local Forces Go Together?

At first glance, these two tools appear almost unrelated. One involves containers, cranes, warehouses, and logistics contracts. The other involves security forces, political organizations, and local armed groups. Strategically, however, they solve two different problems.

Ports create durability. A contract lasting several decades requires businesses, governments, and economic systems on both sides to continue working together across multiple political administrations. Local forces, meanwhile, provide access and help protect influence in environments where central governments do not fully control their territory.

When these two elements appear together, a form of networked power begins to emerge. The UAE does not necessarily have to govern a territory if it has access to its ports, relationships with local authorities, economic interests on the ground, and security partners strong enough to protect those interests.

9. What Does the UAE Actually Want?

No single motive explains every UAE activity. The first remains trade. The UAE has built its economy around aviation, shipping, ports, finance, and logistics. Participating in the operation of multiple points along global supply chains generates profits for Emirati companies while strengthening Dubai and Abu Dhabi as international commercial hubs.

The second interest is maritime security. Yemen, Somaliland, Puntland, and the ports around the Red Sea lie close to routes on which UAE trade directly depends. A conflict at Bab al-Mandab, in the Red Sea, or at the Strait of Hormuz can quickly become an economic problem for the UAE.

The third interest is political. For years, the UAE has opposed movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and has built relationships with governments and forces that share similar views. This has influenced Abu Dhabi’s policies in Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere.

Finally, there is international status. A small country can become difficult to ignore if the ports, investments, trade networks, and security relationships of many other states are partly connected to it. Simply by controlling or participating in ports, trade routes, investment networks, and security relationships across multiple regions, the UAE has been able to generate influence far greater than its physical size would suggest.

10. A Different Kind of Power Is Emerging

It would be a mistake to assess the UAE simply by counting the number of soldiers, aircraft, or military bases it possesses. Much of Emirati influence does not sit in one place. It is distributed across a network: A port in Somaliland, a logistics contract in Africa, an economic zone, a transport corridor, relationships with local authorities, a force trained in Yemen, or a political partner in Libya.

Not all of these links were created for the same purpose. Nor should every commercial activity undertaken by DP World or AD Ports be treated as an instrument of UAE foreign policy. But when enough commercial, political, and security interests converge in strategically important locations, their combined effect creates power greater than any individual project.

This may be the most accurate way to understand the UAE’s rise. Abu Dhabi is not trying to build a territorial empire, nor does it possess the capacity to project military power on the scale of the world’s largest powers. Instead, the UAE is building a system of access points and long-term relationships in places where international commerce, politics, and security intersect. The UAE does not need to control the entire map. It only needs to be present at enough of the important points on it.

The Houthis are advancing toward Bab el-Mandeb just as shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is being disrupted. For Saudi Arabia, that creates a threat to both its southern border and its oil export routes. For Iran, every Houthi advance could force its adversaries to spread their resources thinner. The United States, the UAE, Egypt and other countries also have interests in the Red Sea, but they are not equally willing to pay the price of protecting them.

Yemen therefore cannot be explained as a contest between two adversaries. Outside powers are competing for influence, while Yemeni groups pursue their own goals. To understand who stands to gain, we need to look at what each country wants to protect and how far it is willing to go.

Contents

1. Why does Yemen matter to the wider region?

2. Why can outside powers not control Yemen through local proxies?

3. What does Saudi Arabia want?

4. How does Iran benefit from the Houthis?

5. Why is the UAE competing with Saudi Arabia within the camp opposed to the Houthis?

6. What are U.S. interests, and how far is Trump willing to go?

7. How far will other countries go to help Saudi Arabia?

8. Who can shape Yemen after the war?

1. Why does Yemen matter to the wider region?

Yemen sits on the eastern shore of Bab el-Mandeb, the strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Ships traveling between Europe and many Asian markets pass through these waters when they use the Suez Canal route. Controlling a stretch of Yemen’s coast does not mean controlling the entire strait. It can, however, be enough to threaten vessels, raise shipping costs and force countries that rely on the route to respond.

In 2026, the pressure has increased because traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, has also been disrupted by the war between the United States and Iran. Saudi Arabia has used its Red Sea ports as an alternative outlet for oil exports. As the Houthis advanced along Yemen’s coast in September, that alternative also became less secure. The two straits lie on different waterways, but their effects are now closely linked in Riyadh’s calculations.

That is why a change in territorial control in Yemen attracts attention in so many capitals. For Saudi Arabia, the issue is national security. For Egypt, it is traffic through Suez. For Iran and the United States, it is part of a wider confrontation. For the UAE, Yemen’s coast and south are tied to its influence around the Gulf of Aden.

2. Why can outside powers not control Yemen through local proxies?

The Houthis control the capital, Sanaa, and much of northern Yemen. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council and based in Aden, is backed by Saudi Arabia. But the forces opposed to the Houthis also include the Southern Transitional Council, forces led by Tarek Saleh, the Islah party and other local groups. They do not share a single vision of Yemen after the war.

The Southern Transitional Council wants to restore an independent southern state. Other groups want to keep Yemen united, but they also compete for command and influence within the government. Supplying the forces opposed to the Houthis therefore does not automatically create a unified front. These divisions are among the reasons Saudi backed forces lost ground during the Houthi offensive in September.

Outside countries can provide weapons, money or political backing. They cannot simply erase the Yemeni factions’ own ambitions. That is the first limit on any attempt to shape the country from abroad.

3. What does Saudi Arabia want?

Riyadh led the coalition intervention in Yemen in 2015 to restore the government ousted by the Houthis and prevent a force close to Iran from consolidating power along its southern border. More than a decade later, its two core interests remain: Preventing repeated attacks on Saudi territory and stopping Yemen from becoming a permanent source of pressure on Red Sea shipping.

Saudi Arabia also wants a Yemeni partner strong enough to negotiate and govern territory. An internationally recognized government that is divided and steadily losing strategic positions cannot fill that role. Riyadh must therefore counter the Houthis while keeping the Yemeni forces it relies on from falling apart. That is a harder political task than launching an air campaign.

Riyadh has no easy choice when it comes to the Houthis. If it allows them to strengthen their position around Bab el-Mandeb, Saudi Arabia will have to live with a standing threat to a vital export route. If it expands its military campaign, the Houthis could intensify attacks deep inside Saudi territory. These risks explain why Riyadh is seeking military support and partners to protect maritime routes while keeping diplomacy open. Its strategic choices remain difficult.

4. How does Iran benefit from the Houthis?

Iran has supported the Houthis with weapons, training and intelligence. That relationship has helped them build the capacity to strike far beyond the areas they control. Yet the Houthis are a Yemeni movement with a governing structure, a domestic support base and an agenda of their own. Describing their every action as an order from Tehran overlooks their ability to make their own decisions.

Tehran can still benefit without directing every Houthi move. When the Houthis threaten Saudi Arabia or ships passing through Bab el-Mandeb, Iran’s adversaries have to divide their resources between the Gulf and the Red Sea. Tehran’s bargaining position may improve, especially when the Strait of Hormuz is also under pressure. That is a strategic benefit, not proof that Iran controls every decision on Yemen’s battlefield.

5. Why is the UAE competing with Saudi Arabia within the camp opposed to the Houthis?

The UAE joined Saudi Arabia in the coalition against the Houthis, but the two countries have sought influence through different Yemeni groups. Riyadh relies on the internationally recognized government and needs a partner capable of securing the border. The UAE previously trained and equipped the Southern Transitional Council, which wants an independent south. Abu Dhabi also has interests in shipping routes and ports, and it seeks to contain political Islamist groups it regards as rivals.

These differences have gone beyond policy debates. In late 2025, the Southern Transitional Council advanced into Hadramawt and al-Mahra, provinces bordering Saudi Arabia. A Saudi led coalition then struck the port of Mukalla, alleging that shipments from the UAE contained military supplies for the group. The UAE denied that the shipments contained weapons. After Yemen’s government ordered Emirati troops to leave, the UAE announced it would withdraw its remaining forces, possibly to prevent tensions with Saudi Arabia from escalating. That withdrawal does not establish that the UAE ended all support for the Southern Transitional Council.

This is a layer of competition that is often overlooked. Saudi Arabia and Iran are vying for security influence in Yemen and the Red Sea, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE disagree over how power should be distributed within the camp opposed to the Houthis. The Houthis can exploit that division without having created it.

6. What are U.S. interests, and how far is Trump willing to go?

The United States has three direct interests: Protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, limiting threats from Iran and the Houthis to U.S. interests, and maintaining its security relationship with Saudi Arabia. The two countries signed a strategic defense cooperation agreement in November 2025. But a defense relationship does not mean Washington has committed to launching an offensive campaign whenever Riyadh asks. The U.S. State Department has identified freedom of navigation in the Red Sea as a core American interest.

The events of 2019 show the limits of U.S. commitments. After attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities, the Trump administration blamed Iran. Washington sent air defenses, aircraft and additional forces to Saudi Arabia, but did not launch a retaliatory military strike against Iran. The Pentagon said its aim was to protect infrastructure, trade routes and U.S. interests while avoiding a direct war. U.S. officials determined that the attacks on the oil facilities had not originated in Yemen. The lesson for Riyadh is clear: The United States may help Saudi Arabia strengthen its defenses, but that does not mean Washington will attack Iran in retaliation on Saudi Arabia’s behalf.

Trump now faces a similar choice under more difficult circumstances. The United States struck the Houthis for two months in 2025 before reaching a ceasefire with the group. In September 2026, Washington has not agreed to Saudi requests for direct strikes on the Houthis. The head of Yemen’s internationally recognized government has also asked Trump for military support. The White House has announced no new commitment to fight directly in Yemen. Meanwhile, the United States is at war with Iran. A new campaign in Yemen would compete for forces, weapons and political support.

Washington is also keeping a separate channel of communication open. Vice President JD Vance has confirmed contact between the United States and the Houthis. A reported meeting between representatives of the two sides in Oman has not been confirmed by the State Department. The Houthis say they do not intend to attack U.S. ships. That assurance cannot be treated as a guarantee, but it helps explain how Washington might pursue its own maritime interests without adopting Riyadh’s military objectives.

That choice carries a political cost. If the United States stands aside while Saudi Arabia comes under pressure, Washington’s credibility with its partner could suffer. If it enters the fight, Trump risks opening another front with no assurance that airstrikes can eliminate the Houthis. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said the United States intends to honor its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, without specifying what Washington would do in Yemen. It is therefore too early to say that the United States has abandoned Saudi Arabia. What is clear is that the two countries have not agreed on the level of involvement needed now.

7. How far will other countries go to help Saudi Arabia?

Pakistan and Turkey signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in Mecca in August 2026. Its collective defense provision raised expectations, but their response over Yemen has so far been more cautious than the treaty’s language might suggest. Pakistan says there have been no discussions of a military response under the agreement. Turkey says it is prepared to meet some military needs, particularly technical ones, but has not announced a decision to send forces to fight the Houthis.

Egypt has a direct interest in the Red Sea because ships passing through Bab el-Mandeb also feed traffic toward the Suez Canal. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman discussed maritime security and Yemen on September 15. Egypt supports Saudi Arabia’s right to defend its security, but Cairo has not confirmed that it will join the fighting or the Mecca agreement. Britain has agreed to provide air refueling support for Saudi defensive operations for a limited period. These approaches show that support can range from diplomacy to logistics, with direct strikes on the Houthis representing a much larger step.

China exercises influence through a different channel. Beijing has relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and needs energy shipping routes to remain open. China has publicly called for de-escalation and safe maritime passage. Its relationship with Tehran gives it a diplomatic channel, but does not mean Beijing can dictate what Iran or the Houthis do.

8. Who can shape Yemen after the war?

Three competitions are unfolding at once. Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying for security influence in Yemen and around the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia and the UAE disagree over which groups should have a say in the south. The United States wants to protect its maritime interests and its relationship with Saudi Arabia, but has not agreed to join Riyadh in a new war in Yemen. Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Britain and China all have roles, though their goals and willingness to take risks differ.

Yemen is therefore a test for every country seeking influence there. Influence is measured by a country’s ability to protect its interests, bring Yemeni partners together and bear the cost of a postwar order. Yemenis will live with the outcome longer than any outside power. The United Nations estimates that more than 21 million people in Yemen will need humanitarian assistance in 2026.

Taken separately, these developments may look like a collection of military agreements, port investments and diplomatic initiatives. Put them on the same map, however, and a larger structure begins to emerge. A dispute that has lasted for more than 30 years between Somalia and Somaliland is becoming increasingly connected to wider power struggles across the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Contents

1. Why Do Somalia and Somaliland Exist Separately?

2. Why Is Somaliland Becoming More Strategically Important?

3. Somalia: Which Countries Are Moving Closer to Mogadishu?

4. Somaliland: Which Countries Are Moving Closer to Hargeisa?

5. Which Rivalries Are Converging on Somalia and Somaliland?

6. How Far Have Signs of Proxy Competition Developed?

7. How Is Somaliland Lobbying the United States?

8. A Local Dispute Is Becoming a Regional Power Contest

1. Why Do Somalia and Somaliland Exist Separately?

Somalia and Somaliland are not 2 internationally recognized countries with equal legal status. Somalia is an internationally recognized state. Somaliland has its own government, president, security forces, currency and administrative institutions, but most of the international community still considers it part of Somalia. The African Union continues to support Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and rejects the unilateral recognition of Somaliland as an independent state.

The roots of this situation go back to the colonial period. The territory that is now Somaliland was formerly British Somaliland, while much of southern Somalia was administered by Italy. British Somaliland became independent on June 26, 1960. On July 1, 1960, the former Italian administered territory also became independent, and the 2 territories united to form the Somali Republic. The union was therefore not simply the absorption of one province into an already existing country. Two territories that had been governed separately by Britain and Italy joined together to create a new state.

The union later descended into crisis. Under Mohamed Siad Barre, conflict between the central government and the Somali National Movement in the north became increasingly severe. In 1988, Hargeisa was devastated during fighting between government forces and the insurgency. Human Rights Watch has documented mass civilian deaths and large scale displacement during the conflict. When Siad Barre’s government collapsed in 1991, leaders of the Somali National Movement and traditional elders declared Somaliland independent from Somalia.

This history explains why Hargeisa rejects the idea that Somaliland should simply be described as a province seeking secession. Somaliland argues that it had already existed as an independent state before voluntarily joining Somalia in 1960, that the union later failed, and that Somaliland restored its independence in 1991. Mogadishu rejects that interpretation and considers Somaliland an integral part of Somalia. That fundamental disagreement has continued for more than 3 decades.

2. Why Is Somaliland Becoming More Strategically Important?

If Somaliland were located somewhere less strategically important, the dispute might have remained primarily an issue between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Instead, Somaliland controls a long coastline along the Gulf of Aden, directly across from Yemen and close to the maritime route leading through Bab el Mandeb into the Red Sea. The port of Berbera sits near one of the major corridors linking the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and European markets.

Its geographic value has increased as the Houthis in Yemen have expanded their ability to threaten commercial shipping around Bab el Mandeb. Access to Berbera could provide an additional commercial, logistical or security position on the southern side of the Gulf of Aden. This does not mean Berbera has already become a foreign military base, but it helps explain why the port repeatedly appears in the calculations of the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Israel and now Somaliland’s lobbying campaign in Washington.

Somaliland also understands that geography can be converted into diplomatic leverage. Hargeisa is no longer relying only on historical arguments or more than 30 years of effective self government. Its government is putting Berbera, mineral resources, investment opportunities and potential security cooperation on the table as incentives for countries willing to deepen relations with Somaliland.

3. Somalia: Which Countries Are Moving Closer to Mogadishu?

Somalia’s objective is relatively clear: Keep Somaliland within the borders Mogadishu considers sovereign territory, prevent additional countries from recognizing Somaliland and strengthen the federal government’s military capabilities. But the countries moving closer to Somalia do not all have the same motivation. Each views Mogadishu through a different strategic lens.

Turkey: Military Influence and a Strategic Position in the Horn of Africa

Turkey is one of Somalia’s most important military partners. Ankara has trained Somali security forces for years and maintains a major military training facility in Mogadishu. In 2024, the 2 countries signed a 10 year defense and economic agreement under which Turkey would help develop Somalia’s naval capabilities and protect its territorial waters. Turkey has also publicly opposed the recognition of Somaliland and continues to support Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Somalia receives military training, greater defense capacity and a partner capable of helping protect its coastline. Turkey, in return, gains a strategic position in the Horn of Africa close to major trade routes linking the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Ankara’s relationship with Mogadishu also extends into infrastructure, energy, trade and diplomacy. Supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity therefore also protects a political and strategic relationship that Turkey has spent years building.

Egypt: Somalia Is Also Part of the Competition with Ethiopia

Egypt significantly increased its defense relationship with Somalia after Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in early 2024. Cairo and Mogadishu reached a security agreement, after which Egypt began delivering weapons to Somalia. In September 2024, an Egyptian warship delivered additional artillery and air defense weapons to Mogadishu, according to Reuters.

Egypt’s motivation goes beyond supporting Somalia. Cairo has a long running strategic dispute with Ethiopia, particularly over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. When Ethiopia sought access to Somaliland’s coast and the possibility of establishing a naval facility there, Egypt gained another reason to strengthen its relationship with Mogadishu.

Somalia therefore gives Egypt another source of strategic pressure around Ethiopia. In return, Egypt provides Somalia with weapons, military cooperation and a partner with a direct interest in preventing Ethiopia from using Somaliland to alter the regional balance. Reuters reported in 2024 that the growing convergence of Egyptian and Somali interests was already raising concerns that the Egypt Ethiopia rivalry could spill into another arena in the Horn of Africa.

Saudi Arabia: Red Sea Security and Competition with the United Arab Emirates

Saudi Arabia publicly supports Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In February 2026, the 2 countries signed a memorandum on military cooperation in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has also opposed moves that could weaken Somalia’s unity and sovereignty.

Riyadh has an obvious geographic reason to care. Somalia and Somaliland lie across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea from the Arabian Peninsula. Developments in Yemen, Bab el Mandeb and the Horn of Africa can directly affect Saudi trade, energy flows and maritime security.

The agreement was signed by Minister of Transport and Logistic Services and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Transport General Authority Saleh Al-Jasser and Somali Minister of Ports and Maritime Transport Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, in the presence of several officials from both sides.

There is another layer of competition. Reuters reported in February 2026 that tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had extended from Yemen into the Horn of Africa. While Abu Dhabi has developed extensive economic and security networks in Somaliland and elsewhere, Riyadh has increased coordination with Egypt, Turkey and Qatar.

This does not mean Saudi Arabia supports Somalia simply to counter the United Arab Emirates. But Somalia is becoming a place where Riyadh’s Red Sea security concerns and its wider competition with Abu Dhabi can overlap.

Qatar: Defense Cooperation and Influence in Mogadishu

Qatar also supports Somalia’s sovereignty and has opposed unilateral recognition of Somaliland. In January 2026, Somalia and Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement covering military training, exchange of expertise, defense capacity development and broader security cooperation.

Doha has maintained political ties with Mogadishu and views the Horn of Africa as part of a wider network of influence across the Middle East and Africa. For Somalia, Qatar adds another diplomatic and defense partner to a network that already includes Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

HE Minister of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al Khulaifi met on Monday with HE Somali President’s Envoy, Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir Mohamed and HE State Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Ali Mohamed Omar.

Taken together, Somalia now has a relatively clear group of partners. Turkey provides long term military presence and training. Egypt supplies weapons and views Somalia partly through its competition with Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia is focused on Red Sea security and the regional balance with the United Arab Emirates. Qatar is expanding defense cooperation while maintaining political influence in Mogadishu.

These countries do not form a formal military alliance defending Somalia. Their interests are different. But for now, all of them have reasons to support Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity rather than Somaliland’s independence.

4. Somaliland: Which Countries Are Moving Closer to Hargeisa?

Somaliland is pursuing a fundamentally different objective. Hargeisa has exercised effective control over much of its territory for decades, but control on the ground has not translated into broad international recognition. Somaliland is therefore using geography, ports, natural resources and security cooperation to build relationships that could help break its diplomatic isolation.

Israel: Diplomatic Recognition Combined with Military Cooperation

Israel has gone further than any other country. On December 26, 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent country. Somalia rejected the decision, while the African Union maintained that Somaliland remained part of Somalia.

The relationship then expanded into security cooperation. In June 2026, Somaliland’s defense minister confirmed to Reuters that Israel was training Somaliland police and military forces. He denied reports, however, that the 2 sides were negotiating the establishment of an Israeli military base in Somaliland.

For Somaliland, Israel provides what Hargeisa needs most: Recognition. Recognition by a United Nations member state creates a precedent and demonstrates that the international consensus surrounding Somaliland can be broken.

For Israel, Somaliland’s geography is significant. Somaliland lies directly across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen and close to Bab el Mandeb, while the Houthis have become a direct security threat to Israel and to Red Sea shipping. This does not prove that Israel recognized Somaliland solely because of the Houthis, but it creates a clear strategic rationale for deeper relations with Hargeisa.

United Arab Emirates: Ports, Investment and a Network of Influence

The United Arab Emirates has not formally recognized Somaliland as an independent state, but Abu Dhabi has exercised significant practical influence there for years. Dubai based DP World has invested more than $400 million in expanding the port of Berbera and developing a commercial zone around it. Somaliland has also maintained economic and security ties with the United Arab Emirates even after the Somali federal government cut relations with Abu Dhabi in early 2026.

Somaliland receives capital, infrastructure, commercial connectivity and access to an influential Arab partner. The United Arab Emirates, in return, gains a strategic position on the Gulf of Aden and another node in a wider network stretching from the Arabian Peninsula into the Horn of Africa.

Reuters has described Abu Dhabi as having built substantial economic and military influence across the region through investment, diplomacy and relationships with local actors. That is why the relationship between the United Arab Emirates and Somaliland is increasingly viewed within the wider context of Saudi and Emirati competition in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia: Somaliland Has What Addis Ababa Lacks Most

Ethiopia’s motivation is more straightforward: Access to the sea. Ethiopia lost its coastline after Eritrea became independent and remains heavily dependent on Djibouti for international trade. In early 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland seeking access to part of its coastline for commercial purposes and the possible development of a naval facility. Somalia regarded the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty.

In return, Somaliland hoped Ethiopia might eventually move toward recognizing its independence. If that happened, Hargeisa would gain recognition from one of the most influential countries in the Horn of Africa, while Ethiopia would gain another route to the sea and reduce its dependence on Djibouti.

However, Ethiopia cannot simply be placed in a fixed Somaliland camp. Following the 2024 crisis, Turkey mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia. In the Ankara Declaration of December 11, 2024, the 2 sides reaffirmed respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and agreed to seek a mechanism that could provide Ethiopia with maritime access under Somalia’s sovereignty.

Ethiopia should therefore be viewed as a country with major strategic interests in Somaliland rather than a country that openly supports Somaliland’s independence. But Addis Ababa’s need for maritime access ensures that it will remain a major variable.

United States: Somaliland’s Most Important Diplomatic Target

The United States does not currently belong in the Somaliland camp. Washington maintains relations with the Somali government and continues to participate in security structures related to Somalia. Hargeisa, however, has placed the United States at the center of its latest diplomatic campaign.

In September 2026, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi traveled to Washington to lobby for recognition. In a September 16 interview with Semafor, he said Somaliland was willing to offer access to facilities and mineral resources while leaving open the possibility of broader military access in future negotiations.

Somaliland already has security cooperation with the United States, including training, but there is no United States military base in Somaliland. Abdullahi made clear that greater military access could become part of future negotiations if Somaliland received greater security and political benefits in return.

This marks an important shift in Somaliland’s diplomatic strategy. Hargeisa is no longer speaking only about self determination or the history of 1960. Its message has become more transactional: Somaliland has Berbera, coastline, mineral resources, a position directly across from Yemen and the potential to become a security partner. In exchange, it wants recognition and international support.

5. Which Rivalries Are Converging on Somalia and Somaliland?

Viewed only through Somalia and Somaliland, the dispute is mainly about independence and territorial integrity. Once the outside powers are added, however, a more complicated network of rivalries becomes visible.

Egypt and Ethiopia have competed for years over the Nile. Ethiopia wants greater maritime access, including through Somaliland, while Egypt has moved closer to Somalia and supplied weapons to Mogadishu. The dispute between Hargeisa and Mogadishu has therefore become another place where the strategic interests of Cairo and Addis Ababa could collide.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are also competing for influence from Yemen into the Horn of Africa. Abu Dhabi has deep relationships with Somaliland and other local actors, while Reuters reported in February 2026 that Riyadh was increasing coordination with Egypt, Turkey and Qatar as competition with the United Arab Emirates spread into the region.

Israel, meanwhile, views the area partly through the security environment surrounding Yemen, the Houthis and the Red Sea. Turkey has long term interests in the Somali government and has opposed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Ankara also helped prevent the maritime dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia from escalating further.

These countries do not form 2 fixed alliances. Saudi Arabia still maintains relations with the United Arab Emirates. Turkey maintains relations with Ethiopia despite supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity. Ethiopia has reconciled with Mogadishu despite its earlier agreement with Somaliland. The Horn of Africa is therefore better understood as a network of overlapping interests rather than a simple 2 sided confrontation.

6. How Far Have Signs of Proxy Competition Developed?

There is not yet enough evidence to describe Somalia and Somaliland as a proxy war between outside powers. The countries aligned more closely with each side are not currently using Somalia and Somaliland to wage a direct conflict against one another in the classic sense of proxy warfare.

However, several conditions commonly associated with proxy competition are becoming increasingly visible. Somalia and Somaliland have an unresolved sovereignty dispute. Outside powers have competing interests. Their relationships are no longer limited to diplomacy and investment, but increasingly include military training, arms deliveries, military facilities, maritime cooperation and defense agreements.

On Somalia’s side, Turkey trains Somali forces, Egypt has supplied weapons, Qatar has signed a defense cooperation agreement and Saudi Arabia has expanded military cooperation. On Somaliland’s side, Israel is training security forces, the United Arab Emirates has deep economic and security ties, and Ethiopia retains major strategic interests related to maritime access.

More importantly, many of these outside powers have their own rivalries. Egypt looks toward Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia is watching the expansion of Emirati influence. Israel looks toward Yemen and the Houthis. Turkey wants to preserve its long term position in Somalia.

Reuters reported in February 2026 that Saudi and Emirati competition in the Horn of Africa was increasingly placing pressure on local actors and risked making existing conflicts more complicated.

The line to watch is the level of military support. If outside powers continue investing, training and signing defense agreements without using local actors against one another, this remains primarily a competition for influence. If weapons, intelligence, financing and local armed forces begin to be used directly to weaken the opposing side, Somalia and Somaliland will move much closer to a genuine proxy conflict.

7. How Is Somaliland Lobbying the United States?

Israel’s recognition created a diplomatic breakthrough, but Hargeisa understands that recognition from the United States would carry significantly greater weight. It could encourage other countries to reconsider their positions and substantially change Somaliland’s international standing.

That is why Somaliland’s campaign in Washington is increasingly framed around strategic interests rather than history alone. President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi has openly offered facilities, mineral resources and the possibility of expanded security cooperation. Berbera is presented as a port close to Bab el Mandeb. Somaliland’s natural resources are being promoted as investment opportunities. Its position across from Yemen is presented as an advantage for security operations around the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

In his September 16, 2026 interview with Semafor in Washington, Abdullahi described recognition as the main objective but made clear that Somaliland was prepared to negotiate. He said Somaliland could offer its facilities and minerals, while future military access would depend on what Somaliland received in return.

This is an increasingly transactional strategy. Somaliland is trying to demonstrate that recognizing it would not simply fulfill Hargeisa’s political ambitions. It could also give Washington access to a strategically located partner near one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

Somalia is not standing still. Mogadishu has also tried to persuade Washington not to shift toward recognition of Somaliland, including through proposals involving access to ports. The competition between Somalia and Somaliland is therefore no longer confined to the Horn of Africa. Both sides are increasingly taking their case directly to major outside powers.

8. A Local Dispute Is Becoming a Regional Power Contest

Somalia wants to preserve its territorial integrity. Somaliland wants to turn more than 30 years of self government into international recognition. Behind those 2 objectives, however, an increasing number of countries are pursuing very different strategic calculations.

Turkey wants to preserve its military, economic and maritime influence in the Horn of Africa. Egypt views Somalia partly through its competition with Ethiopia. Ethiopia needs access to the sea. Saudi Arabia is concerned with Red Sea security and the regional balance of power. The United Arab Emirates has built a network of ports, investment and local relationships around the Gulf of Aden. Israel views Somaliland partly through the security environment surrounding Yemen, the Houthis and Red Sea shipping. The United States has not shifted into the Somaliland camp, but Hargeisa is trying to draw Washington closer through Berbera, mineral resources and potential security cooperation.

Somalia and Somaliland are therefore becoming a place where several rivalries that began elsewhere are converging. The Egypt Ethiopia dispute, Saudi and Emirati competition, Turkey’s strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and Israel’s security calculations around the Red Sea are all touching the same geographic space.

This is not yet a proxy war. But when ports, investment and diplomacy begin to appear alongside weapons, military training, maritime cooperation and defense agreements, the dispute between Somalia and Somaliland enters a different phase.

What began as an unresolved political split in 1991 is gradually becoming one of the most important emerging power contests in the Horn of Africa.

Sources

Reuters, reporting on Somaliland’s strategic importance, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Israeli military training of Somaliland forces, Egyptian arms deliveries to Somalia, Turkey’s relationship with Somalia, and Saudi and Emirati competition in the Horn of Africa.

Semafor, interviews and reporting on Somaliland’s campaign for United States recognition, Berbera, mineral resources and potential military access.

Human Rights Watch, reporting on the conflict in northern Somalia, the destruction of Hargeisa and abuses during the Siad Barre period.

African Union, official statements on Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia, December 11, 2024.

The United Kingdom has left the EU but remains one of Europe’s major military powers and signed a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU in 2025. Norway is not an EU member but is a NATO ally, occupies a strategically important position in the Arctic and North Atlantic, and is described by the EU as its most closely associated security and defense partner.

Ukraine is not yet an EU member but is directly fighting Russia, possesses extensive experience of modern warfare and has a defense industry that is becoming increasingly integrated with Europe. Canada lies outside Europe but is a NATO ally, an Arctic power and, in June 2026, became the first non-European country to participate in the EU’s SAFE defense procurement instrument. The EU could gain military capabilities, defense industrial capacity, battlefield experience, strategic reach in the Arctic and stronger transatlantic coordination from these partners.

In return, the United Kingdom, Norway, Ukraine and Canada could gain deeper access to European security discussions, defense programs, joint procurement and the EU defense market. For Britain, it could provide another channel for security coordination with the EU after Brexit. For Norway, it could provide greater involvement in decisions affecting northern European security. Ukraine could deepen its integration into Europe’s defense system, while Canada could gain a larger defense market and further diversify its security partnerships.

The purpose is therefore broader than simply creating another EU institution. A European Security Council could provide a way to bring countries with important capabilities for the security of the continent around the same table, even when they are not members of the European Union. Von der Leyen has so far proposed a direction rather than a finished structure. Its membership, powers and relationship with NATO have yet to be defined.

On September 20, 2026, The Guardian reported that Michal Koudelka, head of Czechia’s BIS security service, said Russia believed that if it escalated enough, European countries could eventually decide not to continue supporting Ukraine.

Latvian intelligence also said Russian sabotage was moving away from relatively random targets toward railways, infrastructure supporting Ukraine and the European defense industry.

The logic is fairly straightforward. Supporting Ukraine would no longer mean only sending money and weapons abroad. Moscow may want to turn that decision into a security risk felt inside the countries supporting Kyiv.

But this should not be confused with evidence of an imminent Russia NATO war. In the same Guardian report published on September 20, 2026, Normunds Mezviets, director general of Latvia’s State Security Service, explicitly said they saw “no indications of an imminent attack.” He also said it remained unclear whether Moscow had direct and concrete plans or was primarily trying to spread fear and uncertainty across Western societies.

On September 19, 2026, a senior Estonian official also pushed back against growing public panic about a possible Russian attack and urged people to remain calm and continue supporting Ukraine.

The current warnings therefore do not mean Russia is about to attack NATO. The more immediate issue is whether Moscow will intensify sabotage in order to make the cost of supporting Ukraine increasingly visible inside Europe itself.

There is another potential benefit for Moscow that does not require opening a new front: forcing Europe to think more about defending itself.

Every time a drone or missile approaches or enters NATO airspace, European governments face a very practical calculation. An interceptor sent to Ukraine is also an interceptor that is no longer sitting in a national stockpile to defend their own territory.

That does not mean Europe has stopped transferring air defense munitions to Ukraine. In July 2026, NATO was still urging Allies to release more interceptors from their stockpiles for Kyiv, and in August the EU approved billions of euros more for Ukrainian air defense systems, missiles and ammunition.

But the more incidents occur near NATO territory, the greater the pressure may become to retain part of those defensive capabilities at home.

Moscow therefore does not necessarily need Europe to stop supporting Ukraine altogether. If it can make governments ask whether they are sending away missiles, radars or air defense systems that they may soon need themselves, it has already made support for Kyiv more difficult both militarily and politically.

On September 17, 2026, WikiLeaks posted a photo of Julian Assange in Sydney with a simple message: “He’s back.” Assange then reposted it from his personal account with just two words: “I’m back.” For most X users, this might look like nothing more than a return after a long period of silence. But with Julian Assange, those two words carry far more weight. He is not someone who can simply return to the internet like an ordinary user. For nearly 20 years, his name has been associated with classified documents, intelligence, war, diplomacy, criminal investigations and one of the biggest debates over the boundary between state secrecy and freedom of information.

The question, then, is not simply why Assange has returned to X. It is what he intends to do with the influence that still surrounds the Julian Assange name. WikiLeaks is still operating, its brand remains globally recognized and millions of people still see Assange as a symbol of an individual who challenged some of the most powerful governments in the world. If he truly returns to public life, activists, media networks, whistleblowers, political movements and even governments with their own interests will all have reasons to pay attention.

Contents

1. From an Internet Project to a Global Issue

2. Seven Years in an Embassy and More Than Five Years in Prison

3. WikiLeaks Did Not Disappear With Assange

4. What Role Will Assange Return To?

5. Why So Many Actors Will Want Access to Him

6. The Lesson of the 2016 U.S. Election

7. Assange’s Greatest Source of Power Today

8. Where Will “I’m Back” Lead?

1. From an Internet Project to a Global Issue

Julian Assange founded WikiLeaks in 2006 around a simple idea with potentially enormous political consequences: Create a system through which people inside governments or powerful organizations could provide documents to WikiLeaks, then use the internet to bring those documents before the public. The turning point came in 2010, when WikiLeaks published a massive collection of U.S. military and diplomatic documents related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with diplomatic cables.

From a relatively small internet project, WikiLeaks became one of the most controversial organizations in the world. Assange went from being a programmer and activist to a figure capable of creating political earthquakes simply by publishing documents. WikiLeaks’ power did not come from an army, territory or enormous financial resources. It came from its ability to turn information a government wanted to keep secret into an issue the entire world had to discuss.

That is also what made Assange such a polarizing figure. His supporters regard him as a symbol of freedom of information, press freedom and the ability to hold governments accountable. His critics argue that the way WikiLeaks handled and published classified material could endanger intelligence operations, national security and individuals named in leaked documents. That debate has never truly ended.

2. Seven Years in an Embassy and More Than Five Years in Prison

After 2010, Assange’s life became almost inseparable from legal battles. In 2012, he entered the Ecuadorian Embassy in London and was granted asylum by Ecuador. He lived inside the embassy for nearly seven years. In 2019, Ecuador withdrew his asylum and British police arrested him. Assange was then held at the high-security Belmarsh prison while fighting extradition to the United States.

The legal battle continued until June 2024, when Assange reached an agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice. He pleaded guilty to one charge related to conspiring to obtain and disclose classified national defense information, received credit for time already served and returned to Australia. Legally, that marked the end of a long chapter. Politically, however, the Assange story did not end with the case.

After returning to Australia, he largely withdrew from public life. Assange appeared at several events but did not return to his previous role or become a regular voice on social media. That period of silence is what made his “I’m back” message on September 17, 2026, particularly significant. Assange is signaling that a period of silence may be coming to an end.

3. WikiLeaks Did Not Disappear With Assange

During Assange’s imprisonment and after his release, WikiLeaks never completely disappeared. Its vast archive of documents remained online, the WikiLeaks brand survived and its system for receiving anonymous submissions continued to operate. Icelandic journalist Kristinn Hrafnsson remained one of the organization’s most prominent public figures while Assange was unable to operate as he once had.

WikiLeaks in recent years, however, has no longer occupied the same position in the global news cycle that it did between 2010 and 2016. The infrastructure remains. The brand remains. But the person who generated much of its public attention has been absent. If Assange genuinely returns to active involvement, those two elements could come together once again.

There is currently no evidence that WikiLeaks is preparing a major new release of documents. Nor has there been any announcement that Assange will return to directly running the organization. But the return of its founder inevitably increases WikiLeaks’ importance to anyone holding information they want brought before the public. A globally recognized platform becomes considerably more significant when its most famous figure returns to the center of the conversation.

4. What Role Will Assange Return To?

The first and most obvious possibility is that Assange returns to the world of WikiLeaks: Anonymous sources, classified documents and information that governments or powerful organizations do not want made public. If that happens, he could quickly return to the center of debates over state secrecy, intelligence and press freedom.

But Assange in 2026 is no longer the same Assange of 2010. After years inside an embassy, years in prison and a prolonged legal battle, his own life has become a political story. That creates another possible role: Public advocacy around press freedom, whistleblower protection, government surveillance, espionage laws, privacy and the right to publish classified information.

An even more interesting possibility is that Assange becomes an independent political figure in the broader sense. He would not need to run for office or join a political party to wield political influence. Simply by using social media, appearing at events, giving interviews and entering major public debates, Assange could affect how millions of people view governments, the media and power itself. These roles are not mutually exclusive. He could simultaneously advocate for freedom of information, participate in political debates and maintain ties to WikiLeaks.

5. Why So Many Actors Will Want Access to Him

If Assange truly returns to the arena, he will not be operating in a vacuum. A person with that kind of name recognition and influence naturally becomes attractive to people who possess information, a message or a political objective they want amplified. A whistleblower may want to give documents to WikiLeaks. A press freedom organization may want Assange to appear at its events. An anti-establishment political movement may want to use Assange as the symbol of an individual who once confronted the state.

Governments could see similar opportunities. An authentic document damaging to an adversary retains its value regardless of the motives of the person who provides it. A government, intelligence service or faction inside a state does not necessarily need to control WikiLeaks in order to benefit from it. It only needs to possess the right information and find a sufficiently credible channel through which to release it to the world.

This is the most difficult part of the WikiLeaks model. A platform receiving leaked material can be used by a whistleblower acting from moral conviction, but it can also be used by a corporation, political faction or intelligence service seeking to damage an opponent. The documents themselves can be completely authentic in both cases. The difference lies in the objective of the person supplying them.

The question to watch is who approaches Assange, what kind of information they bring with them and what they hope to achieve by attaching that information to his name.

6. The Lesson of the 2016 U.S. Election

The 2016 U.S. presidential election provides the clearest example of this problem. U.S. authorities concluded that Russian military intelligence officers stole documents from Democratic Party organizations as part of an operation to interfere in the election. WikiLeaks subsequently published stolen material while the campaign was underway.

U.S. investigations later closely examined WikiLeaks’ role and the connections surrounding the distribution of those documents. The point is not to reduce Assange or WikiLeaks to simple instruments of Russia. The public evidence does not justify reducing the story to that conclusion. A government can attempt to use a publishing platform without necessarily owning or controlling it.

If an intelligence service obtains authentic documents, passes them to an organization capable of generating news and allows that organization to publish them, the documents themselves can do the rest. The public debates their contents, the media develops the story and political opponents are forced to respond. The original source of the material can almost disappear from the process.

That is why any serious return by Assange will be watched by far more than journalists and his supporters. Intelligence services, governments and organizations involved in information warfare will also have reasons to pay attention.

7. Assange’s Greatest Source of Power Today

Assange in 2026 possesses something that Assange in 2006 did not: A personal story known around the world. He published American secrets, lived for nearly seven years inside an embassy, spent more than five years in a high-security prison, faced the possibility of extradition to the United States and eventually returned to Australia after reaching a plea agreement.

To his supporters, those experiences transformed Assange into a symbol of the price of challenging power. To his critics, they do not erase the controversies surrounding WikiLeaks’ methods, its choices over what documents to publish and the political consequences of those releases. That polarization itself increases his influence.

This makes the Assange name a valuable asset to groups with very different objectives. A press freedom organization may want him to speak about freedom of information. An anti-government movement may want him to speak about state surveillance. A government hostile to the West may want to use his statements to reinforce its own narrative. A Western politician may want to stand alongside Assange to demonstrate opposition to the traditional establishment.

None of them needs to control Assange. They only need to find the part of his story that serves their own objectives.

8. Where Will “I’m Back” Lead?

After nearly two decades surrounded by state secrets, prosecution and imprisonment, “I’m back” may be nothing more than a social media post. But it may also mean that Julian Assange’s obsession with the secrets that powerful institutions want to keep hidden never really disappeared.

Assange’s return therefore needs to be viewed as something larger than the question of whether he will continue leaking classified documents. A publicly active Julian Assange could become a focal point for many different interests. Whistleblowers wanting to expose documents, organizations seeking to amplify a message, media outlets looking for a story, political movements searching for a symbol and governments seeking an advantage in information warfare could all see value in him.

If Assange enters public political life, he could become an outsider with influence comparable to Elon Musk. But while Musk’s power comes from money, Assange’s weight comes from the secrets he has exposed and the image of a man willing to confront some of the most powerful states in the world.

So what China needs may not be the immediate conquest of Taiwan. What it needs is for Taiwan, the United States and Japan to always believe that China could actually go to war. That fear creates power by itself. Taiwan has to think carefully before moving too far toward political independence or becoming a U.S. military outpost just off China’s coast. Washington and Tokyo must also factor the cost of war into every decision to deepen their involvement.

Pressure on Taiwan also sends a broader message to every country around China: Beijing does not want territory along its borders and surrounding seas to become military outposts that could be used against China. A Taiwan closely integrated with the U.S. military would place a strategic position directly off China’s coast in the hands of a rival. But Beijing has similar concerns about Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Myanmar, Laos, Central Asian states and other countries around China.

The message Beijing wants its neighbors to understand is clear: If their territory becomes a military outpost directed against China, they must also consider the possibility that China could use direct military force. The lesson from Ukraine is that a major power may be willing to pay an enormous price to prevent a neighboring country from moving in a direction it considers a threat to its security. Beijing wants the countries around China to always factor that risk into their decisions.

By repeatedly demonstrating its ability to attack Taiwan, China makes every neighboring country think carefully before allowing its territory to become a military position against Beijing. So China may not be eager to conquer Taiwan. A Taiwan that constantly fears war, a United States that must continually weigh the risk of direct confrontation, and neighboring countries that remain wary of a possible Chinese attack already give Beijing considerable advantages without a shot being fired.

At 84, McConnell is also entering the final months of a political career that has lasted more than four decades. He no longer leads Senate Republicans and will leave office when his term ends in January 2027.

But if McConnell is viewed today simply as an elderly senator nearing the end of his career, it is easy to forget that he was once one of the most powerful figures in Washington. For 18 years, McConnell led Senate Republicans, using rules, procedures, voting schedules and behind-the-scenes negotiations to turn political power into concrete results.

Then Donald Trump arrived.

Trump had almost no political experience before running for president. He had never served as a governor, senator or elected official. While McConnell had spent decades learning how Washington worked, Trump entered the Republican Party from the outside and quickly gained something McConnell had never possessed: The direct support of an enormous number of voters.

The struggle between the two reveals a larger question about the nature of power: In politics, who has the greater advantage, the person who controls the machinery or the person who can rally the mass of voters?

Table of Contents

1. How Did Mitch McConnell Control the Senate?

2. What Does Institutional Power Really Mean?

3. Trump Entered Politics With a Different Kind of Power

4. When Trump and McConnell Needed Each Other

5. The Split After the 2020 Election

6. Who Could Really Put Pressure on Whom?

7. When Two Kinds of Power Collide

8. McConnell’s Final Chapter and the Lesson About Power

1. How Did Mitch McConnell Control the Senate?

McConnell entered the Senate in 1985 and became the Republican leader in 2007. When Republicans held the majority, he became Senate Majority Leader. The position gave him enormous influence over what came up for debate, when votes were held, the strategy of Republican senators and the confirmation process for a wide range of important positions.

This was not the kind of power that was easy to see on television. McConnell did not need rallies with tens of thousands of people. He did not need to be the most popular figure in the party. His power came from understanding the system and occupying the right position within it.

A U.S. president can win an election with tens of millions of votes and put forward an ambitious political agenda. But a president cannot pass most legislation alone. Nor can a president simply place a justice on the Supreme Court. Those things require Congress and, in many cases, the Senate. McConnell understood this bottleneck extremely well.

The most famous example came in 2016, when Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia died. President Barack Obama nominated Merrick Garland to replace him, but McConnell and Senate Republicans did not move forward with the confirmation process before the presidential election.

The seat was ultimately left for the winner of the 2016 election. Donald Trump won, and Neil Gorsuch was confirmed to the Supreme Court.

During Trump’s first term, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett were also confirmed. Trump selected the nominees, but without a Senate led by McConnell, those three choices could not simply have become three Supreme Court justices.

It was an almost perfect example of institutional power: You do not necessarily need crowds chanting your name. You need control over the doors that every major decision must pass through.

2. What Does Institutional Power Really Mean?

Put simply, institutional power is the ability to use a position within the system to determine what can happen, what can be blocked and what has to wait. McConnell was not the president’s superior. He could not order Trump to run the White House in a certain way. But Trump could not fire McConnell or force the Senate to pass everything he wanted.

If the White House wanted a bill but did not have enough votes in the Senate, the bill could fail. If the president nominated a controversial figure and senators refused to support that person, the nominee might not be confirmed. That is why a Senate leader can be extremely powerful even if most ordinary voters pay little attention to his name.

McConnell spent decades building this kind of power. He knew the senators, understood the rules, had a fundraising network, had years of negotiating experience and knew when to attack and when to delay. If politics took place only inside Washington, very few people could compete with McConnell. But politics does not take place only in Washington.

3. Trump Entered Politics With a Different Kind of Power

When Trump ran for president in 2015, he was almost the complete opposite of McConnell. Trump did not have decades of experience in Congress. He did not understand the Senate as well as McConnell, and he did not control the Republican Party machinery.

But Trump quickly proved that he had a different asset: He could persuade a large share of Republican voters to follow him even when many longtime figures in the party opposed him. This is the most important difference between the two men.

McConnell could pressure a senator through his position, relationships, resources and influence inside the Senate. Trump could pressure that same senator by speaking directly to the senator’s voters. A politician might not fear a speech by Trump in Washington. But if millions of Republican voters trusted Trump more than that politician, the situation changed completely.

Senators and representatives have to run for reelection. Before facing a Democratic candidate, many of them first have to survive a Republican primary. A public attack from Trump, or an endorsement from Trump for their opponent, could therefore become a direct threat to their political careers. McConnell could influence a politician’s position inside the system. Trump could influence whether voters would allow that politician to return to the system at all. That is a major difference.

4. When Trump and McConnell Needed Each Other

What makes the story more interesting is that the two men once worked together very effectively. During Trump’s first term from 2017 to 2021, Trump and McConnell were not close friends, but they understood that they needed each other.

Trump brought the White House, the energy of Republican voters and the ability to dominate the media agenda. McConnell brought Senate experience, the ability to organize votes and a political machine capable of turning parts of Trump’s agenda into concrete results. The 2017 tax policy and, especially, judicial appointments showed this partnership most clearly. Trump could make the choice. McConnell could find a way to get that choice through the Senate. Trump could create pressure from outside. McConnell handled the votes on the inside.

When those two kinds of power were aimed at the same objective, they were extremely effective. But the relationship also revealed an important reality: Trump still needed people who understood the system. Having voters behind him did not mean that a president could simply bypass Congress.

McConnell, in turn, also needed a Republican president capable of winning elections. Without Trump’s victory in 2016, the Supreme Court seat left open after Scalia’s death could have produced a completely different outcome. The two men needed each other until the conflict shifted from policy to the question of who truly represented the Republican Party.

5. The Split After the 2020 Election

The Trump-McConnell relationship clearly broke down after the 2020 election. Trump continued to challenge the election result, while McConnell recognized Joe Biden as the winner. After the riot at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, McConnell publicly criticized Trump in very strong terms and said Trump was practically and morally responsible for what had happened, although he later voted to acquit Trump in the second impeachment trial.

Trump responded with repeated public attacks on McConnell. Their relationship became extremely hostile, and the two barely spoke directly for years. By the logic of traditional politics, this should have been the moment when McConnell had the advantage. Trump was out of the White House. McConnell was still the Republican leader in the Senate. He had experience, relationships, money and a powerful position inside the system.

But one thing did not leave Washington with Trump: His voters. Trump continued to wield enormous influence over the Republican base. Candidates seeking to win Republican primaries continued to seek his endorsement. Republican politicians who opposed Trump had to consider the reaction of the very voters who would decide whether they could continue representing the party.

This was where the limits of McConnell’s decades of experience became clear. He might have understood the system far better than Trump, but he could not give orders to the voters.

6. Who Could Really Put Pressure on Whom?

It would be wrong to say that Trump was McConnell’s superior or that McConnell was Trump’s superior. The American system does not work that way. When Trump was president and McConnell led the Senate, they occupied different centers of power. Each could make life difficult for the other, but they had different tools.

If Trump wanted to pass legislation or confirm a nominee, McConnell could say that he did not have enough votes. Trump could become angry, attack him or apply pressure, but he could not simply order the Senate to act. That was McConnell’s power. But if McConnell wanted a Republican senator to oppose Trump, that senator had to ask a different question: Whose side are my voters on? That was Trump’s power.

And over the long term, this created a more serious problem for someone who relied on institutional power. McConnell could make life difficult for a politician in Washington for several years. But voters could end that politician’s career in the next election. A Senate leader could control the existing machinery, but if large numbers of voters repeatedly chose candidates loyal to someone else, the composition of that machinery would gradually change.

7. When Two Kinds of Power Collide

This is the most important point in the Trump-McConnell story.

Trump entered politics with almost no political experience. By that time, McConnell had already spent more than three decades in the Senate and nearly a decade leading Senate Republicans. If political experience, relationships and control of the machinery were everything, Trump would have had almost no chance of competing with McConnell for power inside the party. But Trump found a shorter route. Instead of spending decades climbing through the system step by step, he built a direct relationship with a large number of voters.

When enough voters stand behind a politician, the people who hold positions inside the machinery have to take that into account because they also need those same voters to keep their seats. This does not mean Trump can do whatever he wants. Congress, the courts, the Constitution and institutional constraints still exist.

But in an internal struggle within a political party, commanding the support of a large share of voters creates a special advantage: You can pressure the people who control the machinery by threatening the very source of their own power.

By 2024, this was very clear. McConnell had harshly criticized Trump after 2020. Trump had attacked McConnell for years. But when Trump once again secured the Republican presidential nomination, McConnell endorsed him. That did not mean McConnell had become a close Trump ally or that the two had resolved all their disagreements. It showed something simpler: Republican voters had made their choice. McConnell could control many things in the Senate, but he could not replace that choice.

8. McConnell’s Final Chapter and the Lesson About Power

Mitch McConnell’s return to the Senate in a wheelchair on September 14, 2026 marked one of the final stages of a political career spanning more than 40 years. He no longer leads Senate Republicans and will leave the Senate when his term ends in January 2027.

McConnell will leave behind a major legacy. He led Senate Republicans for 18 years, helped shape the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary, and became one of the politicians who best understood how to use the power of the Senate. Many decisions made during his time in leadership will continue to affect the United States after he leaves Washington.

But the Republican Party McConnell is preparing to leave is very different from the one he once led. Trump entered politics with no experience in government, overcame much of the party’s traditional leadership and ultimately became the political center of the party. The conflict between the two men therefore leaves an important lesson: Power inside the system can take decades to build, while sufficiently broad support from voters can shift the balance of power much faster.

Burnham was once called the “King of the North,” a nickname he earned during his years as Mayor of Greater Manchester. His image as a northern politician willing to confront Westminster, particularly during disputes with the central government, helped Burnham build an appeal far beyond Manchester and ultimately carried him to 10 Downing Street.

But the skills that helped someone become the “King of the North” are not necessarily the skills required to lead the entire United Kingdom. What has happened around the issue of Scottish independence in September 2026 may be the first sign of that limitation.

If Burnham continues to let his opponents choose the battlefield, continues to react rather than lead, and fails to build a political narrative strong enough to bring England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland together, he may not need to wait for the United Kingdom to break apart. His premiership may end first.

Table of Contents

1. From “King of the North” to British Prime Minister

2. The Remark That Put Burnham on the Defensive

3. How Did the SNP Exploit That Mistake?

4. How Should Burnham Have Responded?

5. The Problem Is Not the Law, but His Ability to Unite

6. Burnham May Always Be Only the “King of the North”

1. From “King of the North” to British Prime Minister

Andy Burnham became British Prime Minister on July 20, 2026, just over a month after returning to the House of Commons. Before that, he spent nine years as Mayor of Greater Manchester and built a distinctive position in British politics.

It was during this period that the media began calling Burnham the “King of the North.” The nickname evokes the famous title from the television series Game of Thrones, but in British politics it reflected Burnham’s image as a powerful representative of northern England standing up to the concentration of power in Westminster.

Burnham strengthened that image in particular when he confronted the central government during the pandemic. He was willing to publicly challenge London, speak for communities that felt neglected by Westminster, and build the image of a leader who stood up for his region.

That was a major political asset while he was in Manchester. But once Burnham entered Downing Street, his position was completely reversed. He was no longer the outsider demanding that the center of power listen. He had become the center of power.

Burnham also simultaneously serves as Minister for the Union, a position directly connected to the responsibility of ensuring that the government serves England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as a whole.

A “King of the North” can build power by representing one region. A British Prime Minister must do something much harder: Convince regions with different identities and interests to accept him as their representative.

And this may be Burnham’s weakness.

2. The Remark That Put Burnham on the Defensive

On September 9, 2026, SNP MP Chris Law challenged Burnham in the House of Commons over Scotland’s right to hold another independence referendum.

Northern Ireland has a legal mechanism that allows a referendum on leaving the United Kingdom and uniting with the Republic of Ireland if it appears likely that a majority of voters would support it. Scotland has no equivalent mechanism.

The question was cleverly framed. Chris Law asked Burnham whether the Scottish people had a similar right to determine their own future and whether the conditions for holding a second independence referendum should be written into law.

Burnham replied that he would adhere to the Good Friday Agreement 100 percent. After discussing the conditions for holding a referendum in Northern Ireland, he made the remark that the SNP immediately seized upon:

“I would say that it is exactly the same situation in Scotland.”

Burnham went on to say that he was not aware of majority public support in Scotland for another referendum and that, until that changed, there would not be another vote.

This answer gave Scotland no additional legal rights. Current law still does not allow the Scottish Parliament to unilaterally hold an independence referendum. Westminster still holds the power to decide.

But Burnham turned a question he could have rejected into a debate over what conditions would allow Scotland to vote.

That was the political mistake.

3. How Did the SNP Exploit That Mistake?

Scotland’s First Minister, John Swinney, did not let the opportunity pass. On September 10, 2026, just one day after Burnham’s remarks, the Scottish First Minister wrote to him and proposed that the two meet to turn the principle Burnham had just articulated into a “legal mechanism” for a referendum.

The SNP’s logic is easy to understand: If the British Prime Minister says Scotland is in “exactly the same situation” as Northern Ireland when public opinion shifts strongly enough, why should Scotland not have a similar legal mechanism?

Burnham then had to emphasize that Scotland and Northern Ireland have different histories and constitutional circumstances, while continuing to reject another independence referendum. But the need to clarify his position exposed the problem with his original answer.

By September 14, 2026, the leaders of the SNP in Scotland, Plaid Cymru in Wales and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland had met in Cardiff and signed a joint memorandum of understanding. They asserted the right to self-determination, called on Westminster to prepare for constitutional change, and declared that each nation would determine its future in its own way and in its own time.

This does not mean that the United Kingdom is about to break apart. Scotland and Wales still cannot unilaterally hold an independence referendum recognized by Westminster. Northern Ireland has its own separate legal framework. Support for separation also differs significantly among the three.

Burnham allowed one of his own answers to become part of the argument his opponents are using to pressure his government. For a prime minister who has been in office for less than two months, that is a more worrying sign than the Scottish referendum issue itself.

4. How Should Burnham Have Responded?

SNP MP Chris Law placed Burnham inside a framework that strongly favored the SNP: When will Scotland be allowed to vote to leave the United Kingdom?

Burnham did not have to accept that framework.

First: Northern Ireland has its own legal framework, and the government will respect it.

Second: Scotland has a different constitutional framework, and the 2014 referendum was held legally.

Third: He should then have immediately shifted to a positive argument: My government will demonstrate that Scotland is stronger, more prosperous and has a greater voice inside the United Kingdom.

That would have allowed Burnham to respect democracy, while giving the SNP no wording it could turn into a new demand, and at the same time place himself in the proper role of a prime minister defending and uniting the Union.

Burnham could then have shifted the focus away from the question of “when Scotland will be allowed to leave” toward the question a prime minister should be able to answer: Why should Scotland continue to stay?

He could have talked about the economic benefits, the common market, security, defense, public finances, infrastructure and international influence that the four nations gain from remaining together within the United Kingdom.

More importantly, he could have said that his government’s job is not to calculate the threshold at which Scotland might want to leave, but to govern the country well enough that Scots do not want to leave. That is the role of a leader capable of uniting a country. Burnham did not do that.

He stepped directly into the SNP’s question, discussed thresholds of public opinion and unintentionally confirmed that a sufficiently large shift in public opinion could change the situation. From there, his opponents only need to continue asking: If such a threshold exists, why not define it in law?

5. The Problem Is Not the Law, but His Ability to Unite

Westminster still holds an overwhelming legal advantage. Scotland cannot unilaterally organize a lawful independence referendum unless Westminster transfers the necessary power. Wales has no unilateral mechanism either.

Burnham therefore did not create a constitutional crisis with a single remark. But a prime minister cannot rely solely on the law to keep a multinational state united.

If London’s final answer to Scotland becomes simply, “You do not have the right to hold a referendum,” separatists will have an argument that is easy to sell to voters: Westminster is using legal power to prevent the Scottish people from deciding their own future.

A better way to counter that argument is to persuade enough Scots that they do not need another referendum. To do that, Burnham must become a prime minister who is seen as capable of representing the entire United Kingdom.

He needs people in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast to feel that the central government is their government too, rather than a power in London that appears only to say “no.” This is a far more difficult test than winning power inside the Labour Party or winning an election.

6. Burnham May Always Be Only the “King of the North”

The nickname “King of the North” was once a compliment. It described an Andy Burnham with a clear political identity, an understanding of his voters, a willingness to confront Westminster and an ability to turn regional discontent into political power. That image helped make him one of the most prominent politicians in Britain and ultimately carried him into Downing Street.

But the office of Prime Minister requires a different kind of power. Burnham can no longer simply stand on one side and demand that Westminster change, because he is now Westminster. He no longer needs only to understand northern England. He must understand how to keep Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England together within the same political structure. Nor can he simply represent those who are dissatisfied with the center of power, because he must now make them trust that center.

The Scottish issue shows that this transition may be harder than Burnham expected. A politician who once succeeded by exploiting the distance between the regions and Westminster must now be the person who closes that very distance. If he cannot do that, the qualities that once carried him to Downing Street may become the limits of his leadership once he is there.

Whether the United Kingdom will break apart is still far too difficult to predict. Whether Scotland will eventually hold another referendum also depends on many political variables in the years ahead. But Burnham’s political career does not need to wait for those questions to be answered.

A prime minister who loses the ability to unite will increasingly have to rely on law, party discipline and the formal powers of office to hold together what should instead be sustained by political support. When opponents repeatedly force him onto the defensive, when different parts of the country increasingly view Westminster as an adversary rather than a common center, and when doubts about his leadership begin to emerge inside the Labour Party itself, the future of his premiership will become a problem before the future of the Union does.

That is the central prediction here: Andy Burnham’s political collapse has begun, not because Scotland is about to become independent, but because he is revealing a dangerous limitation for a British Prime Minister: His ability to win power may be greater than his ability to unite once he has won it.

Andy Burnham has proved that he can become the “King of the North.” What he has not proved is whether he can become the leader of the entire United Kingdom. Burnham is capable of becoming the “King of the North,” but he may not be capable of holding on to the office of Prime Minister of the entire United Kingdom.

These movements did not emerge in 2026. They have existed for decades, and in some cases for generations. What has changed is that their political strength is rising at the same time, while more people are questioning whether London still offers a model attractive enough to justify leaving the final say in the hands of the central government.

Contents

1. Why is the independence debate heating up again?

2. What do Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland want?

3. Why is the United Kingdom finding it harder to keep them?

4. Is this also about political ambition?

5. What do they gain by staying in the United Kingdom?

6. Who has the best chance of succeeding outside the United Kingdom?

7. What would the United Kingdom and England gain and lose?

8. If one succeeds, what happens to the other two?

9. Could this strengthen separatist movements around the world?

10. The hardest test begins after leaving

1. Why is the independence debate heating up again?

In Scotland, John Swinney is First Minister, the head of the Scottish Government, and leader of the SNP. The SNP is the Scottish National Party, a political force that seeks to make Scotland an independent country.

In Wales, Rhun ap Iorwerth is First Minister and leader of Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru is a Welsh nationalist party that seeks greater self determination and ultimately an independent Wales. The Senedd is the Welsh Parliament. After the May 2026 election, Plaid Cymru became the largest party and took control of the Welsh government for the first time.

In Northern Ireland, Michelle O’Neill is First Minister and a member of Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein is an Irish nationalist party active in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It does not seek an independent Northern Irish state. Its goal is for Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and reunify with the Republic of Ireland.

Developments in September 2026 rapidly pushed the issue back into the spotlight. On September 9, 2026, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham sparked controversy in the House of Commons when he suggested that Scotland could eventually be treated in a way similar to Northern Ireland if public support became clear enough. Northern Ireland has a mechanism for a referendum under the Good Friday Agreement, while Scotland has no equivalent arrangement. The Prime Minister’s office later had to reiterate that London had not agreed to another Scottish independence referendum.

The SNP immediately used those remarks to increase the pressure. On September 10, 2026, John Swinney called on the British government to clarify the mechanism through which Scotland could hold a referendum once public support reached a sufficient level.

On September 12, 2026, Donald Trump pushed the issue onto the international stage when he said in Dublin that he would like to see a united Ireland. His remarks immediately drew criticism from political forces that want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.

On September 14, 2026, the leaders of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are expected to meet in Cardiff to sign a joint declaration on self determination and cooperation in areas including the economy, energy, relations with Europe and constitutional issues. Three movements that developed separately are beginning to support one another politically.

2. What do Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland want?

Scotland wants to become an independent country. Scotland was once a separate kingdom before its political union with England in 1707. In 2014, Scotland held an independence referendum. 44.7 percent voted to leave the United Kingdom, while 55.3 percent voted to remain.

Brexit gave the independence movement new momentum. A majority of Scottish voters chose to remain in the European Union in 2016, but Scotland still had to leave because the United Kingdom as a whole voted for Brexit. For the SNP, this demonstrated that Scotland could choose one direction and still ultimately be taken in another by the decision of the United Kingdom as a whole.

Wales has moved more slowly. For decades, Plaid Cymru focused heavily on Welsh identity, the Welsh language and greater autonomy. As the Senedd and the Welsh Government gained more powers, independence gradually became a more serious political option.

Northern Ireland has a completely different history. The debate there is not primarily about creating a new country. It is about whether Northern Ireland should remain in the United Kingdom or reunify with the Republic of Ireland. This debate has lasted for generations and was once at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement moved the issue onto a democratic path.

3. Why is the United Kingdom finding it harder to keep them?

A union cannot survive indefinitely on history, law or the power of the central government alone. It must make its members feel that their lives are better inside it than outside it.

This is where London is struggling. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland still receive major benefits from the common market, public finances, the pound sterling and the United Kingdom’s defence system. But those advantages have not been enough to eliminate dissatisfaction over growth, public services, economic opportunities and political control.

When people do not believe the existing system is producing good enough results, the argument made by independence movements becomes easier to understand: If London cannot do better, let us do it ourselves.

Scotland wants greater control over its economy, immigration, energy and relationship with the European Union. Brexit strengthened the perception that Scotland’s political choices can still be overridden by decisions made across the United Kingdom as a whole.

In Wales, Plaid Cymru wants greater control over resources, public finances, justice and economic development. First Minister Rhun ap Iorwerth has also stressed that Wales should be treated as a nation with its own needs, not as a region of England.

Northern Ireland is different because national identity and the historical division of Ireland play a much larger role. But the same issue of political control also exists there: Sinn Fein does not want Northern Ireland’s future to remain dependent on decisions made in London.

England is by far the largest part of the United Kingdom in population, economic weight and political power. That gives London the foundation of a powerful state, but it also makes it easier for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to feel that they live within a system in which they are not the main decision makers.

If they see themselves as distinct nations, why should their most important decisions still be made by a political centre outside them? This question has always been present within their independence movements.

4. Is this also about political ambition?

Yes.

If Scotland became independent, Edinburgh would go from being the seat of a devolved government to the capital of a sovereign state. The Scottish Government would control taxation, borders, immigration, foreign policy and defence. Wales would undergo a similar transformation if it became independent.

Local political elites therefore have an incentive to seek greater power. Once a government controls health and education, it may also want authority over taxation, then immigration, foreign policy and eventually full sovereignty.

But it would be too simplistic to treat this only as the ambition of politicians. The SNP, Plaid Cymru and Sinn Fein could not become major political forces without enough voters sharing their dissatisfaction or political objectives.

In Scotland and Wales, dissatisfaction with current outcomes, national identity and the ambition for self government all coexist. In Northern Ireland, the historical division of Ireland and national identity play a larger role.

5. What do they gain by staying in the United Kingdom?

Scale provides major advantages. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are part of a single internal market, use the pound sterling, rely on the financial capacity of a large state, share a common defence system and benefit from London’s international influence.

Internal trade is especially important. Official figures show that sales to other parts of the United Kingdom are equivalent to at least 21.9 percent of Scotland’s GDP, 20.6 percent of Wales’s GDP and 24.1 percent of Northern Ireland’s GDP. For England, the figure is only around 3.1 percent.

The three also receive higher public spending per person than England. In the 2024 to 2025 financial year, public spending was GBP 13,134 per person in England, GBP 15,563 in Scotland, GBP 15,155 in Wales and GBP 16,116 in Northern Ireland.

Independence would give them greater control, but it would also require them to bear costs that are currently shared across the United Kingdom. More sovereignty also means paying for that sovereignty yourself.

6. Who has the best chance of succeeding outside the United Kingdom?

Scotland has the strongest foundation. It has North Sea oil and gas, renewable energy, financial services, the drinks industry, tourism and strong universities. In 2025, Scotland was a net exporter of 20.8 TWh of electricity to other areas, with an estimated value of around GBP 1.7 billion.

But public finances are a major weakness. In the 2025 to 2026 financial year, Scotland’s estimated fiscal deficit was GBP 25.3 billion, equivalent to 10.9 percent of GDP, compared with 4.2 percent for the United Kingdom as a whole. If Scotland became independent with its current spending and revenue structure, it would have to raise more revenue, cut spending or generate stronger economic growth.

Scotland has enough of a foundation to function as an independent country. Whether Scots would become richer after leaving is another matter.

Wales faces a harder calculation. Independence would give Cardiff greater control over taxation, energy, resources and economic development, but its economy is smaller and deeply integrated with England. Wales could gain political sovereignty before developing enough financial capacity to replace the benefits it currently receives from the wider system.

Northern Ireland has a completely different alternative. If Ireland reunified, Northern Ireland would not have to build a new state from scratch. It would join the Republic of Ireland and become fully part of the European Union. However, Northern Ireland’s economy remains heavily dependent on trade with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Scotland has the strongest foundation for standing on its own, Wales faces the greatest economic risk, while Northern Ireland has the clearest alternative because it can shift from London to Dublin.

7. What would the United Kingdom and England gain and lose?

If Scotland and Wales became independent while Northern Ireland reunified with the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom in its current form would effectively cease to exist. England would become the core of whatever state remained.

London could reduce some of the financial obligations associated with the other three nations. Public spending per person is currently higher in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland than in England. England is also less dependent on trade with the other three than they are on trade with England.

But the losses would be substantial. London would lose territory, population, natural resources, energy infrastructure, ports, maritime space and several strategically important military positions.

On the map, England would still have a long coastline and direct access to the North Sea, the English Channel, the Atlantic Ocean and the Irish Sea, but its maritime strategic depth would shrink considerably. Scotland opens onto the North Atlantic and the northern sea routes. Wales occupies a significant part of the western coastline of Great Britain. Northern Ireland provides an additional strategic position between the Irish Sea and the North Atlantic.

Scotland is also particularly important for energy and defence. The Faslane and Coulport bases currently play a central role in Britain’s nuclear submarine force. If an independent Scotland refused to allow London to continue using those facilities, the British government would need to reach a new agreement with Edinburgh or find an alternative location.

London would also lose part of its international weight. A state with less territory, a smaller population, fewer resources and reduced strategic capacity would find it harder to preserve the full level of influence currently enjoyed by the United Kingdom.

In return, England would have a simpler political structure, fewer disputes over devolution and a central government whose policies could more directly reflect the preferences of English voters.

London could reduce part of its financial burden, but the price would be a smaller territory, fewer resources, less strategic depth and diminished international weight.

8. If one succeeds, what happens to the other two?

If Scotland became independent and remained stable after several years, the argument that leaving the United Kingdom is simply too dangerous would become much weaker. Wales would have an immediate example next door showing that separation does not necessarily lead to collapse.

If Northern Ireland reunified with the Republic of Ireland and the transition went smoothly, the current structure of the United Kingdom would also lose its image of permanence.

The effect could also work in the opposite direction. If the first territory to leave suffered a fiscal crisis, lost investment or had to make severe cuts to public services, that outcome could weaken the remaining independence movements.

The first to leave would therefore influence more than its own future. Its success or failure would directly affect how attractive independence looks to the others.

9. Could this strengthen separatist movements around the world?

If Scotland left a union that has existed for more than three centuries through a democratic vote and then functioned successfully as an independent country, the impact would extend far beyond the United Kingdom.

Catalonia, Flanders, Corsica, Quebec and many other movements would not automatically gain new legal rights. Each has its own history and legal system. But they would gain a powerful example to point to: A community with a distinct identity can leave a developed democratic state through peaceful means.

Scotland would not even have to become independent for the effect to begin. If London increasingly accepted the principle that part of the United Kingdom could leave when a majority of its people wanted to, other separatist movements could cite that precedent.

If a case of separation ended in economic failure, the effect would reverse. Governments seeking to persuade voters to remain would use it as evidence that staying is safer.

The United Kingdom could become a major test case for separatist movements in the twenty first century.

10. The hardest test begins after leaving

Winning the right to leave only settles who has the power to decide. Currency, public finances, trade, borders, defence, welfare and relations with neighbouring countries still have to be dealt with afterward.

Scotland has the strongest foundation for taking the gamble. Wales may face the higher economic cost. Northern Ireland could join an existing state rather than build a new one. England would also have to accept that retaining more money and political control would come at the cost of territory, resources and strategic power.

In the end, the ability to preserve the United Kingdom still comes down to a simple calculation: London must convince people in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland that their lives are better inside the United Kingdom than they would be if they chose their own path.

MAIN CONTENT

1. What Is the Mecca Alliance Really?

2. What Is Saudi Arabia Trying to Escape From?

3. Why Is Israel at the Center of the Story?

4. Turkey and Pakistan: The Two Pieces Saudi Arabia Needs

5. Egypt, Syria, and an Expansion That Could Change the Balance

6. What Will Mecca Do to American Influence?

7. The Internal Weakness: Saudi Arabia and Turkey Both Want to Lead

8. Who Will Ultimately Shape the Middle East?

1. WHAT IS THE MECCA ALLIANCE REALLY?

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed in Mecca by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Its most striking provision states that an armed attack against any member will be considered an attack against all members. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the principle as technically similar to NATO’s Article 5, while emphasizing that the scale and form of assistance would be determined through consultation among the members. Mecca therefore creates a collective-defence obligation, but it does not mean that every attack will automatically send all three countries into war.

The differences between Mecca and NATO remain substantial. The full text of the agreement has not been published. Mecca does not yet possess an integrated military command comparable to NATO, it has no permanent joint force, and it has not demonstrated in a major crisis how far its members are actually willing to go in fulfilling their commitments.

However, the institutionalization that was only planned when the agreement was signed has now begun. On August 31, 2026, the foreign ministers, defence ministers, and senior military chiefs of the three countries met in Istanbul for the inaugural meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee. They agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for a three-year term. They also committed to strengthening collective defence capabilities and military cohesion through joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation, joint technology development, and production. Mecca has therefore begun moving from a political-military agreement on paper toward a permanent institutional structure.

The origins of Mecca also go deeper than the current crisis. On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, under which aggression against either country would be considered aggression against both. That agreement institutionalized a military relationship that had already existed for decades and immediately raised questions about the possible role of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in Gulf security. Mecca expanded that foundation by bringing Turkey into the structure, combining Saudi financial power, Turkish military and industrial capabilities, and Pakistan’s military strength and nuclear factor.

The wars across the region have made such a structure more urgent. On August 6, 2026, one day before the Mecca agreement was signed, Reuters cited a senior Saudi official saying Riyadh feared that Iran-linked forces could conduct coordinated attacks from Iraq and Yemen. At the same time, the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran had already continued for months, disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, placed pressure on energy markets, and exposed Gulf states to the consequences of military decisions they did not fully control.

By early September 2026, the danger from Yemen was no longer hypothetical. On September 8, 2026, the Houthis launched coordinated missile and drone attacks against cities, energy facilities, and an airbase in southern Saudi Arabia, wounding 73 people. On September 10, 2026, Houthi forces captured the Red Sea port city of Mocha, moving closer to Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.

The most important question about Mecca, therefore, is not the identity of a single enemy. The members themselves insist that the agreement is not directed against Iran or any other specific country. Its strategic value is broader: A collective-defence mechanism gives its members additional options when dealing with Iran, Israel, the Houthis, maritime instability, or even crises that do not yet exist. To understand how far Mecca could develop, it is necessary to examine what each member actually wants from the alliance.

2. WHAT IS SAUDI ARABIA TRYING TO ESCAPE FROM?

Saudi Arabia possesses money, energy, markets, and a special position in the Arab and Islamic worlds, but its independent military power has not yet matched those resources. For decades, Riyadh has relied heavily on the United States for weapons, technology, intelligence, logistics, and strategic deterrence. That relationship has provided Saudi Arabia with an extremely valuable security umbrella, but it has also created a vulnerability: When Washington controls capabilities that Riyadh cannot easily replace, the United States gains the ability to impose conditions.

Questions about the reliability of the American security umbrella did not begin in 2026. A series of events, from Iraq, the Arab Spring, Syria, and Yemen to the limited American military response after the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities, has caused regional governments to question Washington’s role. The Iran war in 2026 has deepened the problem because American partners in the Gulf can become targets of retaliation for military decisions made in Washington over which they have little control.

What Mohammed bin Salman appears to be seeking is therefore not a break with the United States. Riyadh still needs Washington and retains enormous interests in preserving the relationship. A more realistic objective is to change the balance between dependency and choice. In the past, if Washington rejected a Saudi strategic demand, Riyadh had very few alternatives capable of replacing American power. If Mecca, Saudi relations with China, and other networks continue to develop, Riyadh can remain an American partner without treating every demand from Washington as an unavoidable condition.

The debate over Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program demonstrates the value of that autonomy particularly clearly. The United States and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement related to civilian nuclear cooperation in July 2026. On July 24, 2026, Trump publicly said the United States would not proceed with the nuclear agreement unless Saudi Arabia joined the Abraham Accords and normalized relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia has maintained its demand for a credible and irreversible path toward a Palestinian state before recognizing Israel.

From Washington’s perspective, the transaction has a clear logic: The United States possesses technology Saudi Arabia wants and seeks to use that leverage to achieve another strategic objective, the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations. Riyadh can view the same transaction very differently. A Saudi strategic requirement in its relationship with the United States is being linked to a political decision that would produce a major geopolitical victory for Israel. If Saudi Arabia considers leadership of the Arab world and the ability to shape the region independently to be core interests, the condition gives Riyadh a concrete reason to build alternatives.

This is where the distinction between opposing the United States and opposing American pressure becomes essential. Saudi Arabia does not need to turn Washington into an enemy in order to reject a Washington policy. Riyadh can continue buying American technology, maintaining defence relations, and investing heavily in the United States while simultaneously building a structure that gives it the ability to act differently when the interests of the two countries diverge. Viewed this way, Mecca is more a tool for increasing Saudi freedom of action than a declaration of separation from the American order.

3. WHY IS ISRAEL AT THE CENTER OF THE STORY?

Israel is not a member of Mecca, but it is directly connected to many of the forces pushing Saudi Arabia toward a more independent path. A common argument holds that Saudi Arabia and Israel share concerns about Iran and therefore must eventually move closer together. That is only partly true. Both countries may want to prevent Iran from becoming the dominant power in the Middle East, but if Iran is weakened, a more important question immediately follows: Which country will fill the resulting power vacuum and set the rules for the region?

Israel has demonstrated both the capability and the willingness to use military power beyond its borders. In Syria, tensions between Israel and Turkey have become serious enough that the United States has had to establish a deconfliction mechanism to prevent the two countries from unintentionally sliding toward a military confrontation. In August 2026, Israel struck a Syrian airbase because of concerns that it could be connected to a Turkish military presence, while U.S. envoy Tom Barrack acknowledged that Ankara had not been informed in advance and could easily have prepared a military response after detecting Israeli aircraft moving toward the Turkish frontier.

Saudi Arabia is building power differently. Riyadh uses finance, energy, investment, diplomacy, and its ability to assemble Arab and Islamic partners. A post-Iran Middle East could therefore produce competition between two different models of regional power. Israel seeks to convert its military superiority and special relationship with the United States into an accepted central position in the regional order. Saudi Arabia wants to ensure that Riyadh itself remains one of the capitals that determines the future of the Arab and Islamic worlds.

This is why the Abraham Accords mean far more than a peace agreement. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have participated in normalization to varying degrees, but Saudi Arabia carries an entirely different weight. Riyadh is the custodian of Mecca and Medina, has deep influence across the Islamic world, and occupies a special position in the Arab system. If Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Israel, Israel will obtain a degree of regional legitimacy that the earlier agreements could not provide.

From Riyadh’s perspective, the price of such a decision depends heavily on Palestine. If Saudi Arabia recognizes Israel without securing a sufficiently significant political outcome for the Palestinians, Israel would receive a historic strategic victory while Riyadh could weaken its own claim to leadership of the Arab world. The Palestinian question therefore cannot be understood solely through religion or public opinion. It is directly connected to Saudi prestige and power.

Even the UAE, which normalized relations with Israel in 2020, has not accepted the idea that Israel should be free to destroy the prospects of a two-state solution. On August 21, 2026, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt in condemning Israel’s E1 settlement plan and warning that it threatened the viability of an independent, contiguous Palestinian state. Normalization with Israel therefore does not mean that Arab states are willing to allow Israel to determine the regional order alone.

The statement that “the United States is choosing Israel over Saudi Arabia” should consequently be understood as an analytical judgment about strategic priorities when interests collide, not as a claim that Washington has abandoned Riyadh. The strongest evidence today comes from the nuclear dispute: The United States is willing to use a strategic benefit that Saudi Arabia wants as leverage to pressure Riyadh into producing a major victory for Israel’s regional integration. If Mohammed bin Salman views that as a limit Saudi Arabia cannot accept, Riyadh has a strong incentive to build enough strategic power to make it harder for Washington to present the same choice in the future.

4. TURKEY AND PAKISTAN: THE TWO PIECES SAUDI ARABIA NEEDS

Saudi Arabia has enough money to purchase many of the world’s most advanced weapons, but buying weapons is not the same as possessing a complete military power system. Riyadh needs industry, manpower, operational experience, command capabilities, and partners that can actually deploy force. Turkey and Pakistan provide precisely the capabilities Saudi Arabia lacks, while both countries need resources that Riyadh can supply.

Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military, decades of experience operating inside an integrated military alliance, and a rapidly developing defence industry capable of producing UAVs, missiles, warships, electronics, and a growing range of other systems. For Ankara, Mecca opens a major market for Turkish defence technology, access to Gulf capital, and another platform through which Turkey can expand its political role in the Middle East. Fidan has also made clear that Erdogan wants the alliance to expand beyond its original three members, indicating that Ankara does not see Mecca merely as another defence contract with Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan brings a different form of power. The Pakistan-Saudi military relationship has existed for decades. More importantly, Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority country with nuclear weapons. This does not mean the Mecca Alliance automatically creates a Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia and Turkey, because no such public commitment under the trilateral agreement has been confirmed. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s presence changes the long-term deterrence calculations of any potential adversary.

In return, Islamabad needs capital, energy, defence contracts, and political support from Riyadh. Pakistan can also use Mecca to reshape its international position. Instead of being viewed primarily through its rivalry with India, Islamabad gains an opportunity to become a security provider for the Arab world and the broader Middle East. That is an extremely valuable political asset, particularly for a country whose military power is considerably greater than its economic power.

The exchange can therefore be understood in simple terms: Saudi Arabia brings money, energy, and political status. Turkey brings defence technology, military power, and NATO experience. Pakistan brings armed forces, strategic depth, and the nuclear factor. This complementarity explains why three countries with different priorities can nevertheless build a common alliance. Yet the same formula creates the most difficult internal question Mecca faces: Which country possesses the capability the others cannot replace?

NATO provides a useful comparison. The United States does not dominate the alliance simply because it contributes more money. Washington also provides intelligence, logistics, command capabilities, defence industry, global deployment capacity, and enough military power to protect its allies in practice. Saudi Arabia currently possesses the financial portion of that formula but not the entire military component. If Riyadh finances the system while Turkey supplies an increasing share of the technology and Pakistan supplies an important share of the military strength, Saudi Arabia could remain the administrative center of Mecca without necessarily becoming its unquestioned center of power.

5. EGYPT, SYRIA, AND AN EXPANSION THAT COULD CHANGE THE BALANCE

The Mecca Alliance becomes much more significant when its possible expansion is considered. Erdogan has publicly called for additional countries to join, while Fidan has specifically mentioned Egypt as a potential member. In August 2026, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty confirmed that Cairo was studying Mecca “very seriously” but had to examine constitutional issues, legal obligations, and existing strategic relationships before making a decision.

Egypt would bring much more than a large military. Cairo controls the Suez Canal, sits between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, has an enormous Arab population, and occupies a historic position in Arab politics. If Egypt joins, Mecca will become much harder to portray as simply a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani triangle. One of the traditional centers of the Arab world would be inside the structure, strengthening Riyadh’s claim that it is building a regional system led by indigenous powers.

The same value explains Cairo’s caution. Egypt wants to preserve relations with the United States, Israel, the UAE, Greece, Cyprus, and India while retaining its role as a mediator in multiple regional crises. Cairo may also worry that a security structure financed by Riyadh and institutionally centered in Saudi Arabia would strengthen Saudi leadership of the Arab world at the expense of Egyptian autonomy. The process of recruiting members therefore already raises the same question that could later divide the alliance itself: Who leads the Arab world?

As of September 11, 2026, there has been no official confirmation that Egypt will join Mecca. Significantly, on September 7, 2026, Abdelatty called for the development of broader Arab security arrangements built on the Arab Joint Defence Treaty and existing Arab League mechanisms. This does not mean Cairo has rejected Mecca, but it suggests that Egypt still wants a collective-security path in which its own autonomy and regional role are not subordinated entirely to a structure created by Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad.

Syria matters for a completely different reason: Geography. On August 21, 2026, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani confirmed that Damascus was considering Mecca but had not made a final decision. He also stated that Israel had no right to determine which relationships or alliances Syria could build and emphasized that one of Syria’s immediate priorities was ending Israeli attacks on Syrian territory. As of September 11, 2026, Syria has not announced accession to the alliance.

If Syria joins, Mecca would immediately face a real-world test of what collective defence actually means. Israel and Syria are still engaged in U.S.-mediated security discussions, but Israel has continued to use military force inside Syria at the same time. Washington is already attempting to coordinate between Israel, Syria, and Turkey to prevent an unintended confrontation. If Damascus were placed under a collective-defence mechanism with Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad, every Israeli strike on Syria would have to be evaluated in an entirely different strategic context.

If Egypt and Syria both joined, the implications for Israel would become considerably larger. Egypt lies southwest of Israel, Syria lies to the north and northeast, Turkey is farther north, and Saudi Arabia lies to the southeast. Pakistan does not border Israel but brings substantial military power and the nuclear factor. This should not be described as a military encirclement that has already taken shape. The more important point is that Israel would have to calculate several additional layers of potential response before using force.

Bangladesh is also keeping the door open, but the status of the invitation requires correction. Reuters reported on August 25, 2026, that Dhaka was viewing possible participation positively. However, Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman on August 27, 2026, and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaed Islam on September 1, 2026, subsequently said that Bangladesh had not received a formal invitation. Dhaka’s current public position is that it would consider membership positively if invited, but that national interests would determine the final decision.

If Bangladesh joins, Mecca would extend much deeper into South Asia. Pakistan lies west of India and Bangladesh lies to the east. If both belonged to the same defence structure, New Delhi would inevitably incorporate Mecca into its security calculations even if the alliance had not been created to oppose India.

Iran is the most sensitive scenario. There have been reports that Tehran received an invitation, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry denied that it had received a formal membership invitation. Iran therefore cannot be treated as a country that has formally been invited to join.

A new signal nevertheless emerged on September 2, 2026. Iran’s ambassador to Bangladesh, Jalil Rahimi Jahanabadi, said Tehran had neither expressed interest nor applied to join, but that Iran would accept if the Mecca members offered it membership. This is not the same as a formal Iranian application or a decision by Iran’s senior leadership to seek membership, but it shows that Tehran does not publicly regard Mecca as an inherently hostile structure and is leaving the possibility of future participation open.

The U.S.-Iran conflict remained unresolved as of September 11, 2026. If Iran joined Mecca under such circumstances, a new American or Israeli attack on Iran could create consultation and assistance obligations for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Ankara would then simultaneously belong to NATO alongside the United States and to Mecca alongside Iran. Nothing in the existing arrangements allows us to conclude automatically that Turkey would fight the United States, but the political contradiction for NATO would be profound.

Expectations about the speed of enlargement also need to be updated. On September 2, 2026, Pakistan said it was not aware of any country having formally applied. By September 10, 2026, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson said there were currently no plans to expand the alliance. That does not necessarily close Mecca to new members in the long term. It suggests that the three founders are prioritizing consolidation and testing of the existing structure before adding additional states.

6. WHAT WILL MECCA DO TO AMERICAN INFLUENCE?

Trump’s reaction creates one of the greatest paradoxes surrounding the agreement. On August 16, 2026, the U.S. president publicly welcomed the Mecca Agreement, said he was pleased that the three countries had finally signed it, and described it as a major, bold, and important step because Middle Eastern countries would be better able to defend themselves. That reaction is entirely consistent with Trump’s longstanding position that allies and partners should spend more on their own defence rather than relying so heavily on American resources.

In the short term, Mecca could genuinely serve American interests. If Saudi Arabia becomes better able to defend itself, Turkey supplies more regional military capability, and Pakistan assumes a larger security role, the United States does not need to manage every crisis directly. Washington can reduce costs while maintaining relationships with all three founding members, each of which already has important links with the United States.

But the Houthi crisis in September 2026 demonstrates the current limits of that process. According to Axios, Mohammed bin Salman called Trump twice on September 10, 2026, and urged the United States to strike the Houthis as they advanced along the Red Sea coast. Trump declined, and U.S. officials said Washington currently had no plans to open a new direct military front against the Houthis. Reuters carried the report while noting that it had not independently verified the Axios account. CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper also travelled to Saudi Arabia for coordination. If the reported calls are confirmed, the episode is particularly significant: Less than two months after Mecca was signed and little more than a week after its permanent institutional structure was agreed, Riyadh still turned to Washington when confronted with a serious military crisis.

The problem arises if Mecca actually succeeds. A Saudi Arabia with its own air defence, defence industry, military partners, and security network would be less dependent on Washington’s protection. As dependency falls, American leverage also falls. The nuclear dispute illustrates the point particularly clearly. Trump can currently link American nuclear technology to normalization with Israel because U.S. technology remains extremely valuable to Riyadh. If Saudi Arabia eventually develops sufficiently credible alternatives, Washington’s ability to impose such conditions will weaken.

This is why strategists can view Mecca very differently from Trump. Mecca’s importance does not necessarily depend on Turkey and Pakistan being able to replace American military power completely. Its political importance lies in Riyadh’s search for alternatives because Saudi Arabia no longer assumes that the old system will always serve its interests.

The same development can therefore support two different interpretations. Trump sees burden-sharing, while strategists see the gradual erosion of America’s indispensability. Both processes can occur simultaneously. The United States saves resources when its partners become stronger, but those same stronger partners also become more capable of saying no to Washington.

The relationship between Mecca and the Abraham Accords should be viewed within this context. The Abraham Accords are a U.S.-supported process designed to integrate Israel more deeply into the regional system. Mecca creates a different kind of structure in which major Muslim powers can coordinate without the United States being a member and without Israel occupying the center. It is still too early to describe them as opposing blocs, but their strategic directions are clearly different.

Saudi Arabia stands between those two paths. If Riyadh normalizes relations with Israel, Washington and Jerusalem would achieve a major victory in strengthening the Abraham framework. If Saudi Arabia instead continues developing Mecca and later brings Egypt, Syria, or other countries into the structure, Riyadh will be building a center of power that neither the United States nor Israel directly controls. This is one reason Mohammed bin Salman’s decision will have consequences far beyond bilateral Saudi-Israeli relations.

For Israel, the long-term risk from Mecca does not necessarily come from direct war. Israel currently possesses the ability to use military force rapidly before other regional states can coordinate an effective response. If Mecca develops shared early warning, air defence, intelligence, logistics, and consultation mechanisms, an Israeli military action against one member would have to account for several countries instead of a single opponent. Simply increasing the cost of military action would already narrow Israel’s strategic freedom.

The United States and Israel therefore have multiple ways to respond. Washington can use security, economic, and technological incentives to keep Saudi Arabia close, accelerate the Abraham process, encourage Egypt to remain outside Mecca, or exploit disagreements among the members. Israel can deepen relationships with partners such as Greece, Cyprus, and India while continuing to limit Turkey’s military expansion in Syria.

Pressure, however, can produce the opposite effect. The more Israel uses force inside Syria, the more reason Damascus has to seek a security umbrella. The more Washington uses Saudi dependency to impose conditions connected to Israel, the more reason Riyadh has to build alternatives. An attempt to weaken Mecca could therefore unintentionally provide additional justification for making it stronger.

The Houthi crisis in September 2026 could even accelerate this process. If Riyadh concludes that Washington does not want to deal directly with the Houthis while Mecca is not yet capable of responding independently, Saudi Arabia will have even greater reason to develop the capabilities the alliance still lacks: Shared intelligence, air and missile defence, logistics, command structures, early warning, and deployable forces. In other words, failure in the first stress test would not necessarily weaken Mecca. It could show the three members exactly what they need to build next.

7. THE INTERNAL WEAKNESS: SAUDI ARABIA AND TURKEY BOTH WANT TO LEAD

An alliance can be built around common interests without its members sharing the same ultimate objectives. This is precisely the problem Mecca will have to manage. Pakistan prioritizes its rivalry with India. Turkey focuses heavily on Syria, Israel, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and NATO. Saudi Arabia concentrates on the Gulf, Yemen, the Red Sea, Iran, energy, and its leadership position in the Arab world. All three can agree that they need greater strategic autonomy without being equally willing to pay the cost of every conflict affecting another member.

The alliance’s first serious stress test is now much clearer. After the September 8, 2026, Houthi attacks, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned that unprovoked aggression or the spillover of the Yemen conflict into Saudi territory could activate the Mecca Agreement and that Pakistan was bound by its commitments. Yet on September 10, 2026, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said that no military response under the agreement was currently being discussed and that Islamabad would act when the time came.

The gap between those two statements matters. It does not mean Pakistan is abandoning its commitment. It shows that the principle that “an attack on one is an attack on all” still requires a political decision before it becomes military action. Mecca therefore resembles NATO in the principle of collective defence, but the precise response still depends on circumstances and political decisions by the member governments.

More difficult tests could emerge outside the Middle East. If Pakistan and India enter a major war, would Saudi Arabia be prepared to sacrifice valuable economic relations with New Delhi in order to stand fully behind Islamabad? If Turkey clashes with Israel in Syria, how far would Pakistan go in supporting Ankara? If Saudi Arabia continues to face Houthi attacks, would Turkey deploy forces to Yemen or limit itself to intelligence, equipment, and diplomatic assistance? The agreement can create obligations, but national interests will still determine how far those obligations are carried out.

Developments in Yemen have raised the level of that test. The Houthis have not only struck Saudi territory. On September 10, 2026, they also seized Mocha, strengthening their ability to pressure Bab el-Mandeb. Reuters cited Yemeni government, Iranian, and regional sources saying that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards provided military guidance and weapons to the Houthi offensive. Pakistan has meanwhile conveyed a warning to Iran to rein in the Houthis. Mecca is therefore simultaneously confronting an attack on a member, a proxy conflict, and a threat to a strategic maritime chokepoint, yet it has still not produced a collective military response.

The more important long-term contradiction lies between Riyadh and Ankara. The two countries currently complement each other extremely well. Saudi Arabia possesses capital needed by the Turkish economy and defence industry, while Ankara possesses military and technological capabilities Riyadh wants. But neither Mohammed bin Salman nor Erdogan appears interested in becoming a secondary player in the regional order.

Saudi Arabia wants to use economic power, religious status, and capital to become the center of the Arab world. Turkey wants to assert itself as a major power stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria to the Caucasus and the broader Islamic world. The two countries competed intensely in the years following the Arab Spring. Their presence together in Mecca reflects a period in which common interests are larger than their disagreements. It does not prove that the competition for leadership has disappeared.

The paradox is that the weaker Mecca remains, the less important this problem is. The more successful Mecca becomes, the more serious the leadership question becomes. If the alliance genuinely reduces American pressure, forces Israel to act more cautiously, and attracts additional members, Riyadh and Ankara will both possess more power worth competing over. At that point, the most important rival to Saudi Arabia’s leadership ambitions may not be outside Mecca at all.

Riyadh therefore has to do more than provide financing. Saudi Arabia needs its own defence industry, intelligence capabilities, logistics, command structures, and the ability to protect its partners. Otherwise, Turkey could become the military backbone of the alliance while Pakistan retains a form of strategic deterrence Saudi Arabia cannot independently provide.

The decision on August 31, 2026, to place the secretariat in Saudi Arabia while appointing a Pakistani as its first secretary-general for three years is also revealing. Riyadh is the institutional center of Mecca, but operational authority is already being distributed among the members. That may reduce competition during the alliance’s early phase, but it also underlines that Saudi Arabia has not created a simple structure in which Riyadh commands and the other members follow.

This is the difference between a financier and a leader. A financier can pay the costs required to keep a system functioning. A leader must possess capabilities that make the system unable to function in the same way without it. The United States achieved that position inside NATO. Saudi Arabia still has to prove it can convert financial power into a similar form of strategic authority within Mecca.

8. WHO WILL ULTIMATELY SHAPE THE MIDDLE EAST?

The Mecca Alliance is not yet an Islamic NATO, and it cannot yet accurately be described as an official anti-American or anti-Israeli alliance. Its military commitments remain only partially tested, its members have different interests, and its command structures are still being developed. But judging Mecca only by its current strength would miss the more important question: The direction in which it develops could reshape regional power relationships long before the alliance reaches NATO’s level of integration.

By early September 2026, however, Mecca had already progressed beyond the stage it occupied immediately after signing. The Strategic Political and Defence Committee had met. The establishment of a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia had been agreed. The initial leadership arrangement had been allocated, and the three states had committed themselves to joint defence, industrial, and technological development. What had not yet emerged was an integrated military command or a collective military response during a real crisis.

If the three members build regular exercises, interoperability, intelligence sharing, air defence, logistics, and joint defence production, Mecca will gradually become a more difficult structure to reverse. If Egypt joins, the alliance gains additional Arab political weight and strategic access around Suez. If Syria joins, Mecca reaches Israel’s immediate frontier. If Bangladesh joins, its influence extends deeper into South Asia. If Iran ever becomes a member, the relationship between Mecca, the United States, Israel, and NATO would move into an entirely different category.

At least in the short term, however, expansion is no longer the obvious next step. Pakistan said on September 10, 2026, that there were currently no plans to expand the alliance. The immediate test is therefore not how many states Mecca can recruit, but whether its three founding members can turn their collective-defence clause into practical capability.

International reactions also demonstrate that Mecca has not been isolated. Trump publicly welcomed the agreement on August 16, 2026. Several Muslim-majority states have responded positively to the idea that regional countries should assume greater responsibility for their own security. India is cautious because of Pakistan. Israel has to consider the implications of the alliance’s future development. Strategists are debating whether Mecca represents burden-sharing or the beginning of a more post-American regional order. These competing interpretations reflect the alliance’s unfinished character: The structure remains flexible enough that different actors still hope it can serve their own interests.

Saudi Arabia has the most to gain. If Riyadh succeeds, it could move from being an extremely wealthy country that still depends on an external great power for its ultimate security toward becoming a state capable of organizing capital, military power, and regional influence around its own interests. Mohammed bin Salman would then be doing more than reducing dependence on the United States. He would gain greater ability to force Washington to negotiate with Saudi Arabia as a center of power that possesses genuine alternatives.

But the Houthi crisis in September 2026 also demonstrates that Saudi Arabia has not yet reached that position. A founding member has been attacked. Pakistan has said the agreement could be activated, yet as of September 10, 2026, there had been no collective military response. At the same time, Axios reported that Mohammed bin Salman turned to Trump and asked the United States to strike the Houthis directly. If that report is confirmed, it is perhaps the clearest evidence yet of the gap between Mecca’s strategic ambition and its current capabilities.

Israel would also have to adapt to a different Middle East. For years, its military superiority has allowed it to manage different theatres largely as separate problems. A Syria operating inside a defence network with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, or an Egypt participating in the same structure, would make those calculations more complicated. Israel could still retain overwhelming military advantages, but military superiority would no longer necessarily translate into the same freedom to act without considering the response of a broader network.

For the United States, a successful Mecca contains both advantages and risks. Washington could reduce its burden if regional partners become better able to defend themselves, exactly as Trump wants. But a region more capable of organizing itself will also be harder to control. As Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, and other states increasingly try to construct an order around their own interests, Washington can no longer automatically assume that it will remain the final decision-maker in every regional security arrangement.

This is also why Mecca’s true purpose does not need to be hidden in some secret clause. The members may be completely sincere when they describe the agreement as defensive. A sufficiently strong defensive alliance can still have major political consequences: It helps members resist pressure, increases the cost of military action by adversaries, and creates strategic options that previously did not exist. If Mecca makes it easier for Saudi Arabia to refuse Washington and forces Israel to account for several countries before using military force, the regional balance of power has changed even without the alliance ever declaring itself “anti-American” or “anti-Israeli.”

The larger contest will therefore revolve around who gets to shape the future Middle East. The United States wants to preserve its position as the most influential external power. Israel wants to convert military superiority and normalization into an accepted central role in the region. Saudi Arabia wants to demonstrate that no Arab order can be designed without Riyadh. Turkey wants Ankara to possess similar influence. Pakistan wants to turn military power into influence beyond South Asia.

For now, those ambitions have found a common meeting point in Mecca because each country needs something the others possess. But if the alliance truly succeeds, that very success could open the next competition. Saudi Arabia can use money to assemble an alliance, but whether money is enough to ensure that Riyadh always sets the rules remains unanswered.

The developments of September 2026 do not change the central question of this analysis. They make it sharper. Mecca has demonstrated that its three members are serious about building institutions, but the Houthi stress test has simultaneously shown that a defence institution does not automatically produce a defence capability. Saudi Arabia now has an alliance, but Riyadh has not yet demonstrated that the alliance can act when Saudi Arabia itself is genuinely under attack.

That may ultimately be the defining test of the Mecca Alliance. If Mohammed bin Salman can transform financial power into military capability, institutional authority, and the ability to protect allies, Saudi Arabia will move closer to becoming a power that directly shapes the Middle East. Mecca will show whether Saudi Arabia can turn money into power, or whether it will ultimately end up financing the ambitions of Turkey and Pakistan.

From its name and signing location to its administrative structure, Saudi Arabia appears to occupy the central position. Riyadh wants not only to reduce its security dependence on the United States but also to become a power capable of shaping the Middle Eastern order.

Turkey needs capital, access to defense markets, and a greater regional role. Pakistan needs investment, energy support, defense contracts, and Saudi backing to expand its influence in the Arab world.

The Mecca Alliance will reveal whether Saudi Arabia can shape the alliance around its own interests or merely become the financier that enables Turkey and Pakistan to pursue their own ambitions.

However, being at the center on paper does not necessarily translate into having the greatest influence in practice. NATO operates by consensus, yet the United States remains its most influential member because Washington provides not only funding but also military power, command capabilities, and the ability to protect its allies.

Saudi Arabia has only half of that formula. Riyadh can provide financing, purchase weapons, and bring partners together. But if the alliance’s military capabilities remain largely in the hands of Turkey and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia may become the financier without necessarily setting the goals and rules.

Control Threat | The Political Signals Others Miss